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Abstract

This dissertation is a critical assessment of “biopoetics”:
a new literary theory that attempts to import ideas from
evolutionary science to the study of literature. Borrowing
from the field of evolutionary psychology, the
biopoeticists argue that some literary forms and themes are
particularly valuable because they result from our innate
and evolved cognitive structure; they also attempt to
create a normative aesthetic from the idea that evolution
is progressive. In its first half, this study examines the
claims of evolutionary psychology and their application by
the biopoeticists; in the second half, it examines the idea
that evolution is progressive, and considers the
implications this may have for literary theory. In its
conclusion, this work argues that biopoetics, conceived
from a dissatisfaction with other contemporary literary
theories--and in particular with such theories’
politicization of literature--is more dubious in its
assumptions and reasoning, and more programmatically
political, than the approaches that it seeks to replace.
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Introduction
A new methodology is gaining ground in literary studies--one
that challenges the politicization of literature and the
denigration of beauty that the dominant interpretive schools
have been preaching for years. This methodology aims at
finding the truth about literary works through an
understanding of science, and developing an aesthetics that
recognizes that beauty transcends politics.
Specifically, this new methodology calls for an
integration of literary studies with an understanding of
evolutionary science--particularly with the implications of
that science for human nature (humans have a pre-social
nature) and for an aesthetics that recognizes human nature.
Such a methodology also recognizes that contrary to a
fashionable pessimism, life, and the universe as a whole, is
inexorably evolving towards higher forms--and encourages an
aesthetics that celebrates as well as emulates such
evolutionary progress.
This methodology is proposed by the leaders of a
growing movement called “biopoetics.” Given its name by
Brett Cooke, the co-editor of an anthology of work within
this new paradigm, this movement consists of humanities
scholars working within what they call the “evolutionary
model”--a model that principally calls for making
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connections between the developing field of evolutionary
psychology (previously known as human sociobiology) and the
study of literature, but that also, for some of these
scholars, calls for a recognition of the supposedly
progressive nature of evolution. In the pages that follow, I
hope to provide a thorough explanation and critique of the
biopoeticists’ paradigm and of the scientific assumptions
behind it.
The biopoetics movement is small, but growing.
Humanities study in the academy, always troubled by the
necessity of proving its relevance, is particularly
vulnerable in lean times. In the current atmosphere in the
United States of shrinking budgets and departments, more
than ever there is a pressure to make work in the humanities
appear more systematic and scientific. Biopoetics (a
movement whose members are almost exclusively based in the
US) proposes that the systematic study of literature can
lead to objective knowledge--about texts and about human
nature. Surely such a view of the role of literary study
would be attractive to parents paying tuition and state
legislatures voting on funding.
Moreover, as evolutionary-psychological explanations
become more popular in the broader culture (explaining
everything from why men rape to why women earn less than
men) and as an increasingly economically stratified society
2

calls for more sophisticated ideologies to legitimate the
depredations of global capitalism, the opportunities for
growth of a critical theory and aesthetic that assumes that
gender differences are innate and preaches that “progress”
is the good, the true and the beautiful are tremendous.
The attempt to root aesthetics in human nature is
hardly a new one, but the modern movement to explain
presumably innate human behavioral tendencies as adaptive
responses to conditions in the ancestral environment can be
traced to the publication of E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology in
1975, which applied new theories from evolutionary biology-particularly the notion of “inclusive fitness”--to the study
of animal (including human) behavior. To understand the work
of the biopoeticists, we must understand the science upon
which it is based.
Human sociobiology (which was roundly criticized for
its political implications) has re-emerged in recent years
as “evolutionary psychology.” It is this field that the
biopoeticists embrace. The claims of evolutionary psychology
have been popularized in recent years by books with titles
like The Moral Animal and The Mating Mind. Although such
books claim to synthesize and popularize solid empirical
research, their approach is generally this: identify some
apparently universal human tendency, then speculate as to
what adaptive advantage such a trait might have held in the
3

ancestral environment. The classic example of this is the
fact that in virtually every culture, men are more
promiscuous than women. The evolutionary-psychological
explanation: the strategies for men and women to get the
most children into the next generation are radically
different. The best way for a man to guarantee many
offspring is to impregnate many women, while the best policy
for a woman, whose eggs (and possible time devoted to
pregnancy) are limited, is to find a mate to stick around
and help raise her offspring. Therefore we are all the
descendants of promiscuous men and nesting women, and share
their tendencies.
The critiques of evolutionary psychology are many, but
in the following pages I will focus on two: evolutionary
psychology (like the larger field of what Stephen Jay Gould
calls "Darwinian fundamentalism") assumes that every
inherited trait is adaptive, and it is too quick to identify
as innate human tendencies which can be more parsimoniously
explained as cultural products.
We must come to terms with such criticisms if we are to
evaluate the attempts of the biopoeticists to apply
evolutionary psychology to the study of literature. Such
attempts range from the speculations that innate tendencies
like male promiscuity and incest avoidance can be used to
gauge the "universality" of a work of literature's themes to
4

more grounded research (actually closer to cognitive science
than to evolutionary psychology) into the consequences for
artistic form of the limitations of human memory and pattern
recognition.
The success or failure of most of these attempts
depends to a great degree on the persuasiveness of the
evolutionary-psychological model, so I will spend a great
deal of time addressing specific critiques of evolutionary
psychology. Since much of the work of evolutionary
psychologists is avowedly speculative and cutting-edge (part
of Richard Lewontin’s critique is that evolutionary
psychology is so speculative as to not be science at all), I
will examine the definition of science, as well as consider
arguments as to whether highly speculative "science" with
possibly pernicious consequences should be practiced at all.
The criticisms of evolutionary psychology put its
status as a science into serious question. It has not,
however, been completely discredited, and it could in fact
grow into a more mature science. So we must consider this:
independent of the cogency of evolutionary-psychological
arguments, what are the consequences for criticism and
theory of the idea of evolved and innate human behavioral
tendencies? The biopoeticists seem to think that quite a lot
turns on this idea; I will argue that rather little does,
unless one embraces the idea (rejected by mainstream
5

evolutionary psychology) that "innate" means "good."
Biopoetics ultimately represents an attempt, rooted in
highly speculative science and elaborated in a desperate and
often vague way, to rescue aesthetics from politics. If
there is no innate sense of beauty, say the biopoeticists,
then beauty (and art) is whatever people say it is. Art
becomes ideology, as the biopoeticists' enemies--Marxists,
feminists, and the like--claim.
In addition to the idea that evolutionary psychology
can provide some insight into the nature of literature and
the value of individual works, some of the most prominent
biopoeticists attempt to derive an aesthetics from their
belief that evolution is progressive.
Despite Darwin's caveats, many persist in reading
"fittest" in “survival of the fittest” to mean something
like "absolute fitness"--that is, that organisms aren't just
"fit" in the sense of adapted to their environment, but show
some general increase in complexity or quality. (This
despite the fact that algae are the modal organism on the
planet.) The notion of evolution as progress, as a ladder
with man (so far) at the top has been used to underwrite a
number of political programs--among them the smarter
versions, such as Herbert Spencer's, of Social Darwinism-and it is seeing a resurgence as an ideological
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justification for the libertarianism of the new
technological overclass.
The biopoeticists subscribe to this notion of progress,
and explain such progress through appeals to controversial
findings from the field of complexity studies. From such
findings they assert not only that life and the cosmos are
evolving into “higher” forms, but that it should be so, and
that we should actively encourage or accelerate this
evolution. They also attempt to directly construct a theory
of beauty from complexity studies.
Frederick Turner, a prominent theorist of the
biopoetics movement (and co-editor of the Biopoetics
anthology), has written a book-length epic poem, Genesis,
about the terraforming (“making Earth-like”) of Mars. In
this work Turner presents an ethos of progress that he has
partially presented in nonfiction works: it is man's
obligation, as the most complex life form on earth, to
encourage the universe's tendency toward higher forms. One
important way of doing this is by bringing life to lifeless
planets like Mars. And the most effective way of doing this
is through unbridled capitalism.
As with evolutionary psychology, the ethic of evolution
as progress operates, through a dubious scientific claim and
an even more dubious application of that claim, to forestall
political debate. It will not, however, be my primary goal
7

in the following pages to evaluate the political
implications of the biopoeticist paradigm--although those
consequences will probably strike most readers as
pernicious.
Why, then, is this still-inchoate movement deserving of
such attention? Although membership in this movement is
still small, as I indicated earlier, this approach to
literature is poised to become very influential, both within
the academy and in popular culture. Lingua Franca has
published a cover story on evolutionary-psychological
approaches to the arts, and Reason magazine, the foremost US
journal of libertarian politics--and favorite reading, after
Wired magazine, of techno-elites everywhere--seems to have
adopted biopoetics as the official aesthetic theory of smart
libertarians.
Yet, as we shall see, many of the basic assumptions of
this approach are highly questionable, and the reasoning is
often shoddy. Because biopoetics is an emerging paradigm, we
might expect it to be somewhat internally incoherent, or for
there to be disagreements about empirical evidence
supporting its claims; more than this, though, biopoetics is
false to its own stated mandate: characterizing contemporary
theory as scientifically illiterate and poorly reasoned, the
biopoeticists embrace claims that most scientists (even
those whose theories they enlist to support their arguments)
8

reject, and their reasoning is poor by almost any academic
standard--but particularly feeble when compared to the rigor
of, for example, the work of Jacques Derrida, the
biopoeticists’ frequent target of condemnation.
Moreover, decrying the politicization of literature and
criticism by contemporary theory, the biopoeticists
ultimately argue for an aesthetics and critical theory that
is based more crudely on a political vision than the least
sophisticated feminist or Marxist criticism.
The rapidly growing field of biopoetics cries out for
criticism, then, not only because of its political
implications--and its status as a reflection of the dominant
ideology of the late-capitalist US--but because it is, to
put it simply, bad theorizing. Its claims to have discovered
the truth about literature are ludicrous; its criticism and
theorizing can be “interesting,” but interesting in the way
that a literary theory based on Aristotelian physics might
be, or the literary theory of Hippolyte Taine is. (In fact,
one biopoeticist, Joseph Carroll, highly praises Taine’s
work as a precursor to biopoetics, particularly his use of
“race”--the innate differences between peoples in body and
temperament--as an explanatory factor in his discussion of
literature. Most evolutionary biologists and psychologists,
on the other hand, believe that the category of race is a
useless explanatory concept.)
9

If all that one desires of one’s critical theory is
that it be interesting, rather than truth-seeking--and
assuming one finds this sort of “scientific” criticism
interesting--one might find biopoetics to be a fine critical
theory. For me, its questionable fundamental assumptions and
logical incoherence make biopoeticist work a failure even as
interesting fiction--I cannot suspend my disbelief.
Ultimately, this is why I believe biopoetics is
deserving of criticism. I prefer that my critical theory
both instruct and delight; biopoetics does neither. That
this sort of thing might become popular--that one might have
to reckon with this nonsense in writing, in class, or in
conversation--is a real possibility, one that I do not view
with pleasure.
Therefore the following: an attempt to take biopoetics
and its scientific assumptions seriously, an attempt to
salvage what is useful from its critical framework, an
attempt to challenge biopoetics on its own ground, dealing
fairly with its most cogent arguments and most persuasive
theorists.
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Part I: Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Theory
The Model
Darwin’s most important insight was suggested by Thomas
Malthus’s observation that the human population will always
grow at a faster rate than available resources: differential
reproduction. Animals will differ in the number of their
offspring that will survive into the next generation. Since
animals differ, however subtly, in a variety of ways (size,
hairiness, color), hereditary traits that enhance an
animal’s ability to survive to reproductive age and to
reproduce will tend to be preserved, while other traits will
not. This process, in which some members of a species
survive and reproduce, preserving their hereditary traits,
while others do not, Darwin called

“natural selection” or

(in a phrase borrowed from Herbert Spencer) “survival of the
fittest.”
This famous phrase is somewhat misleading, because
although it suggests movement towards some sort of “absolute”
fitness--that is, progress--Darwin always meant fitness
within an ecological niche. The phrase is actually a
tautology; fitness in fact for Darwin meant survival into the
next generation; the phrase could be translated as “survival
of that which survives” or “fitness of the fittest.”
However, despite the confusion it generates, the term
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persists, perhaps because it is so evocative of the constant
struggle that Darwin saw in nature.
Natural selection (to employ the more precise phrase),
operates thus: if a particular trait is advantageous--let us
say hairiness in cold climes--eventually those whose
ancestors were particularly hairy will come to completely
dominate. If the cold-climate whatevers are reproductively
isolated from the original population of whatevers,
eventually they will differ genetically so much from the
original population so much that they become their own
species (that is, they can only reproduce with one another).
Evolutionary psychologists (and before them
sociobiologists) apply this Darwinian logic to behavior.
The methodology works this way: some trait is observed
to be virtually universal, and then an explanation for this
behavior being genetically advantageous in the Environment
of Evolutionary Adaptation (also known as the “ancestral
environment”) is proposed. Simple enough, and not unlike the
methodology used by evolutionary biologists (but, we shall
see, fatally flawed).
The founding observations of evolutionary psychology
were made by geneticist A.J. Bateman, and were elaborated on
by biologists George Williams and Robert Trivers. Bateman’s
observation, made in 1948 (from studying fruit-flies) was
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that while females had the same number of offspring
regardless of how many males they mated with, males had more
offspring the more females they mated with. Such an
arrangement, Bateman observed, would encourage “an
undiscriminating eagerness in the males, and a
discriminating passivity in the females” (Qtd. in
Segerstrale 56).
George Williams, in his 1966 work Adaptation and
Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary
Thought, restated the subject of differing male and female
genetic interests as differing “sacrifices” necessary for
reproduction. The male’s “essential role may end with
copulation, which involves a negligible expenditure of
energy and materials on his part, and only a momentary lapse
of attention from matters of direct concern to his safety
and well-being” (183). Males benefit (that is, they get
their genes into the next generation most successfully) by
having “an aggressive and immediate willingness to mate with
as many females as may be available” (184).
For females, however, “copulation may mean a commitment
to a prolonged burden, in both the mechanical and
physiological sense, and its many attendant stresses and
dangers” (184). It is therefore in the interests of her
genes to reproduce only in particularly good circumstances--
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and one of those circumstances is a particularly fit
inseminating male. These differing needs and strategies lead
to courtship: males attempt to present themselves as highly
fit whether they are or not--and females show discrimination
(184).
Robin Trivers, with his 1972 paper “Parental Investment
and Sexual Selection,” replaced Williams’s language of
“sacrifice” with one of “investment.” “Sperm is cheap; eggs
are expensive” would soon come to be the mantra of
sociobiologists everywhere, the assumption being that
virtually all observable differences in behavior between
males and females are rooted in reproductive “strategies”
resulting from this biological difference.
It was these observations, and their consequences, that
E.O. Wilson popularized in his books Sociobiology (1975) and
On Human Nature (1978). These works, although proposing few
new ideas, were an extraordinarily thorough synthesis that
influenced research in a number of fields, as well as
provoking a formidable backlash. Wilson's primary
contribution in this work was to apply ideas from
evolutionary biology--particularly the notions of

"kin

selection" and "inclusive fitness" (the notion that the
gene, rather than the individual or the group, is the
primary unit of selection, and that, therefore, traits
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unfavorable to the individual can persist into the next
generation if the survival of close relatives is enhanced-in the world of behavior we call such traits "altruistic")
to animal behavior. While Wilson's speculations about the
evolution of altruistic behavior among ants were well
considered and persuasive to many (Wilson was, and still is,
a renowned naturalist and entomologist), his final chapter,
on human behavior, was not quite so readily accepted.
“Kin selection” and “inclusive fitness” are terms
introduced by biologist William Hamilton in the early 1960s,
and they are at the center of the new “selfish gene” model
embraced by Wilson and Richard Dawkins (in his famous
popularization, The Selfish Gene). What Hamilton proposed
was that the most important unit of selection for natural
selection to operate on was the gene, rather than the
individual organism (as Darwin argued) or on the group or
species as a whole (as some people were beginning to argue
before the notion of gene selection was introduced, but
which was never well explained as a mechanism). Hamilton’s
elegant theory, introduced to explain “selfless” or
altruistic behavior among some animals, was that if certain
behaviors contributed to the well-being and reproductive
success of one’s kin (that is, those who share a great deal
of one’s genes), then it is sometimes beneficial to the
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organism to engage in behaviors that might seem “selfless”
but in fact serve to get one’s genes into the next
generation.
Biologist J.B.S. Haldane is said to have lampooned this
kind of logic by remarking that he would never give his life
for his brother, but would give it for “two brothers or
eight cousins” (Segerstrale 63), but it does seem to explain
some sorts of animal behavior--in particular, the behavior
of ants and bees, the selflessness of which was a question
that Darwin himself was unable to solve. Hamilton’s theory
predicts that the higher the degree of relatedness between
organisms, the more selfless behavior will be observed. Ants
and bees do all sorts of things that are completely selfless
from the organism’s viewpoint.
Despite devastating critiques by scientists such
Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin and philosophers such
as Philip Kitcher, as well as general disapproval from the
left of the political consequences of sociobiological
speculation about innate human tendencies, human
sociobiological research continued, to emerge in recent
years as "evolutionary psychology."
The scientific and political critiques were often
intertwined, but (as we shall see in the next section) not
always: Wilson was accused of racism despite the fact that he
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approvingly cited data and conclusions from Lewontin
indicating that "race" was not a useful explanatory concept
in biology. Wilson was less often accused of sexism, despite
the fact that his strongest conclusions touched on innate
gender differences in behavior.
In a nice bit of sleight-of-hand, the evolutionary
psychologists distinguish themselves from the sociobiologists
by claiming that while the sociobiologists identified innate
tendencies and said they were therefore good, evolutionary
psychology allows that traits that might have been adaptive
in the ancestral environment may no longer be useful. While
some figures in sociobiology might have made the former
claim, such was surely not the claim of Wilson and the other
principal figures in sociobiology. The evolutionary
psychologists have focused on an at most marginal tenet of
sociobiology as its major flaw, making their own field, which
is identical to human sociobiology in nearly every respect,
seem corrected.
This debate aside, what are the implications of the
ideas of inclusive fitness and evolved psychological
“traits” as applied to human beings, in either sociobiology
or evolutionary psychology?

As we shall see, many

evolutionary-psychological explanations are origin stories
explaining well-documented phenomena from cognitive science-
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-such as why humans are better at remembering faces than
remembering names. The more revolutionary work of
evolutionary psychology is in its arguments about the
innateness and evolutionary origin of more complicated
behaviors. One of the first, and now one of the most
central, “findings” of evolutionary psychology was in the
area of sex and gender.
As Wright sums up the argument in The Moral Animal, if
we merely accept that natural selection implies a fitness
benefit from relative choosiness in women, that such
choosiness is virtually culturally universal, and that
cultural theories cannot explain these differences as
parsimoniously, we must accept that gender differences (at
least in regard to mating behavior) are at least partially
innate (46-48).
This theory, probably the most uncontroversial (within the
field; it’s certainly politically explosive) and most touted of
evolutionary psychology’s “findings,” obviously has profound
social implications, some of them quite disturbing. For example,
in their 2000 book A Natural History of Rape: The Bases of Sexual
Coercion, evolutionary psychologists Craig Palmer and Randy
Thornhill argue that the phenomenon of rape is a direct
consequence of these differential reproductive strategies: men
may be predisposed to rape because if they are facing complete
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reproductive failure, or simply because of their predisposition
to want to have intercourse with as wide a variety of women as
possible.
Because of men’s predisposition to rape, Palmer and
Thornhill argue, they should be educated about this natural
rape drive, the better to suppress it. Such an education,
they suggest, might be a requirement for a young man’s
receiving his driver’s license (179). The program would
include instruction in the evolutionary causes of men’s
arousal at the mere image of a woman, as well as
explanations of why men might be led to demand sex even when
women don’t want it, and frequently misinterpret gestures or
clothing as sexual overtures (179).
Of course, this program would emphasize that despite
the fact that men have an evolved tendency to rape, this
natural impulse is no excuse for rape, and that if they
comprehend and resist these impulses, they may be able to
avoid committing rape (179).
Women too, should receive an education that addresses,
in addition to how apparent youth is the most significant
risk factor for rape, how health, symmetry, and hormone
markers such as waist size, in addition to clothing and
makeup that enhance apparent fertility, all contribute to
the risk of rape. Not that women should be urged to look ill
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and infertile--they must simply be aware of the risks
involved in not looking this way (182).
Such arguments are easily lampooned, but Thornhill and
Palmer’s “diagnosis” of rape is exemplary of evolutionarypsychological methodology. Although there was a brief media
firestorm over the book when it was first published, most of
the criticism of the book revolved around its distasteful
political implications, not around its science.
In fact, some of the foremost proponents of
evolutionary psychology lined up to praise the book: Steven
Pinker, perhaps the best-known and most-respected of the
academic popularizers said in his blurb for the book jacket,
“This is a courageous, intelligent, and eye-opening book
with a noble goal--to understand and eliminate a loathsome
crime. Armed with logic and copious data, A Natural History
of Rape will force many intellectuals to decide which they
value more: established dogma and ideology, or the welfare
of real women in the real world.” John Tooby and Leda
Cosmides, editors of The Adapted Mind, one of the founding
documents of evolutionary psychology, also defended
Thornhill and Palmer’s science, in a letter to The New
Republic.
Thornhill himself was already an eminent authority in
evolutionary psychology, the co-author of a well-known
study--“Human Facial Attractiveness and Sexual Selection:
20

The Role of Symmetry and Averageness” (1994)--arguing that
we have evolved to find facial symmetry attractive because
in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness it was
adaptive to do so. He argues that there is a transcultural
standard of beauty based on this preference. This idea has
been popularized in such books as Nancy Etcoff’s Survival of
the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty (2000).
Critics on Jenny Jones and in the pages of Time and
Newsweek (both of which have run cover stories on
evolutionary-psychological “proof” of innate psychological
differences between men and women), by implicitly accepting
the evolutionary psychology paradigm, allowed Thornhill and
Palmer to take the scientific high ground, their position
essentially being, “We don’t like this any more than you do,
but these are the facts. Given those facts, here’s what we
think should be done.”
To halfhearted challenges like, “If rape is about
reproduction, then why are so many men, children, and women
obviously past reproductive age so frequently the victims of
rape?” Thornhill and Palmer could respond, from the evershifting ground of adaptive explanation, that the mental
module was about forced sex, not about discrimination among
candidates for rape on the basis of suitability.
The debate over The Natural History of rape presented
an excellent opportunity for a public discussion of the
21

methodology of evolutionary psychology, the insights of
which have enlivened the discourse of both cocktail party
bores and (as we shall see) literary critics. Such a
discussion failed to emerge.
This episode is instructive not because it tars the
entire enterprise of evolutionary psychology, but because it
illustrates how far the evolutionary-psychological model has
colonized the popular consciousness--the arguments about the
science were fought almost exclusively in orthodox
evolutionary-psychological terms--and also how quickly
evolutionary-psychological explanations, even if true, can
be used to make very questionable assertions about the role
of mental “organs” in a world full of more proximate causes
of emotions and behaviors.
The incident is also noteworthy because the assertions
made by Thornhill and Palmer were so uncontroversial within
the field. If one wished to emphasize the loathsome uses to
which evolutionary psychology can be put, one would do
better to emphasize the work of Kevin Macdonald, professor
of evolutionary psychology at California State University at
Long Beach and witness for the defense at the trial in
Britain of Holocaust Revisionist David Irving. Macdonald’s
thesis about the Jews, set forth in a trio of works--A
People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group
Evolutionary Strategy; Separation and Discontents: Toward an
22

Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism; and The Culture of
Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in
Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements--is
that Judaism is basically a group evolutionary strategy to
maximize intelligence. Macdonald, while not a holocaust
denier himself, sees anti-Semitism, and even Nazism, as the
inevitable response to this eugenics program (Shulevitz 1).
Far from a fringe figure, Macdonald was, at the time of the
trial, a prominent member of the Human Behavior and
Evolution Society (the professional society to which most of
the most prominent evolutionary psychologists in the United
States belong), serving as archivist, secretary, editor of
the newsletter, and member of the executive board (Shulevitz
2).
Despite the increasing appearance of such easy targets,
it will not be primarily my project in the following pages
to evaluate directly the political or social consequences of
the arguments of evolutionary psychology. For reasons that I
hope will become clear in the following section, I believe
that challenging “scientific” findings because of their
political consequences is not only “wrong” in the sense of
“mistaken by contemporary canons of science,” but is
ultimately a rhetorically weak strategy.
It will, rather, be my project in the following pages
to evaluate the epistemological status of the evolutionary23

psychological enterprise, and to consider, regardless of the
disagreements among scientists about the goals and
accomplishments of that enterprise, the consequences of this
fledgling science for the field of literary criticism and
theory.
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The Critique

Although evolutionary-psychological speculation may
sound plausible, critics of sociobiology and evolutionary
psychology maintain that this is the essence of their
critique: evolutionary psychological explanations are
plausible, but not particularly scientific. The critiques of
evolutionary psychology are many, but perhaps the most
elegant and complete critique was made by philosopher Philip
Kitcher, in his 1985 book Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology
and the Quest for Human Nature.
Kitcher begins his critique with two fundamental
distinctions: between “broad” and “narrow” sociobiology and
between narrow sociobiology and “pop” sociobiology. Broad
sociobiology, in Kitcher’s view, is the study of the
biological basis of social behavior--encompassing such
issues as the mechanisms, development, genetics, and
function of social behavior--a program to which few
reasonable people would object (114-115).
Narrow sociobiology, on the other hand, focuses
exclusively on evolutionary questions: how did the behavior
evolve, and why does it persist? How, in particular, do
traits such as altruism, which would seem to reduce
individual fitness, evolve? (115)
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It is the insistence of evolutionary theory on assuming
adaptive explanations for every aspect of an organism--and
the importation of this methodology to sociobiology, in
which all behaviors are assumed to be adaptive (which leads
to the creation of pseudo-problems such as the “problem” of
altruism)--to which evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay
Gould most object. Kitcher, however, has a more specific
target: “pop” sociobiology.
Pop sociobiology, as Kitcher defines it, is the
application of ideas about the evolution of animal behavior
to the construction of theories--often quite sweeping--about
human behavior and politics; such theories are most
frequently addressed to a popular audience rather than to
the scientific community.
But pop sociobiology, in Kitcher’s view, is practiced
not only by journalistic popularizers, but also by
scientists like E.O. Wilson, who may make real and
compelling discoveries yet also advance grandiose and poorly
grounded claims.
Although many writers have made cogent critiques of
sociobiology (most notably Stephen Jay Gould and Richard
Lewontin), Kitcher describes, perhaps more clearly than
anyone, the logical structure of sociobiological argument.
Pop sociobiology, argues Kitcher, relies on a chain of
invalid inference that he calls "Wilson's ladder." Wilson’s
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ladder has four "rungs": first, it assumes that all members
of a certain group would maximize their fitness in their
typical environments by exhibiting a specific behavior;
second, when we find a certain behavior in virtually all
members of a certain group, we can conclude that this
behavior became prevalent and remains so through natural
selection (specifically by increasing fitness); third, since
selection acts upon genetic differences, we can conclude
that there are genetic differences between the current group
and their ancestors who failed to reproduce; fourth, it will
be difficult to modify the behavior by altering the social
environment, because the behavior is either impossible to
eliminate or impossible to eliminate without giving up other
important goals (127).
Most of the critiques of sociobiology can be understood
as attacks on one or more of these rungs--so the ladder
provides a fine framework for organizing these critiques.
For Stephen Jay Gould, the leap from the first rung to
the second is the crucial flaw of sociobiology--it is an
unabashed endorsement of what is known as the
"adaptationist" program, which Gould argues has a logical
flaw at its center: the confusion of historical origin and
current utility.
Much of Gould's career has been an attack on the
adaptationist program--which he has recently dubbed
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"Darwinian fundamentalism" (“Fundamentalism”). One of
Gould's most famous discussions of the topic, and one in
which he and his co-author Richard Lewontin introduced a
rather arcane term into common usage, is contained in an
address that he delivered to the Royal Society in 1978. "The
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme." The arguments made
here are central to a serious critique of sociobiology and
evolutionary psychology. The adaptationist program is still
the dogma of many evolutionary thinkers, and it is
superficially quite convincing; it would therefore be
appropriate to discuss in some detail the still somewhat
controversial critique of this program.
In the “spandrels” paper, Gould and Lewontin object to
the adaptationist program because of its faith that natural
selection always optimizes. The adaptationist program works
by breaking down the organism into unitary “traits” and
imagining an adaptive story for each one. Even traits
thought to be non-optimal are assumed to be the result of
trade-offs with other optimized traits. Gould and Lewontin
believe that the evolution of organisms can be more
scientifically explained by considering organisms as
integrated wholes, and by considering constraints placed on
natural selection by lineages, developmental pathways, and
general architecture. They fault the adaptationist program
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for failing to consider the distinction between origin and
current utility; for refusing to consider alternatives to
adaptive stories; for accepting adaptive stories on the
basis of mere plausibility; for failure to consider other
causes of evolutionary change, such as random fixation of
alleles, production of non-adaptive structures by
developmental correlation with selected features; for not
separating adaptation and selection; for not considering the
possibility of multiple adaptive peaks; and for not
considering current utility as an epiphenomenon of nonadaptive structures.
It is sociobiology's failure to consider alternatives
to adaptive explanations to which Gould and Lewontin object;
to give a simple example: suppose Wilson is right, and there
are significant and nearly universal differences between
male and female human behavior (of course there is great
reason to suppose the measurable differences are far less
than he supposes). Let us additionally suppose that such
differences are proven to be completely hereditary. Gould
could still object that the existence of such traits does
not automatically imply adaptation: they could be a relic of
our hominid ancestors, who were much more sexually dimorphic
(as measurable by size) than we.
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Gould and Lewontin in fact propose several alternatives
to immediate adaptation for the explanation of form,
function, and behavior.
There is, for example, the possibility of change
occurring absent any adaptation or selection at all. This
can occur due to genetic drift or population bottlenecks.
Genetic drift occurs like this: say we have five green and
five red lizards. Five of them are killed by accidents--a
tree falling, a flood, whatever. If all of the green ones
happen to be killed, the only ones left would be red,
meaning a change in the gene pool. Evolution has occurred,
despite the fact that there is no advantage in having red
skin and there was no selection. All of the deaths are
random. If this occurred in the rain forest, it would have
occurred even if there were natural selection for green skin
because of its utility for hiding from predators.
A population bottleneck (a special case of genetic
drift) occurs when there is a reduction in the size of the
population--and therefore in the gene pool of the
population--and then a return to the original population
size.
Particular parts of organism may also evolve despite an
absence of adaptation or selection because they are
correlated with selection of some other trait. For example,
considering our red and green lizards again, let us suppose
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that the gene which gives our lizards green skin also gives
them immunity from a certain virus. If the virus is
introduced into their environment, the red lizards might all
die, while the green ones are unaffected. There would only
be green lizards left, but not because they are green. They
would remain because being green is associated with another
trait that does confer selective advantage.
Another way in which a trait might evolve is that it
might vary in a direct way with another trait (this is
called allometry). Let us say body size and metabolism are
related allometrically. In our lizards’ environment, there
is a selective advantage to being large. The lizards become
larger over several generations; their metabolic rate
increases, too, although there was no selection for an
increased metabolic rate.
Sometimes, there can be a decoupling of adaptation and
selection. Lewontin gives an example of one form of this-selection without adaptation--in another essay: a mutation
that doubles the fecundity of individuals will sweep through
a population. If there is no increase in available
resources, members of the population will lay more eggs (for
example), but the excess births will die off because of
resource limitations. The individuals are no better adapted
than before--in fact, if a predator prays on immature
members of the population, population size may actually
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decrease. Yet selection will always favor those individuals
with higher birth rates (7).
Adaptation can also occur in the absence of selection.
Imagine for a moment that our lizards’ skin color is
determined not by genetics, but by diet. If we put our
differently colored lizards (from different environments) in
a rain forest, there will be heavier predation on the red
lizards. But the diet here turns all the lizards green. As
the red lizards eat the new diet, they turn green. We are
left with an entirely green population. The green lizards
are adapted to the green environment, but not because of
selective forces.
Finally, sometimes adaptation and selection occur, but
the adaptation is a secondary use of available parts. Gould
and Lewontin explain this idea in their discussion the
Tyrannosaurus’s forelegs. Although the Tyrannosaur no doubt
used them for something, it would be foolish to seek an
immediate adaptive explanation for them, argue Gould and
Lewontin, when they are the reduced product of functional
limbs in the Tyrannosaur’s ancestors. The size of the
Tyrannosaur’s limbs is likely to be the result of a fixed
allometric relationship between increases in head and limb
size. As there are well-known rules for relationships
between parts of animals at different sizes (both within and
among species), Gould and Lewontin claim that such
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explanations are much more testable than adaptive
explanations.
As these proposed alternatives to optimization through
selection and adaptation suggest, Gould's argument with the
Darwinian Fundamentalists can be summed up rather easily:
they are not historical enough. In concentrating on
adaptedness, they ignore historical contingency and the
constraints that such contingency puts on the supply of
variation on which natural selection can work.
This emphasis on historical contingency can be seen in
what is probably Gould's most famous and most profound
contribution to paleontology and evolutionary biology: the
theory of "punctuated equilibrium." Introduced in a paper
written with Niles Eldredge in 1977, this theory was
proposed to explain a puzzle in paleontology: the dearth of
intermediate forms in the fossil record. What the record
seems to show, instead of the gradual transformation of
species that the dominant interpretation of the theory of
natural selection would suggest, most species appearing
suddenly and changing little in form during their existence.
What Gould and Eldredge argued was that this dearth was
not an artifact of the incomplete fossil record, but that it
reflected reality: species do emerge in a geological
instant, remain basically stable throughout their lifetimes,
and then disappear. But how can there be such long-term
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stability in the face of selective pressure? And if such
stability is the norm, how does speciation occur at all?
Species remain static for long periods of time for two
primary reasons. First, absent very intense selective
pressure, even the most adaptive trait will be swamped by
genetic drift.
Second, even when there are phenotypic changes in
lineages from one generation to the next, such changes
typically do not accumulate. They "wobble" around a
phenotypic mean. Jonathan Weiner describes this process in
his book The Beak of the Finch:
In wet years, there is selection for slender beaks
that enable finches to eat small soft seeds. In
dry years, there is selection for more robust
beaks. These are suited for cracking the larger
harder seeds available in droughts. Wet years are
interleaved with dry ones, so there is no longterm directional selection. The mean size and
shape of the finch beak wobbles to and fro. If
this fluctuating environment persists over the
long term, finch species will be in stasis, as
Gould and Eldredge define it. There will be no
long-term shift in finch phenotypes. (76)
So how does speciation ever occur? There are many
theories, but occasional Gould co-author Elizabeth Vrba has
argued that rare catastrophes (in human terms; in geological
time they are relatively frequent) can cause a "turn-over
pulse," in which those species that do not become extinct
are fragmented. In these fully isolated populations, changes
can accumulate, rather than being dissipated in a large
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population. And each population, which could survive its
sister populations by mere chance, is already genetically
sampled, leading to phenotypic changes that have nothing to
do with fitness (Sterelny 102).
This touches on an issue that Gould frequently raises
in his emphasis on historical contingency: mass extinctions.
The sudden death of the dinosaurs (again, sudden in this
context could mean tens of thousands of years) is perhaps
the best-known example of this. In a geological instant the
dinosaurs, which had ruled the earth for tens of millions of
years, suddenly went extinct. It is now generally (although
not universally) believed by the scientific community that
this event was caused by a massive asteroid strike. It is
universally accepted that such a strike did occur at roughly
the time of the dinosaur extinction; what the Alvarez
hypothesis proposes was that this asteroid impact triggered
the Cretaceous extinction, probably by kicking up debris
that caused a "nuclear winter" effect, during which most
cold-blooded animals could not survive.
This event is important because without it, the only
mammals in existence would be the sort of tiny creatures
that spent their lives hiding and fleeing from the much more
successful dinosaurs. The entire biological history of the
world would be different. As Gould has often noted, if we
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were to "play back the tape of history," there would be no
reason to expect that creatures anything like us would
exist.
By asserting the importance of contingency, Gould is not
denying causality; in fact, quite the opposite--he is
defending it. If we were really to rewind history and start
again, everything would occur exactly as it has. What he
means is simply that things would have been different had it
not been for all the contingent events (like asteroid
impacts) that have occurred. One could not have predicted the
emergence of larger mammals, and eventually man, because of
the greater fitness of mammals; mammals "won" because an
entire ecosystem was desolated--because of "chance.”
Mammalian success was not preordained.
And the Cretaceous extinction is hardly a singular
event. There have been several sudden mass extinctions in
the history of life on earth; at the end of the Permian,
over 90% of the animal life on earth became extinct. Some of
these extinctions were possibly because of asteroid impacts
(many paleontologists now believe that virtually every one
of the great extinctions was caused by such a cosmic event);
they were almost certainly because of massive geological or
climatic change.
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One might ask at this point whether we could not
consider the ability to survive such catastrophes a kind of
fitness. We could, but as Gould has pointed out in many
discussions of the "unit of selection debate" (Dawkins and
others, on one side, argue that genes and "gene complexes"
are the primary--perhaps sole--unit of selection, while Gould
and company, on the other, argue that selection operates
primarily on individuals [phenotypes] rather than on genes,
with some selection also operating on the species, and
perhaps even group [although this is more controversial]
levels) and in the "evolvability" of different species,
"species selection" operates on different traits from those
on which individual-level selection works. Species may be
particularly viable (or evolvable). Species with a great deal
of genetic variability may be more resilient in the face of
catastrophic change than others; so may those with broad
geographic ranges. But these are characteristics of the
species as a whole, and may have little or nothing to do with
the adaptedness of an individual organism to a given
environment.
While these are powerful arguments that evolution does
not operate (at least not exclusively) by the accumulation
of tiny changes over time, Gould's most persuasive arguments
about the role of chance in the evolution of form are seen
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in his discussions of the "Cambrian Explosion" and the
"Burgess Shale."
It is now generally agreed that most of the major
animal groups emerged in a relatively short time during the
Cambrian Age, about 530 million years ago. In the Cambrian,
"we find segmented worms, velvet worms, starfish and their
allies, mollusks (snails, squid, and their relatives),
sponges, bivalves and other shelled animals appearing all at
once, with their basic organization, organ systems, and
sensory mechanism already operational" (Sterelny 90).
Since then there has been development within phyla, but
no major deviation from the forms that emerged in a
geological moment. This in itself is a strong argument for
the sudden emergence of species generally, but the Cambrian
holds a more important lesson for us.
The Burgess Shale Fauna, found in a quarry in British
Columbia, were an important discovery because these fossils,
dating from the Cambrian, preserved not just records of hard
structures such as shell and bone, but soft structures as
well. And these records revealed the existence of animal
forms we never knew existed.
Gould points out, in his book Wonderful Life: The
Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, that with a single
exception, all of the living phyla (the major subdivisions
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of animal life) are found in the Cambrian. But the Burgess
Shale reveals the existence of animal forms as disparate
from each other and from existing phyla as existing phyla
are from one another; basically, there were many more phyla
in existence in the Cambrian than there are now.
Why is this important? Gould argues that despite the
consensus view, and despite the fact that there are many
more species in existence than there were in the Cambrian,
the idea that there has been a steady increase in diversity
(basic forms adapting to specific habitats) is mistaken--or
at least misleading. There has in fact been a reduction in
the disparity of forms that animal life takes.
This is important, because if a great number of
possible forms did emerge and then disappear
catastrophically (the Burgess Shale Fauna, familiar and
unfamiliar, disappeared very quickly), and if the existing
forms seem inherently conservative (that is, showing very
little change over time), then many--perhaps even most--of
an animal’s traits would be better explained as the product
of a specific lineage than as an adaptation to a local
environment.
Gould provides a simple example of this in his chapter
"Male Nipples and Clitoral Ripples" in Bully For
Brontosaurus. One of the questions that he is most
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frequently asked, often by puzzled librarians trying to find
out for a patron, is "why do women have two breasts rather
than one?" After all, most women only have one baby at a
time--is not the extra breast unnecessary, and a metabolic
waste? After considering mathematical models that have been
proposed to try to make adaptive sense out of this puzzle by
weighing the drag of an unnecessary breast against the
possibility of malnourishing the rare twin, Gould points out
the obvious: women have breasts because of bilateral
symmetry, a pattern that was set far back in our lineage.
The real emphasis in this essay is not on phyletic
constraints, but on a couple of examples of developmental
constraints, another important challenge to unbridled
adaptation. "Male nipples" prove to be another puzzle to
those who believe in pervasive utility for all parts of all
creatures. Adaptationist explanations of male nipples invoke
past utility; the most persuasive of these is the not-veryconvincing theory that men in primitive societies used to
nurse babies. In fact, to simplify a fairly detailed
discussion of embryonic development, men have nipples because
women do, "and the embryonic pathway to their development
builds precursors in all mammalian fetuses, enlarging the
breasts later in females but leaving them small (and without
evident function) in males" (127). The same logic explains
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the existence of the clitoris, the position of which makes
orgasm from intercourse difficult for virtually half of all
women. This argument is somewhat more controversial, because
male nipples seem transparently without function while the
clitoris may have been co-opted for adaptive functions such
as "cementing pair bonds" (a typical sociobiological
explanation). (This co-optation of a previous existing
structure for another purpose is "exaptation" in Gould's
terminology; his most famous example is the panda's thumb,
which is not a thumb at all, but an extension of a bone in
the wrist that has come to function as a thumb).
Incidentally, this theory would seem to present
evidence, were any needed, contradicting the assertion made
by Daniel Dennett and others that Gould's science takes a
back seat to his progressive politics: his non-adaptive
explanation of the clitoris has angered some feminist
biologists, traditionally his allies. (Although it should be
noted that he believes that the non-adaptive explanation is
the more progressive one; he provides a fairly convincing
argument that the presumption of the utility of the clitoris
[and the female orgasm] has caused women immense suffering.)
As Gould and Eldredge point out in the "Spandrels"
essay, phyletic constraints explain not only why our bodies
are not optimally designed for upright posture (for example,
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women have much more difficulty than most other animals in
giving birth because our hips became narrower when we
deviated from our quadrapedal ground plan), but also why "no
mollusks fly in air and no insects are as large as
elephants" (194).
There has recently been even more evidence to support
non-adaptive explanations in the evolution of form and
function--from demonstrations of neutral, nonadaptive
changes in the evolution of nucleotides (Gould, “More
Things” 106) to studies of the conservation of basic
pathways of development, which support the view of evolution
as being as much about constraints as it is about selection
leading to perfect adaptation: "The major developmental
pathway for eyes is conserved and mediated by the same gene
in squids, flies, and vertebrates", while "the same genes
regulate the formation of top and bottom surfaces in
insects" but with the order inverted because our backs are
anatomically equivalent to

insects' bellies (“More Things”

106).
As Gould sums up the limitations of the adaptationist
program in an article in the New York Review of Books:
Yes, eyes are for seeing and feet are for moving.
And, yes again, I know of no scientific mechanism
other than natural selection with the proven power
to build structures of such eminently workable
design. . . . But does all the rest of evolution-42

all the phenomena of organic diversity,
embryological architecture and genetic structure,
for example--flow by simple extrapolation from
selection's power to create the good design of
organisms? Does the force that makes a functional
eye also explain why the world houses more than
500,000 species of beetles and fewer than fifty
species of priapulid worms? Or why most
nucleotides in multicellular creatures do not code
for any enzyme or protein involved in the
construction of an organism? Or why ruling
dinosaurs died and subordinate mammals survived to
flourish and, along one oddly contingent pathway,
to evolve a creature capable of building cities
and understanding natural selection? (36)
It appears clear that there is much more to evolution
than adaptation; but how is this relevant to the debate over
evolutionary psychology? The problem is that evolutionary
psychology is adaptationist to its core. As we saw in the
last section, the field is full of what Gould and Lewontin
have dubbed "just-so" stories: speculative stories about how
a particular trait developed to serve a particular purpose.
If this is a problem in evolutionary biology, where more
plausible and economical explanations are often rejected in
favor of adaptive stories, it is a disaster for evolutionary
psychology.
First of all, isolating traits is a problem. Gould and
Lewontin discuss in their "Spandrels" essay the problems
generated when we consider, for example, the chin as an
isolatable "trait" rather than as the interaction between
two growth fields; in evolutionary psychology we are faced
not only with the problem of distinguishing selected traits
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from such artifacts, but with the problem of identifying
whether they exist at all. The chin, whatever its origin,
undeniably exists; whether a "mate ejection module" exists
at all is rather questionable.
Moreover, evolutionary psychology's primary
methodological advantage over sociobiology--the concession
that some traits might not be adaptive now, but were in the
ancestral environment1--makes its claims even more
speculative and less testable than explanations that appeal
to known environments. No one really knows how humans and
proto-humans lived hundreds of thousands of years ago; to
appeal to descriptions of how a particular cognitive
disposition might have been advantageous if the ancestral
environment had been so is not methodologically sound.
This is especially true if the cognitive dispositions
that evolutionary psychology purports to explain are only
presumed to exist because of (in addition to folk knowledge)
these models themselves. As we have seen, the typical method
of the evolutionary psychologist is to identify some trait
assumed to be universal (the propensity to rape, for
example), and then to explain why it might have been
advantageous in the ancestral environment (a strategy for

1

Although, as we have seen, this progress has been oversold. Most of the bestknown architects of sociobiology--including E.O. Wilson--acknowledged this.
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men facing complete reproductive failure to get their genes
into the next generation).
In fact, the independent empirical research supporting
even the notion of broad innate cognitive tendencies is
rather thin. As Anne Fausto-Sterling argues in her
exhaustively researched Myths of Gender: Biological Theories
About Women and Men (1992), even such fond assumptions as
"women have poorer math skills, and better verbal skills,
than men" are (leaving aside the question of whether such
differences are the result of very early environmental
differences) not confirmed by every well-formed study; those
studies that do confirm such cultural expectations (and,
admittedly, some do--and none of the studies shows the
tendency running the other way) because of confirmation bias
tend to be those that are published in scientific journals
and reported on in the mass media.
Indeed, another of the central assumptions of
evolutionary psychology--that the mind is made up of
separately evolved, if interactive, modules--is far from
uncontroversial. Even if one agrees generally with the
computational model of the human mind--the working
assumption of most theorists of the mind--one need not
accept that it is necessarily modular, and even if modular,
those modules are not necessarily innate and evolved.
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Modular organization is not necessarily an inherited
result of natural selection; much of the most exciting work
in robots today involves mechanisms that learn in a bottomup sort of way, starting from a few extremely simple rules
of behavior (Moravec, Mind; Moravec, Robots). And the
evidence from human development is hardly unequivocal:
Annette Karmiloff-Smith, in her essay "Why Babies’ Brains
Are Not Swiss Army Knives," provides a thorough discussion
of how the empirical research on children supports an
environmental explanation of the development of skills and
abilities at least as well as it does an innatist
explanation.
Modularity in fact cuts across political lines: the idea
that intelligence is a unitary thing rather than a
reification of a disparate set of skills (an assumption that
is the target of Gould's critique of IQ testing in The
Mismeasure of Man) is the central assumption of Charles
Murray and Richard Hernstein in their much-maligned work The
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American
Life, in which they therefore must argue strongly against
modularity.
Jerry Fodor, one of the architects of the modular theory
of mind (Modularity), has been very critical of the idea of
innate and evolved modules, and has directly challenged
Pinker’s model. More famously, Noam Chomsky, for reasons that
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are not at all clear, has always denied that the innate and
hereditary language structures that he claims to have
identified are evolved.
Gould (particularly convincingly and completely in his
academic work Ontogeny and Phylogeny, but also throughout
his popular work), in addition to many other scientists and
popularizers, such as Carl Sagan, has argued that what in
fact distinguishes the human brain is its lack of the
specialization that typifies most species. This is because
the human brain, as well as the human body, is marked in its
neoteny (meaning "preservation of juvenile
characteristics"). It is a popularly known fact that
humankind shares over 98 percent of its genes with the
chimpanzees. Gould argues that (as in many cases in which a
small amount of genetic disparity leads to large phenotypic
differences) many of those genes in which we differ affect
rates of development.
It is not simply a cute, chance anthropomorphism that
baby chimps look very human. We are baby chimps, as much in
body as in mind: just as our bodies are essentially frozen
in a juvenile state, so are our brains, which makes them
particularly labile (and our youth a particularly vulnerable
time). Gould in fact argues that given the large size and
capacity for learning of the human brain, specialization
would in fact be disadvantageous. Wouldn't a being with a
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brain particularly prone to absorbing cultural knowledge,
which can accumulate and change very rapidly compared to the
stately rate of evolutionary change, be much better adapted
to any given environment than one with innate modules?
Although Gould chooses to keep his critique on firmer
scientific ground, understandably wary of relying on notions
of human exceptionalism, other critics of evolutionary
psychology are not so cautious about seeing human culture as
the primary challenge to evolutionary-psychological
explanations. Such explanations might be fine for ants, they
say, but not for humans.
Such a claim is not as idealist as it might first
appear. They are not arguing for some sort of mind/body
dualism or for the autonomy of culture from the natural
world; they are simply arguing that the evolutionary
psychologists are too quick to jump to evolutionary
explanations when simpler cultural explanations are
available.
Even as implacable a critic as Gould accepts the
usefulness of sociobiological logic in some situations: when
beings, such as ants, have no apparent way to pass on
knowledge through culture, there must be some kind of
evolutionary explanation (although not necessarily an
adaptive one).
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Ultimately, whether one believes that sociobiology and
evolutionary psychology are "scientific" or not depends on
one's definition of science and one's notion of what
science's relation to society is and should be. Wilson,
Dawkins, and other supporters of evolutionary psychology
believe that an area of inquiry can be called a science even
if it is largely speculative and untestable.
The principal opponents of evolutionary psychology-Gould and Lewontin in particular--have a somewhat more
restrictive view of legitimate science. As Ullica
Segerstrale sums up Lewontin's position in Defenders of the
Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and
Beyond, Lewontin believes that scientific arguments should
be correct, not just plausible; that correctness is most
likely to be obtained through experimentation; that
speculation about past evolution can only ever be plausible,
and so is not scientifically useful; that large
generalizations about evolution are almost certain to be
wrong because of the complexities involved; and that we
should focus on predictions employing the experimental
method and ask restricted questions (105-106).
It is unclear which came first--Gould and Lewontin's
demanding requirements for legitimate science or their
distaste for sociobiology--but it is clear that on its own
terms, their critique is devastating. By standards distilled
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from other, established sciences, evolutionary psychology
(at least in its present form) is "unscientific."
Gould, in fact, has been quite consistent in holding
ideological allies to the same high standards to which he
holds his foes: he has been outspoken, for example, in his
critiques of "feminist science" (which he has said does not
exist) and of Jeremy Rifkin's lack of integrity or knowledge
of evolutionary theory in his environmentalist and antitechnology screeds (Urchin).
Less compelling than scientific critiques such as
Gould’s and Lewontin’s, however, are those critiques that
begin from a certain moral or political perspective and
therefore hold evolutionary psychology to a higher standard
than other sciences. Kitcher himself does this (although his
argument does not stand or fall on this assumption).
According to him, 'pop' sociobiologists have thrown
away their caution when they write about human behavior. He
suggests that standards need to be raised when it comes to
statements about humans. When there are implications for
humans, some usual practices of science, such as bold
generalization, should be curtailed and the standards of
evidence need to be higher than in other, less sensitive
areas of science (388).
Indeed, some critics are so incensed by the
implications of sociobiology that they cannot be bothered
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with challenging the science; the implications invalidate
the science. Philosopher Mary Midgley, for example, in a
1979 review of The Selfish Gene, was apparently so blinded
by her distaste for the implications of the theory that she
totally misread a fairly clear argument:

[Dawkins'] central point is that the emotional
nature of man is exclusively self-interested, and
he argues this by claiming that all emotional
nature is so. Since the emotional nature of
animals clearly is not exclusively selfinterested, nor based on any long term calculation
at all, he resorts to arguing from speculations
about the emotional nature of genes. . . .Genes
cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than
atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract, or
biscuits teleological. (451)
From such statements, one might gather that Midgley had
not even read the jacket copy, much less the book. Dawkins
never claims that genes, let alone organisms, are "selfish."
He is using the metaphor of "selfishness" to make a point
about gene selectionism as opposed to individual or group
selection. His discussions of emotion in fact emphasize the
existence of altruism as a strong emotional motivation.
In later years Midgley was to admit that "she did not
really wish to go after Dawkins as much as she wanted to
quench any attempt by Moral Philosophers to use selfish
genery as a backup for their purposes" (Segerstrale 77)--to
"criticize Dawkins to such an extent that no moral
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philosopher would ever want to use him as scientific backing
for philosophical theorizing" (Segerstrale 77).
These strategies of working from the political
implications to criticize the science are for the most part
ineffective--and not simply because they present a challenge
to any tedious commitment to truth or objectivity. They are
rhetorically ineffective because those who do not already
agree with Kitcher or Midgley are unlikely to see political
implications that they disagree with as a reason to reject
science otherwise seen as valid. Kitcher's argument is
really that science with anti-egalitarian implications
should be treated more cautiously than other science; truebelieving evolutionary psychologists would argue that
certain egalitarian policies already in place--laws to
remedy gender imbalances in hiring, for example--already
have human costs.
And here is where the political implications of
evolutionary psychology become clear. None but the crudest
popularizers would draw a direct connection between the
conclusions of evolutionary psychology and the world of
politics. The conclusions are not as facile and offensive
as, say, "Men are prone to rape; therefore rape laws should
be more lenient," or "Homosexuality is anti-adaptive, and
should therefore be illegal," or "Man does not have wings;
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therefore he should not fly." The ideologues of evolutionary
psychology understand the naturalistic fallacy too.
The arguments are subtler and more logical--and
therefore more dangerous. Wilson, a professed liberal, lays
out the argument thus:
In hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women
stay at home. This strong bias persists in most
agricultural and industrial societies and, on that
ground alone, appears to have a genetic origin. .
. . My own guess is that the genetic bias is
intense enough to cause a substantial division of
labor even in the most free and most egalitarian
of future societies. . . . Even with identical
education and equal access to all professions, men
are likely to continue to play a disproportionate
role in political life, business, and science.
(“Human” 40)
This is, in Kitcher's schema, the last rung of the
ladder--"Because there are these genetic differences and
because the behavior is adaptive, we can show that it will
be difficult to modify the behavior by altering the
environment" (Kitcher 127), and if we ignore the quick
conflation of "genetic" and "difficult to modify,2 this
argument does have a certain logic. If a certain behavior is
innate and extremely intractable (for example, a feminine
predilection for care-giving and a male one for abstract
math), then attempts to modify this behavior (by, say,
equalizing the male and female proportions of day-care
2

As Gould points out, "Many defects of vision are 100 percent heritable and
easily corrected by a pair of glasses" (Urchin 35).
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workers and of mathematicians) could have real, even
devastating, social costs.
Here is the real social consequence of evolutionary
psychology--not that it offends our a priori egalitarian
ideals, but that social and political implications are read
off from an immature and speculative science. One might
reasonably argue, contra Gould and Lewontin, that
evolutionary psychology is a legitimate science, albeit a
highly speculative and untestable one; in this view, the
only harm that it can do is waste research time. But to
derive political programs, as some evolutionary
psychologists (and, more often, their popularizers) do is
quite unreasonable.
To argue that some political program should be
instituted or dismantled because evolutionary psychology
predicts that we should have certain innate tendencies, in
the absence of any evidence that such tendencies either
exist or are intractable, is to encourage the worst sort of
social experimentation (something the generally conservative
evolutionary psychologists are usually opposed to). What any
reasonable person should object to, rather than the
specifics of these proposals (for example, the anti-feminist
conclusions derived by some popular interpreters of
evolutionary psychology), is that any political program
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should be derived from such shaky science: better that we
muddle along, attempting to solve our social problems in an
empirical, experimental way, than to weigh the social costs
and benefits in advance based on dubious speculation.
Philosophers of science may speculate on whether
evolutionary psychology is, or may ever be, a science. To
the layman, it seems to deserve at least that much
consideration. But even if it is a science, it is still in
its infancy. It may turn out to be a dead end; its
"predictions" may fail to be realized by, say, cognitive
scientists (one of many reasonable objections to
evolutionary psychology is that it warps the research
program of the otherwise fairly objective field of cognitive
science by encouraging an overabundance of research down
certain avenues that would receive no special consideration
were it not for folk psychology and its support by
evolutionary "just so" stories). It may, on the other hand,
bear some fruit. In the meantime, it would be best for us to
avoid compounding speculation with speculation.
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Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Theme
Assuming that there is something to evolutionary
psychology, what does all of this have to do with literary
theory or aesthetics? The most comprehensive application of
evolutionary psychology to literary theory is Joseph
Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory. In this ambitious
work, Carroll attempts to counter what he views as the
excesses of post-structuralism and related approaches (he
groups feminism and Marxism with post-structuralism) and
establish a new foundation for literary criticism and
theory.
The first third of Carroll’s work consists of an
indictment of most of contemporary literary criticism, which
he sees as dominated by the post-structuralist model. There
is nothing particularly original in this indictment, which
is vocally shared by most theorists with evolutionary
approaches and better stated by several critics outside of
the evolutionary approach: Terry Eagleton, Alex Callinicos,
and Christopher Norris to name a few.
We will pass over these arguments briefly, as they are
not at the core of Carroll’s proposal, shared as they are by
many who would strongly disagree with his assumptions about
human nature. What is interesting about these arguments is
that Carroll would choose to include them at all. Setting up
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a straw-man poststructuralism and demonstrating that it has
little useful to say about literature is hardly original
with Carroll. What Carroll adds to the argument is a second
proposition: if we acknowledge that there is a world outside
of language (which he claims the poststructuralists deny),
then we must accept that science has something useful to say
about literature and its production (reasonable enough), and
we must therefore accept that there is an essential human
nature (completely unwarranted). Carroll quickly moves from
quite reasonable arguments that the insights of science
might have a useful role in the humanities (an argument that
anti-foundationalist Richard Rorty would heartily approve)
to arguments asserting the truth of a rather controversial
science. To reject evolutionary psychology, in Carroll’s
view, is to reject science itself, although as we have seen,
many respected scientists are quite suspicious of the claims
of evolutionary psychology--and many of the principal
architects of this new approach would not approve some of
Carroll's more extreme claims. To believe in the world,
argues Carroll, one must believe in an innate human nature-to believe otherwise would be “unscientific”--despite the
fact that hard-nosed positivists like B.F. Skinner are as
thoroughgoing in their critiques of an innate human nature
as the most wild-eyed poststructuralist philosopher.
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So the critique of poststructuralism does not
automatically lead one to an endorsement of evolutionary
psychology; but if the more extreme claims of popular
evolutionary psychology are true

(and, despite its critics,

the EP model has yet to be definitively demolished), do they
provide us with any useful insight into literature?
Carroll, clearly, believes they do. First, Carroll
claims that the "relationship between the organism and its
environment . . . . should take a position of hierarchical
priority over every other concept" (3). What it means for
this relationship to "take a position" of priority over
other concepts in literary criticism is never made exactly
clear, but what Carroll seems to be asserting is that
because this relationship has causal primacy (see Carroll's
third point, below), it should be the context within which
most discussion of literature should take place.
Second, and most central to our discussion, Carroll
asserts that "innate psychological structures--perceptual,
rational, and affective--have evolved through an adaptive
process of natural selection and that these structures
regulate the mental and emotional life of all living
organisms, including human beings" (3). Carroll points out
that "this concept sets itself in irreconcilable opposition
to the idea that human beings are blank slates, that the
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structure of motivations and cognition is infinitely
malleable, and that language or culture provides all
qualitative content and structure for human experience" (3).
Carroll will elaborate on what he means by "regulate" in
this context; just how far evolved traits determine the
structure and content of the mind (very far, Carroll will
maintain) will be an important question in regard to his
larger project. None of the arguments of Carroll's enemies
hinge on the notion of a tabula rasa; some, like Freud (at
least the non-structuralist, biologistic Freud) even name
some of the specific structures and contents of the mind.
Carroll's argument is not that there are some innate
characteristics rather than none, but that there are many
rather than a relative few.
Third, and not very controversial if one accepts
Carroll's second claim, "all 'proximate causes' or
intermediate human motives are regulated by the principles
of inclusive fitness as 'ultimate cause" (3). This concept,
claims Carroll, "does not imply that all organisms at all
times, and especially not all human organisms, are directly
seeking to maximize their reproductive success" (3). It does
imply, however, that "all innate psychological structures
have, in ancestral environments, evolved under the
regulative power of reproductive success and that these
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innate structures remain fully active at the present time"
(3). An important corollary to this concept, for the
purposes of literary criticism, is that "reproductive
success, in its twin aspects of sexual union and the
production of successful offspring, is central to human
concerns and literary works" (3).
Reproductive success, asserts Carroll in a formulation
that will be central to his argument, as well as quite
problematic, "provides an organizing principle that can be
adjusted or modified or repressed (at great cost) but cannot
simply be ignored" (3).
Here Carroll is asserting that innate psychological
structures have a causal primacy in the production of
literature, in much the same way that many Marxists assert
the primacy of the mode of production--the primacy of
"determination in the last instance." But while Marxists can
explain the reductionism implied here by either maintaining
that their focus on the mode of production is actually an
issue of emphasis ("We're explaining how the mode of
production relates to literature, others may explore other
causal factors") or diligently explaining that the mode of
production, while in a complicated way ultimately
determinative, is merely part of a structure of semiautonomous mechanisms (or that the whole thing is properly
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deemed the mode of production), Carroll (and this will prove
to be one of the great failings of his model) fails to
either mitigate his claims ("I'm just investigating one mode
of explanation, in a curiously neglected area") or provide a
convincing model of how these innate psychological
structures interact with other causal factors. When he says
primacy, he means primacy, with a single-mindedness that
would abash the most economistic of Marxists.
Fourth, Carroll claims that "representation, including
literary representation, is a form of 'cognitive mapping"
(3). Which is to say that "representation is an extension of
the organism's adaptive orientation to an environment that
is, in the first place, spatial and physical" (3). This
notion is central to Carroll's characterization of
literature, as he develops the argument that the primary
purpose of literature "is to represent the subjective
quality of experience" (4).
Carroll's central assumption in making these claims is
that "literary works reflect and articulate the vital
motives and interests of human beings as living organisms"
(4). Carroll argues, based on this assumption, that "innate
biological characteristics provide the basis for all
individual identity and all social organization, that
authors exercise originary power in the construction of

61

literary figurations, and that literature represents objects
that exist independently of language" (4).
These claims are relatively abstract, and formulated in
such a way that a weak reading of them results for the most
part in truisms (of course literature is produced by
organisms with motives; who else is going to write it?),
while a strong reading results in radical--and radically
unlikely--claims (art is solely the product of organisms,
whose psychologies are solely the products of genetics). How
can these claims be used practically in the interpretation
of literature? Carroll early on provides us with a reading,
applying these principals, of a canonical work of
literature.
Wuthering Heights provides us with a well-known
example, argues Carroll, of the problem of incest in
literature--a problem that has been approached by many
literary critics employing Freudian assumptions that have
been “falsified” by evolutionary research. According to
Carroll, this research “reveals” that the Freudian notion
that incest is an innate drive that is repressed by social
convention is mistaken. Research “suggests” (it is not clear
why Carroll switches to such tentative language) that a
distaste for incest is genetically programmed (145).
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Knowledge of this innate tendency has important
consequences for literary criticism; such knowledge can help
us avoid erroneous interpretations of such texts as Oedipus
Rex, in which incest is clearly a theme, and help us avoid
“erroneously importing mother/son incest into texts, such as
Hamlet, in which incest is not a central issue” (145).
We see problems developing in the model already. Even
if there is an innate incest-avoidance instinct, Hamlet is a
work of fiction; that a desire for incest is rare (or
contrary to nature, whatever that means) in no way means
that Shakespeare did not intend for incest to be a theme in
his play. (Carroll believes that authorial intention is
particularly determinative of meaning.) And what of
twentieth-century authors who are aware of Freud's model and
believe that there is a general desire for incest? Would it
be illegitimate to see such a desire as important in these
texts?
The problem becomes even clearer in Carroll's
discussion of Wuthering Heights. Even if there is a
"genetically programmed" distaste for sexual relations
between boys and girls who are raised together, a desire for
it is not unheard of--and even if such desire were
impossible, Bronte could still have written about it. As
Alan Richardson puts it in his essay "Rethinking Romantic
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Incest: Human Universals, Literary Representation, and the
Biology of Mind," "If Emily Bronte is at liberty to people
the Yorkshire Moors with ghosts, why not incestuous fostersiblings as well?" (560) To argue against an interpretation
of the novel that sees in the central relationship "Byronic
sexual displays" because evolutionary psychology tells us
that such sexual desires are unlikely is not unlike arguing
that Paradise Lost couldn't possibly be about God and Satan
because such entities probably don't exist. And again, this
critique assumes Carroll's own position that authorial
intention is determinative of meaning; we haven't even
examined whether his arguments on this front are persuasive.
This example does provide a model of how criticism
might be informed by evolutionary psychology, if it fails to
explain why evolutionary psychology should be central. The
science of evolutionary psychology can tell us what is
likely or possible for people to feel, and therefore perhaps
give some insight into what the author intended, in the same
way that the science of physics might hint at the correct
reading (in terms of intent) of a battle scene: the
physically impossible reading is probably not the correct
one.
But despite the shortcomings of this example, Carroll
has a grander notion of the place of evolutionary psychology
in literary criticism. It rests in his idea of the relative
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importance of evolutionary psychology as an explanatory
method.
Any criticism is informed, Carroll maintains, by
certain assumptions about the relative importance of
different causal forces. Critical judgments about literature
are shaped by assumptions about whether “all texts
inadvertently reveal repressed subconscious conflicts,
allegorize the socioeconomic conditions of production, [or]
enact the triumphal self-affirmation of Being-in-theWorld”(40), or such texts “display the indeterminacy of
meaning in an endless semiotic dissemination, helplessly
reproduce an autonomous cultural episteme, or reflect the
interaction of an organism with its environment” (40).
Carroll makes the reasonable point that if a critical
method is based on flatly wrong assumptions about causality,
it will probably be wrong (Carroll assumes that criticism
must be true, rather than simply interesting) in much of its
interpretation. It is unclear, however, why evolutionary
psychology, or even the idea of literature as the product of
biological organism, should take precedence as an
explanatory model.
Perhaps his definition of literature might give us some
clue as to the significance of evolutionary theory for
literary criticism. Carroll defines literary works as
“representations that either take the quality of personal
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experience as their special subject or register the writer’s
own sense of the experiential quality of his or her subject”
(109), that are intended to evoke aesthetic and emotional as
well as intellectual responses in the reader (109), and that
are composed of words rather than some other sort of symbol
(109).
Despite some problems with distinguishing “the writer’s
sense” of something from an “objective” account (what
Carroll seems to mean by this is something like “objectivity
effect” or “objectivity intent”--that is, the author or text
seems to intend to provide an objective picture of the
world, even if by our lights that picture is distorted by
ideology or outdated scientific models), this definition of
“the literary” does demarcate a fairly clear field of study.
What, then, is the purpose of criticism?
Criticism “is concerned to gain objective knowledge
about literature--‘to see the object as it really is’--and
also to communicate the personal and cultural value of
literature” (112).
Here Carroll explicitly endorses Matthew Arnold’s ideas
about the role of literature and criticism, specifically the
notion that the purpose of literature and criticism is “to
establish a relation between the new conceptions [of
science], and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for
conduct” (Qtd. 113).
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Literature provides a subjective view of life,
delivered in words with certain attention to formal
qualities. Criticism provides objective knowledge of the
text, principally by explaining the author as organism in
environment, and comparing the insights of literature with
the scientific knowledge of evolutionary psychology. But
why? What does it mean to “establish a relation between the
new conceptions and our instinct for beauty, our instinct
for conduct”?
The subjective view that literature provides is “a
highly developed body of intuitive qualitative judgment
about human experience” (114). This knowledge can serve as
“an important point of empirical reference” in evaluating
new scientific notions about human psychology and culture”
(114). (Of course, as we saw in the Wuthering Heights
example, if a text’s “intuitive qualitative judgment about
human experience” clashes with evolutionary-psychological
received truth, either the text or its interpreter is
wrong.)
The idea that the primary function of literature might
be to provide a counterpoint to the scientific worldview, to
articulate in non-propositional form an intuitive, emotional
sense of the world, is hardly a new one, as we see in
Carroll’s wholehearted endorsement of Arnold. There is
nothing distinctly Darwinian about this. But given his
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definition of literature and his description of the role of
criticism, what does the Darwinian model add to this
discussion?
We have seen that knowledge of evolutionary psychology
might add something to the reconstruction of authorial
intention--giving evolutionary psychology a useful, if not
obviously important, role in criticism as defined by
Carroll. Carroll, however, sees its role as more central.
To understand why, we must examine his ideas about the
conflict between authorial norms and cultural norms. Carroll
argues that if authorial and cultural norms are the same,
the protagonist is likely to ultimately adjust completely to
his or her society--as Tom Jones and Emma Woodhouse do. If
authorial and cultural norms differ, the story is likely to
end in “isolated alienation”: Gulliver shuns human beings to
live with the horses, Stephen Dedalus leaves Ireland.
This is an interesting schema for the discussion of the
two logical possibilities of narrative. Where Carroll gets
into trouble, however, is precisely where evolutionary
psychology impinges on this schema. Into the discussion of
the relationship between authorial norms and cultural norms
he brings the notion of biological “norms.”
Individuals differ in their dispositions, and these
dispositions are largely “elemental” or innate. Such an
assertion is hardly controversial if one accepts the
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evolutionary psychological model. Sometimes authorial norms
and cultural norms differ--this is also uncontroversial. But
Carroll makes a crucial error when he introduces the idea
that some aspects of personality are not only innate and
virtually universal (both fine if one accepts mainstream
evolutionary psychology) but somehow normative because their
origins were adaptive.
The fundamental fallacy behind this assertion becomes
clear in Carroll’s discussion of homosexuality.
Homosexuality, claims Carroll, violates not only cultural
norms but biological norms as well:
If, as in the case of homosexual writers, both
male and female, the writer’s own sexual
orientation diverges from the species-typical
characteristics necessary to the propagation of
the race, the tension between these two norms, the
individual and the species-typical, will almost
certainly play a large role in the organization of
figurative elements for that author. This tension
is complicated by the relation between personal
organization and cultural norms, but my contention
. . . is that species-typical norms and cultural
norms are distinct categories; neither category is
reducible to the other. (163)
It is certainly possible that there are certain innate
and nearly universal traits. What is not clear is why it
should make a difference if the author’s norms differ from
dominant cultural norms or from dominant innate norms.
Biological norms, asserts Carroll, are not only
dominant, but also functional--otherwise they would not
exist (Carroll is here both assuming universal adaptedness
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and that current utility and adapted origin are the same).
Homosexuality, however, “presents an instance in which the
psychological organization of an individual operates in a
manner different from that of people whose behavior is
functional for the members of that species as a whole”
(167).
Here Carroll is explicitly rejecting the idea proposed
by E.O. Wilson that homosexuality evolved through kin
selection. That is, the presence of a homosexual would be so
advantageous to that person’s kin that the trait would be
passed on despite the fact that that person might be less
likely to have children.
Carroll is not alone in rejecting this notion. Most
theorists of evolutionary psychology find this explanation
unsatisfying; the numbers just do not add up. But while
homosexuality is for evolutionary psychologists merely a
somewhat uncomfortable reminder that not all important and
central psychological characteristics were adaptive or
evolved, Carroll comes to a conclusion that few of these
theorists would endorse: homosexuality is not only not
adaptive, but it is a dysfunction.3
3
Carroll approvingly cites one sociobiologist, George Kocan, who
does not hesitate to label homosexuality a pathology: “The most
parsimonious approach is to view homosexuality as it has traditionally
been viewed in the behavioral sciences, as pathology. The persistence of
diabetes or prostate cancer in the human population does not make them
adaptive and in need of any sociobiological analyses. They are simply
diseases” (Qtd. 169).
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This position is not merely offensive and politically
dangerous, but it is also fallacious. Even if we accept that
homosexuality is somehow “dysfunctional” because its origin
is not adaptive, it is not at all clear why this fact should
have any normative force. As we saw in our discussion of
E.O. Wilson, one of the most basic differences between
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology claimed by
evolutionary psychologists is that evolutionary
psychologists are clear about the distinction between
adaptive origin and present utility--this despite the fact
that most prominent sociobiologists, E.O. Wilson among them,
had already made this distinction.
Evolutionary psychologists again and again maintain
that the innate tendencies that they have “discovered” to
exist and to have adaptive origins--aggression, nepotism,
rape--may in fact be nonfunctional today, either for the
individual or for the species. Yet it is central to
Carroll’s argument that the “species typical” be considered
normative, as we see in his discussion of “deviations in
parental behavior.”
Carroll argues that without a sense of the species
typical, without a recognition that “functional” behavior
has some kind of normative status, we cannot truly
understand the pathological character of some of the
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relations described by authors. For example, if we imagine
that the arrangement in which parents are responsible for
the raising of their own children is purely a cultural
construct, then “we trivialize the anguish in the pathology
exemplified by Mr. Dorrit, as well as the psychological
heroism of those who cope with this pathology” (169).
Carroll is hardly unique in using notions of human
nature to criticize human institutions; such notions are not
even the exclusive property of the political right: Herbert
Marcuse applied a very basic set of propositions about human
nature to argue that people in modern capitalist society
were not as happy as they thought they were, or as they
could be.
And yet Carroll carries this argument farther. He is
arguing that if one’s disposition goes against the speciestypical--even if that disposition is just as “elemental” or
“innate” as the dominant one--then it is the individual, not
the culture, who is wrong.
This may appear to be a minor point, but in fact it
touches on the central justification for Carroll’s project.
Unless, as Carroll argues, “species-typical norms and
cultural norms are distinct categories” (163), and unless
this distinction somehow matters, then the Darwinian
critical approach loses its revolutionary vigor. If the
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central conflict in much of literature is between individual
character and cultural norms, what is added to the
discussion by the knowledge that, say, the cultural norm of
heterosexuality is both statistically dominant and of
adaptive origin?
In a recent essay, “Human Universals and Literary
Meaning: A Sociobiological Critique of Pride and Prejudice,
Villette, O Pioneers!, Anna of the Five Towns, and Tess of
the d’Urbervilles,” Carroll again asks the question that
Evolution and Literary Criticism raises but does not really
answer: “What relevance do human universals have for the
interpretation of specific literary texts?”
The answer, apparently, is not much. Carroll admits
that “sociobiological critics have only begun to consider
the question of evaluation” (13) and that such evaluation
has so far “focused on the presence of universal themes or
sociobiologically typical behaviors,”4--and he admits that
such a model for evaluation is lacking.
But he gropes toward a method of evaluation by
suggesting that we can explain the appeal of great works by
examination of their handling of these universal themes and
sociobiologically typical behaviors. Pride and Prejudice and
4

Frederick Turner, whose work we will examine later, has argued that
one measure of literary worth is the number of such themes dealt with in
a given work.
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Tess of the D’Urbervilles, we learn, are popular novels not
only because of their “extraordinary stylistic felicity in
the invocation of their subjects” (21) and the “rich and
magnanimous generosity of fellow human feeling” (20) with
which they treat their characters, but also because “they
appeal to common and basic motivational structures” (21).
Anna of the Five Towns and O Pioneers!, on the other
hand, are less popular works because they have “eccentric
motivational structures” (22) and therefore “present
interesting puzzles for critical analysis” but “also leave a
sense of dissatisfaction” (22).
That a work’s popularity might be related in some
interesting way to the universality of its themes or
“motivational structures” is not such a ridiculous idea, as
far as it goes. The differences in popularity between some
works may indeed be partially due to the familiarity of the
themes dealt with.
And yet, again, it is unclear how consideration of a
work’s popularity necessarily entails any kind of position
on the innateness or adaptedness of the motivation being
considered. If a work’s popularity can be explained by the
typicality of the themes and motivations it considers, what
difference does it make if those themes and motivations are
innate or enculturated, so long as they are typical? And
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even if this analysis of popularity is legitimate, should
popularity be the measure of greatness?
Ultimately, Carroll’s project of arguing for the
centrality of Darwinian thinking to literary criticism and
interpretation fails on its own terms. Although, as we saw
earlier, a knowledge of evolutionary psychology might play
some modest role in divining authorial intent (that is,
making some intents more or less probable), it is unlikely
to provide much more illumination than this.
Carroll’s main contribution is the suggestion that the
concord/conflict between the author’s or protagonist’s
psychological structure and cultural norms might provide
some insight into a work’s meaning. But the original part of
his suggestion, that there is a useful distinction between
cultural norms and the “species-typical,” remains
ungrounded.
Likewise, any attempt to explain a work’s value, as
opposed to its popularity, by appealing to its treatment of
evolutionarily salient themes is also unconvincing without
some argument as to why popularity and greatness should be
equated. It is also unclear why, even in the explanation of
popularity, the adaptedness of the themes, as opposed to
their typicality, is important.
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Carroll’s work represents the most complete and
convincing argument so far for the importance of Darwinian
thinking in the understanding of literary content. But
perhaps the Darwinian model can provide more of a guide in
the discussion of literary form.
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Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Form

While most evolutionary psychologists see the entire
realm of the aesthetic as a byproduct of other human
behavioral tendencies--“cheesecake for the mind,” in Steven
Pinker’s memorable phrase--many with an evolutionary
approach to the arts believe that art serves a more basic
evolutionary purpose: it is a primary behavior, selected for
because of the reproductive advantage that it confers.
Although Joseph Carroll has suggested, in reviews of
Wilson’s Consilience and Pinker’s How the Mind Works, that
the creation and consumption of art and literature might in
themselves be adaptive, heritable behaviors, his work does
not really pursue this approach.
Anthropologist Ellen Dissanayake, in a series of books
and articles on the subject, has proposed that the arts are
the product of something she calls “making special,” a term
that “refers to the fact that humans, unlike other animals,
intentionally shape, embellish, and otherwise fashion
aspects of their world to make these more than ordinary”
(Aestheticus 30).
Making special doesn’t occur only in the arts, broadly
defined--visual art, music, dance, painting, literature--but
also in forms of ritual and play, behaviors that have long
been interpreted as conferring adaptive advantage on
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animals: “Play allows young animals in a protected or ‘not
for real’ arena to develop practical and social skills that
can be used later” (Aestheticus 32), while “ritualized
behaviors formalize, stylize, and emphasize ordinary
attributes that thereby acquire a secondary communicative
function and smooth the conduct of social life” (Aestheticus
33).
Making special has a particular significance for humans
because of several effects: it “provides something to do in
uncertain or troubling circumstances and gives the
psychological illusion . . . of coping” (Aestheticus 36),
causes us to treat certain objects and activities that might
be essential to survival with special care (Aestheticus 36),
and provides ceremonies and other “multimedia group events”
that pass down information from generation to generation in
memorable form, as well as uniting people.
What most of us think of as “art” is what Dissanayake
calls “aesthetic making special.” Making special is
“aesthetic” when things are made special by means of what
Dissanayake calls “protoaesthetic” elements:
features that inherently give perceptual,
emotional, and cognitive pleasure and satisfaction
in their own right. The reason that they are
inherently pleasing and satisfying is probably
because they indicate that something is wholesome
and good--e.g., visual signs of heath, youth, and
vitality such as smoothness, glossiness, warm or
true colors, cleanness, fineness, lack of blemish;
vigor, precision, and comeliness of movement;
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sounds that are resonant, vivid and powerful. In
any modality, repetition, pattern, continuity,
clarity, dexterity, elaboration or variation on a
theme, contrast, balance, and proportion are
appealing, presumably because they engage and
satisfy cognitive faculties, indicating
comprehension and mastery, hence security. (37)5
Beauty found in nature evokes what may most simply be
described as an aesthetic response. Art is created by a
process of “making special,”–-a process seen in the ritual
behavior of many animals, including humans--but in this case
applying those “beautiful” or “aesthetic” elements.
Such a theory has much to recommend it to the humanist
fearing that he or she is devoted to something superfluous
to the lives of virtually everyone. Art, because the desire
to produce and consume it was selected for, is, in
Dissanayake’s words, “like eating, sleeping, sex,
socializing, and parenting . . . a fundamental and essential
part of human nature.” (150) Art, we are reassured, is
important.
But what does this approach add to the evaluation and
explanation of literature? Does it provide any norms of
judgment, any useful tools of analysis? Can it provide us
5

I will discuss later in this chapter this notion--that there are
things in nature that we have evolved to experience as beautiful--in
regard to the work of Frederick Turner, but an interesting discussion of
an experiment in landscape choice (people prefer to look at pictures of
savannahs) can be found in Appleton. Also provocative are studies that
suggest that there are nearly universal preferences for certain shapes
and forms (Cosmides and Tooby). Of course, none of these studies proves
that the documented preferences are either innate or evolved through
natural selection.
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with a better definition of the literary? Other than
suggesting that producing and consuming literature is
pleasurable, “aesthetic making special” as a concept does
not really do much work. The idea of the intrinsically
beautiful, as we shall see in the work of Frederick Turner,
might provide a norm of judgment, but this is not the
distinctive part of Dissanayake’s theory.
The idea that there is in innate artistic “sense”--an
evolved desire to create and consume art with certain formal
characteristics--might play some role in explaining, as with
Carroll’s work, the popularity and effectiveness of some
works. Ultimately though, Dissanayake’s message in arguing
that art is an evolved behavior is simply that art is
“important.”

In her recent work Art and Intimacy she argues

for more artistic education in the schools (10), and since
What is Art For? has argued for more integration of art into
modern society.
Although Dissanayake is careful enough not to suggest
that art is necessary or important because it is functional
now in the same ways in which it was functional (and
therefore selected for) before, she does suggest that
satisfying the artistic sense might be an important human
need:
What is wrong with calling these tendencies
biologically endowed needs? Part of human nature?
All over the world, individuals in social groups,
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particularly those closer to the environment in
which we were evolved, display them and satisfy
them to greater and lesser degrees. In historic
times, after the rise of civilizations, we can see
that in many societies these needs are not filled
so completely or comprehensively, resulting in
what might be called deformations of a fairly
stable, universal human nature (an ideal
construct, perhaps, and never completely realized,
but an entity like a “species” or “model” with
identifiable, specifiable, fairly uniform
characteristics). (What 198)
Geoffrey Miller believes that he has found the adaptive
purpose of art: it is a form of sexual display. Miller, an
evolutionary psychologist, began his project as an attempt
to explain not the arts but humans’ impressive brains. Those
brains are difficult to explain, argues Miller, for three
primary reasons.
First, “really large brains and complex minds arose
very late in evolution and in very few species. . . . Far
from showing any general trend towards big brained hyperintelligence, evolution seems to abhor our sort of
intelligence, and avoids it whenever possible” (17). This
being the case, “why would evolution endow our species with
such large brains that cost so much energy to run, given
that the vast majority of successful animal species survive
perfectly well with tiny brains?” (17)
Second, there is a very long period time between the
first evidence of the expansion of the human brain and any
evidence of survival benefits. Although “brain size tripled
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in our ancestors between two and a half million years ago
and a hundred thousand years ago” (18), there is little
evidence of its utility until much later:
Arguably, one could not ask for a worse
correlation between growth in a biological organ
and evidence of its supposed survival benefits.
Our ancestors of a hundred thousand years ago were
already anatomically modern humans with bodies and
brains just like ours. Yet they did not invent
agriculture for another ninety thousand years, or
urban civilization for another ninety-five
thousand years. How could evolution favor the
expansion of a costly organ like the brain,
without any major survival benefits becoming
apparent until on after the organ stopped
expanding? (18)
Finally, Miller points out that there have not been any
plausible adaptive explanations for the things that humans
are particularly good at. If our skills of “humor, storytelling, gossip, art, music, self-consciousness, ornate
language, imaginative ideologies, religion, and morality”
(30) are greater than we would expect a general computer as
powerful as the human brain to have, if these imply innate
propensities, not one has proposed a convincing--to
mainstream evolutionary psychologists--explanation of how
these skills could have developed as adaptations.
To explain these uniquely human qualities, Miller makes
a distinction that Darwin made--between “natural selection”
and “sexual selection.”

This distinction refers to the fact

that some traits may be selected for because of the
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“survival advantage” they confer, while others are selected
for because of mate choice, regardless of, and sometimes in
direct opposition to, survival imperatives. The most famous
example of a trait selected for through sexual selection is
the peacock’s tail: a metabolically expensive trait that
nonetheless attracts females. The origin of the female
peacock’s preference for large, colorful tails is obscure;
in fact, the most popular explanation for this preference is
that by being so wasteful, the tail advertises the male
peacock’s fitness--it has resources to waste.
The important fact about sexual selection is not
necessarily the origin of such seemingly “unfit
adaptations”--the trait selected for could as easily be one
that is valuable for individual survival as one that
advertises metabolic waste—-but the runaway quality of such
selection. Once a trait begins to be desired, those males
who have it are at a reproductive advantage--and then so are
those females who choose to mate with these males. Even if
the trait is disadvantageous to individual survival, if the
trait means more reproduction, it pays (from the Darwinian
standard of fitness, rather than from the popular notion of
“absolute fitness”) to have the trait or to desire it in a
mate.
Miller points out that evolutionary biologists no
longer make the distinction between natural selection and
83

sexual selection--when they say “natural selection” they
mean “selection for survival or reproductive advantage”--but
he makes the distinction for the same reason that Darwin
did: to emphasize that selection does not always work
towards increased survivability. Miller, an avowed
evolutionary psychologist, points out that “Many
evolutionary psychologists, who should know better, even ask
what possible ‘survival value’ could explain some trait
under discussion” (8).
Miller actually ends up bolstering Gould’s project of
arguing that evolutionary psychological programs that look
for an adaptive explanation for every trait are too
speculative to be scientific. While Gould does not emphasize
the runaway, positive-feedback nature of sexual selection in
most of his work, the operation of sexual selection can be
added easily to his list of alternatives to “fitness”
explanations of evolutionary change.
Miller’s discussion of the difficulty of explaining the
human brain and its unique abilities through appeals to
fitness conceived narrowly as “survivability”--and his
explanation of these traits by the notion of sexual
selection--actually parallels a famous early dispute in
Darwinian thought. Alfred Lord Wallace, a contemporary of
Darwin’s and an early champion of the notion of natural
selection, famously parted ways with Darwin over the
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evolution of man. Man’s unique cognitive abilities, argued
Wallace, could not have evolved through natural selection;
therefore, man and his unique brain are the result of the
direct action of god.
Wallace is popularly supposed to have reached these
conclusions because of a failure of will, or a latent
idealism or mysticism--he just could not reconcile himself
to the fact that the human mind was the result of a blind
natural process. Stephen Jay Gould, however, points out that
his disagreement with Darwin actually resulted from
Wallace’s “hyper-selectionist” stance. For the reasons that
Miller mentions, Wallace could not explain the human brain
through appeals to “fitness.” Darwin, employing the more
pluralistic stance advocated by Gould, argued that a lack of
adaptive benefit was in no way a demonstration that a trait
was not evolved; adaptation is not the sole source of
evolutionary change, and many mechanisms, among them sexual
selection, could be employed to explain a trait that seems
to have initially conferred no survival benefit (Thumb 4850).
Because we cannot explain the human brain--and in
particular apparently innate skills like language--through
fitness stories, argues Miller, we must look to sexual
selection. In a provocative thesis, Miller uses the
“conspicuous metabolic waste” sexual selection origin story:
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the arts, beginning with ornamentation and song, were taxing
wastes of cognitive resources, demonstrating a mate’s
fitness. Once “artiness” became, almost arbitrarily, a
desired trait, the runaway process of sexual selection
quickly--by the standards of natural selection--led to an
unnecessarily large (by survival standards) and “artistic”
brain.
It is a fascinating thesis, attractive not only because
of its argument that the arts were the primary motor for the
development of human intelligence (rather than a useless
side-effect), but also because of its comforting suggestion
that intelligence and artistic talent might be sexually
desirable (as contrasted to most evolutionary-psychological
discussions of human sexual attractiveness, which basically
argue that symmetry and size in men, and symmetry and youth
in women, are the only real trans-cultural standards).
As with Dissanayake’s theory, Miller’s thesis, even if
true, does not necessarily provide us with any tools for the
interpretation of or evaluation of art or literature. It
might, again like Dissanayake’s theory, suggest that there
is an innate desire for artistic or cognitive stimulation,
but the fact that the ability to create and appreciate art
might be an evolved one in no way makes it innately
valuable. At most it might console the poor poet that his
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decision not to go to law school may not necessarily result
in complete reproductive failure.
Robert Storey’s Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the
Biogenetic Foundations of Literary Representation asks the
same question that Dissanayake’s and Miller’s works do: what
is art for? For Storey, the notion that art is a byproduct
of other tendencies--or even that the urge to produce and
consume art is evolved and innate--is not enough. Storey
argues that art (and therefore literature) has always had an
adaptive function, and still has the same function.
Some of what Storey theorizes is fairly plausible--if
not particularly well proven. For example, in his chapter
entitled “Comedy and the Relaxed Open-Mouth Display,” Storey
argues that, contrary to, say, Freudian hydraulic metaphors
that posit that laughter constitutes a venting of psychic
energy, cognitive science suggests that “the element common
to all laughter-inducing situations . . . is the presence of
a masterable discrepancy or incongruity” (163). The comic
results from the assimilation of incongruities into our
conceptual schema, and, says Storey, “The adaptive advantage
of assimilating incongruities into diverse behavioral and
cognitive systems--and, in doing so, extending intellectual
reach, accounts, undoubtedly . . . for the funniness of a
joke” (163).
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Comedy (not in the formal, classical sense, but in the
sense of “the art of the funny”) exists to satisfy the
adapted pleasure we experience upon mastering cognitive
discrepancies. More than simply pushing evolved buttons to
derive pleasure (exactly what Pinker means by “cheesecake”),
however, comedy serves a valuable function: “laughter . . .
can strengthen both the stress- and disease-fighting immune
system; it can alleviate pain and reduce psychological
tension; it can increase creativity and flexibility of
thought” (149).
Tragedy, however, serves a different function: it
educates the spectator--through empathetic identification
with the tragic hero; through “ambivalence over the
emotional allegiances of the hero,” which results for the
audience in “a preparedness for instruction about their [the
allegiances’] social and psychological consequences” (149);
and through “vicarious endurance of the tragic catastrophe,
which, through being indexed in memory by the ‘painful’
emotions” teaches the audience how to avoid the “inevitable”
(149).
Tragedy teaches us, not by giving us ideas about social
action, but by showing us instructive scenarios.
This is a plausible explanation of the social
functionality of tragedy, but it is difficult to see what is
particularly Darwinian about any of this; even the claim
88

that the pleasure of laughter derives from solving a
“masterable discrepancy” is a claim from cognitive science
that could be confirmed or disconfirmed without the
manufacture of adaptive explanations. And is there really
anything novel about the notion that tragedy (and narrative
in general) educates us in a useful way? Such a claim would
only be particularly Darwinian if Storey were making the
claim that tragedy (or narrative) was a “trait” that had
evolved because it served an adaptive purpose.
And again, assuming all of this is true, what tools of
explanation and evaluation does such a model provide? Like
Carroll (and unlike Dissanayake and Miller), Storey does
attempt to apply his model to a few individual works. For
example, he provides a not uninteresting discussion of
Antigone’s decision to bury her brother in defiance of
Creon.
It seems that she has been prepared by natural
selection to value her brother (in the environment of
evolutionary adaptedness it was a better genetic investment
to care for a brother, who shares half of your genes, than
even to care for a child, who is likely to die, or a mate,
who might leave):
In standing with her brother, Antigone is thinking
with a primitive’s heart, but the circumstances
hardly favor such thinking. Not only is she up
against powerful civic sentiment, but she
confronts a king who fears that his dominance is
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threatened, and threatened by his “natural”
inferior, a woman. (120)
This interpretation is plausible--even conventional (as
critic Tony Jackson says of Storey’s reading, “Who would
deny that Antigone’s dilemma involves a conflict between
immediate family obligations and obligations to civil
authority?” [Questioning 129])--but it is difficult to see
how its grounding in evolutionary psychology makes it
particularly radical. This interpretation makes perfect
sense without the hypothesis of certain innate dispositions.
Again, as with Carroll’s discussions of Shakespeare and
Bronte, knowledge of evolutionary psychology might provide
some insight into authorial intention by indicating that
some behaviors are more probable than others (assuming that
the author is attempting to be “realistic” and to some
extent shares our ideas about human motivational
structures), but that is all.
Poet and critic Frederick Turner--whose ideas about
progress, complexity, and literature we shall discuss at
length in later sections--has made perhaps the most detailed
Darwinian/cognitive analysis of literary form in his
discussions of poetic meter and the significance of the
typical length of a line of poetry.
The poetic line in almost every culture and epoch takes
about three seconds to read aloud--and three seconds, points
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out Turner, is the length of our “mental present”--the
length of time during which we remember completely
everything that we experience, before those experiences are
passed on to long-term memory and edited. Because the poetic
line coincides with this mental present, “poetic meter is
the most efficient and memorable way of communicating verbal
information” (Inner 47); just as we can remember, say, ten
seven-digit telephone numbers much more easily than we could
remember seven strings of ten digit numbers, poetry that
comes packaged in three-second lines is easily remembered.
But even more important than the mnemonic advantages
that the three-second line confers is the “driving” effect
that such a three-second line has. Natural brain rhythms,
like the alpha rhythm, which runs at ten cycles every
second, can be “driven” by an external rhythmic stimulus,
causing “large changes in brain state and brain chemistry”
(Inner 48); driving the alpha rhythm can result in seizures,
but driving the three-second cycle has even more interesting
effects.
Turner claims that research into trances induced by
chanting indicates that chanting either the same threesecond phrase (or different three second phrases with
identical rhythmic structures) causes changes in the
chemistry of the brain that alter how the brain absorbs
information and how it processes that information:
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A state resembling the relaxed awareness that is
the goal of meditative disciplines is attained,
but at the same time a powerful channel is opened
up between the linguistic left temporal lobe of
the brain, normally somewhat isolated, and the
emotive and evocative limbic system. New
experiences of insight and empathy with nature and
with other human beings become possible. (Inner
48)
And while the length of the line has this driving
effect, meter has its own distinctive cognitive effects.
Metered poetry, long recognized as conveying information in
its variation (if we are reading many lines of iambic
pentameter and a line breaks from that pattern, we notice
it), conveys information in a specific way: “The information
is processed and understood not with the linguistic left
brain but with the musical and spatial right brain” (Inner
49). Therefore, “unlike ordinary language, poetic language
comes to us in a “stereo” neural mode, so to speak, and is
capable of conveying feelings and ideas that are usually
labeled nonverbal” (Inner 49). Ultimately, argues Turner,
poetry “is a biocultural feedback loop that makes us able to
use much more of our brain than we normally can” (Inner 55).
This is a quite plausible extrapolation from fairly
uncontroversial findings in cognitive science; along with
the work of Mark Turner on narrative it is one of the most
convincing applications of such findings to the study of
literature. More than convincing, though, it is attractive.
To the poet or critic of poetry haunted by questions of
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“relevance,” this theory provides justification in its
argument that poetry is a pretty amazing tool to achieve
“higher consciousness.”
So Turner’s discussion of poetic form is a fine example
of the application of cognitive science to literary study-and if it provides few means for making qualitative
distinctions between poems, this hardly makes it unique
among such applications--but its connection to the Darwinian
paradigm is more complicated. One could on one level see
this work as complementary to the mainstream cognitive
science position on art, as exemplified by the work of
Steven Pinker; like Pinker’s “cheesecake for the mind,” the
form of poetry exploits certain innate cognitive and
emotional tendencies to give pleasure (and, in this case, to
inform).
Turner’s position, however, is more radical. A fuller
discussion of Turner’s work must wait, but let it suffice
here to say that Turner wishes to do more than claim that
the production and consumption of poetry is a useful
behavior parasitic on more basic (and presumably evolved and
adaptive) cognitive tendencies. Not content with
explanations such as Dissanayake’s and Miller’s, which view
relatively high-level behaviors such as artistic production
as traits both adaptive and selected for-–and certainly
aware that even most evolutionary psychologists find
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adaptive explanations for art unconvincing--Turner argues
that poetry is the result of a more general evolved and
adaptive tendency: the recognition of beauty. Beauty, Turner
claims in an argument developed in Natural Classicism (where
he first developed his theory of poetic form) and most fully
developed in his more recent work The Culture of Hope,
rather than being a culturally variable concept, is
an objective property of the fundamental
generative process of the universe--thus
possessing a real, not just subjective, existence.
Like our eyes, our aesthetic sense is designed to
perceive objects that are actually out there:
systems which show promise for emergent forms of
order. (“Evolutionary” 103)
Such a sense “would have adaptive significance”
(“Evolutionary” 103). Turner’s arguments in defense of these
claims are too complex to evaluate here, dependent as they
are on the science of complexity (the subject of our next
section), but it is important to note that Turner--unlike
Darwinian humanists who either see the arts as either
without primary adaptive significance or, like Miller and
Dissanayake, provide somewhat plausible explanations of
adaptive purpose but admit that the connection of such
purpose to present function is tenuous--sees the perception
of beauty and the production of artistic beauty as innately
good, transcending politics or narrow functionality.
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Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, whose The Adapted Mind
was one of the founding documents of evolutionary
psychology, have recently softened their stance on the
question of the adaptedness of the arts. In The Adapted Mind
they took the position, like Steven Pinker and most
established evolutionary psychologists, that aesthetic
behavior was a by-product of other adaptations. But in a
recent essay, “Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an
Evolutionary Theory of Aesthetics, Fiction, and the Arts,”
Cosmides and Tooby discuss the possible adaptive
significance of something that they call “off-line
thinking.”
Off-line thinking is a concept that they develop in
order to explain a few basic facts about fictive narrative:
first, “involvement in fictional, imagined worlds appears to
be a cross-culturally universal, species-typical phenomenon”
(7); second, “involvement in the imaginative arts appears to
be an intrinsically rewarding activity, without apparent
utilitarian payoff” (7); third, “fictional worlds engage
emotion systems while disengaging action systems” (8); and
finally, “it appears as if humans have evolved specialized
cognitive machinery that allows us to enter and participate
in imagined worlds” (8).
The challenge for the believer in pervasive selection
is clear: we seem to have specialized innate abilities
95

regarding the arts, yet there is no convincing explanation
for how these skills could have emerged adaptively.
Geoffrey Miller’s explanation for artistic “instincts”
that seem to lack survival value is sexual selection. Sexual
selection can lead to the development of all kinds of traits
that might seem, at best, a metabolic drag; in humans, those
traits are artistic behavior and big brains. Cosmides and
Tooby, however, believe that there are only three acceptable
explanations for our artistic propensities: pretend play,
fictional experience, and other aesthetic experiences are
direct adaptations; these things are the result of other
adaptations--“cheesecake,” or, as Cosmides and Tooby put it,
“something that humans were designed to do, but something
they are vulnerable to” (9); or these activities are the
result of genes that spread by chance during evolution.
They reject the final hypothesis as extremely unlikely-the behaviors under question are too complex and well
organized to have developed by chance. The second
hypothesis, which they formerly embraced, and which they
maintain explains many features of the arts, they now find
not completely adequate. These behaviors may have adaptive
value in themselves, and been selected for. Why do they
think this? Because for some reason–-and despite the fact
that organisms have a need for, and therefore presumably a
desire for, reliable information about the world--“when
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given a choice, most individual prefer to read novels over
textbooks, and prefer films depicting fictional events over
documentaries” (11). For this apparently anti-adaptive
tendency to persist, it must in fact have adaptive value.
(Note the familiar hyper-selectionist logic: if a trait is
apparently non- or anti-adaptive, we just haven’t looked
closely enough for an adaptive explanation.)
In order to explain this preference for fiction,
Cosmides and Tooby first present a basic evolutionarypsychological theory of beauty:
A human should find something beautiful because it
exhibits cues which, in the environment in which
humans evolved, signaled that it would have
been advantageous to pay sustained sensory
attention to it, in the absence of instrumental
reasons for doing so. This includes everything
from members of the opposite sex and game animals
to the exhibition by others of intricate skills.
(14)
This functional definition of beauty as “a fascination
with the apparently useless,” they point out, means that
there can never be a general theory of the properties of the
things found to be beautiful,6 but it can direct us in the
investigation of the utility of finding the particular thing
beautiful. For example, Cosmides and Tooby argue that
certain phenomena, like landscapes, stars, and fire, “are
6

This “anti-essentialist” definition is in fact reminiscent of Terry
Eagleton’s discussion in Literary Theory: an Introduction of the term
“literature” as being similar to the term “weed”: weeds are any plants
we don’t want in our yards; literature is a kind of writing that we
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experienced as beautiful because their invariant properties
allow them to function as test patterns to tune our
perceptual machinery” (14).
So why, given this definition, do we experience beauty
upon reading works of literature (or fiction in general)?
Because they are in the form of narrative. Narrative is a
special instance of what Cosmides and Tooby call
“decoupling”--the human ability and tendency to entertain
many different and sometimes contradictory models of the
world. The ability to deal not only with the true but with
“the might-be-true, the true-over-there, the once-was-true,
the what-others-believe-is-true, the true-only-if-I-didthat” and so on is a particular strength of the human
organism.
Cosmides and Tooby argue essentially that fictive
narrative, as suggested by several of the Biopoetics
contributors, is a form of useful scenario-spinning: it
allows us to sharpen our wits and prepare for the
unfamiliar. That it is narrative is important because, they
argue, we process “more deeply” information that comes to us
in the form of individual experience:
We prefer accounts to have one or more persons
from whose perspective we can vicariously
experience the unfolding receipt of information,
expressed in terms of temporally sequenced events
(as experience actually comes to us), with an
particularly value in a certain way (5).
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agent’s actions causing and caused by events (as
we experience ourselves) in pursuit of
intelligible purposes. (18)
Because hypothetical scenarios come to us in narrative
form, they must be “untrue” in their details, but they are
still instructive in their modeling of all sorts of
possibilities in the world and their development in the
experiencer of certain skills: “skills of understanding and
skills of valuing, skills of feeling and skills of
perceiving, skills of knowing and skills of moving” (19).
Unsurprisingly, Cosmides and Tooby’s account of the
adaptive nature of literature (very broadly defined as
fictive narrative) is more detailed and convincing than
those of the critics collected in the Biopoetics anthology.
But even if we find the argument that a taste for narrative
is innate, that innate means adaptive, and that narrative
was in itself selected for and not the by-product of other
adaptations convincing, what does this tell us about
literature? In a general sense, it asserts the cognitive
value of fictive discourse--a value that would seem to
persist despite the radical changes in the human environment
since the environment of evolutionary adaptedness.
But do we really need evolutionary psychology to tell
us this? That a taste for narrative is an adaptive trait--if
true--is no doubt an important fact. That it is innate,
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regardless of its origin, is even more important. The latter
fact is a useful tool for aesthetics and rhetoric,
explaining the appeal of certain kinds of discourse, and
providing predictions as to universal appeal and
intelligibility of certain kinds of works in different
cultural contexts.
But of what importance is it to the critic that this
taste for narrative is adaptive? It is the findings from
cognitive science--which are, incidentally, falsifiable in a
way that the speculations of most evolutionary psychology
are not--that are of some modest usefulness to the critic.
The evolutionary origin of a taste for narrative is as
useful for a theory of reading as the evolutionary origin of
the eye--that we have eyes is certainly significant in the
development of literature, but how we got them is not.
And this problem is representative of the situation of
practically all criticism in the evolutionary mode: even if
the claims drawn from evolutionary psychology are true (and
as we have seen, critics of an evolutionary bent are not
nearly so cautious in their speculation as are most
evolutionary psychologists), this fact does not seem to have
much significance for the evaluation of and explanation of
literature--unless one is willing to make the jump from
adaptive origin to present value.
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The work of Joseph Carroll, as we have seen, is
exemplary in this way. He borrows from evolutionary
psychology certain claims about human emotional organization
and behavioral tendencies. But his arguments about the
interpretation of literature (arguing that Wuthering Heights
doesn’t deal with incestuous feelings but with infantile
acting-out) are based in only a modest, and modestly useful
way, on evolutionary psychology. As we noted earlier,
applying the “findings” of evolutionary psychology in the
thematic study of literature can only affect, as with other
empirical facts about the world, our sense of what the
author probably intended. It is unclear, however, how this
is particularly radical or more insightful than, say,
ideological criticism.
Robert Storey’s work, too, although he presents it as
revolutionary riposte to the poststructuralist orthodoxy,
provides a rather traditional notion of criticism, with only
an almost superfluous grounding in evolutionary psychology
to distinguish it. He makes the perfectly reasonable
arguments that literature allows us to “have the pleasure of
the emotions that accompany loss or injury while remaining
certain that [we] will suffer the real effects of neither”
(115), and that narrative “helps ensure the cohesiveness of
a culture by bringing the potentially disruptive in line
with social norms” (114), but these arguments, aside from
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being as old as Plato and Aristotle, do not depend for their
cogency at all on the insights of evolutionary psychology.
The degree to which literature works upon an innate and
relatively immutable psychological structure is certainly an
important question, the answer to which might assist us in
making probabilistic claims about the reception of
literature. But again, even though Storey makes some rather
halfhearted arguments about the historical fitness-enhancing
qualities of literature, such an adaptive origin story adds
nothing to a discussion of the creation of, effect of, or
social functionality of literature.
What Carroll and Storey--and most of the critics
discussed here--seem to find revolutionary about their
methodology is the assertion that literature is a biological
phenomenon. But such a claim is either a truism7, or an
insane claim of monocausality: literature is the result of-and only the result of--an evolved and immutable
psychological structure.
Nancy Easterlin, a critic generally quite sympathetic
to the project of applying evolutionary psychology to the
study of literature and frustrated with the general
scientific illiteracy of scholars in the humanities, asks,

7

As critic Tony Jackson points out, “barring supernatural explanations,
thought cannot ultimately be anything but biological” (Questioning 327).
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“Do cognitive predispositions predict or determine literary
quality?” Her answer: so far, no--and maybe never.
Easterlin points out that as a result of the hypothesis
of innate cognitive predispositions there are two basic
positions taken in regard to the evaluation of art: “that
artworks whose form and method are based most demonstrably
on biological patterns are superior to those that are not”
(“Cognitive” 244) and “that art exists to break up patterns
of behavioral response (presumably biologically based), and
therefore is most valuable when it deviates from cognitive
or behavioral norms” (“Cognitive” 244).8
The latter position is obviously similar to the
position of Bertolt Brecht or that of the Russian
formalists--art as that which changes our view of the world
by “estranging” it, by violating the conventions by which it
is usually represented--adding only the hypothesis that the
cognitive schema that are being challenged are the result of
innate cognitive architecture rather than the result of
ideology or the autonomous development of aesthetic form.
The arguments for this position would be as strong as those
for any other theory of art as estrangement.
8

Contemporary biopoeticists are generally disinclined, as we have seen,
to make arguments for art that goes against the grain, as it were, of
human cognitive tendencies. Easterlin, however, brings up the example of
Morse Peckam, who in works such as Man’s Rage for Chaos (1960) argued
that “the human drive to order results in the suppression of much
important information, and that it is the role of art to break up
behavioral orientations and create new patterns of response” (244).
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The former position is explicitly embraced by Frederick
Turner and implicitly adopted by Joseph Carroll. A full
consideration of Turner’s position must wait for a
discussion of his entire theory of “natural classicism,” but
Carroll’s position, as it stands, needs elaboration.
Although, as we have seen, Carroll is primarily interested
in theme rather than form, he does suggest, without much
argument to support this position, that those works that
employ more “universal” themes are more likely to be great
works of art. As Easterlin points out, this position, as
well as the position that aesthetic forms that “flatter” our
innate cognitive tendencies are superior to those that do
not, does not follow logically; the most that can be said of
such works is that they might be easier to assimilate or
comprehend than works in other forms or dealing with other
themes.
Tony Jackson has argued that the biopoeticists’ claims
about the revolutionary nature of a criticism informed by
evolutionary psychology are the result of a mistaken idea
about the epistemological claims of poststructuralism, which
they see as the dominant paradigm (“Questioning”). Jackson
argues that critics like Storey and Carroll conflate
relativism with nihilism. Easterlin, despite her misgivings
about evolutionary-psychological criticism, thinks that the
biopoeticists’ criticisms of the epistemological foundations
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of poststructuralist criticism are fairly cogent (“Voyages”
60).
This is hardly the place to discuss the meaning of
poststructuralism--whether there is even one
poststructuralism, what its claims are (if it can be said to
consistently make claims), and whether those claims make any
sense (and what the import of asking whether it makes sense
is). What should be stressed--and Tony Jackson does stress
this--is that regardless of its epistemological claims, the
poststructuralists would not necessarily disagree with the
assumptions of the biopoeticists. For example, of Joseph
Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Criticism Jackson says
this:
Carroll evidently feels he is saying new things
here. He feels that he is proving the biological
basis for the traditional (that is, prepoststructuralist) notions of literature and
thereby disproving the claims of poststructuralist
interpretations. But poststructuralism would agree
with most of these ideas; the disagreement would
involve what actually happens with literature in
specific cultural contexts. Unless biologically
based analyses are going to explain literary
affect in toto, then the realm of history, desire
and politics will inevitably come into play.
(“Questioning” 326)
While Jackson may be a bit too sanguine about the
adequacy of poststructuralist criticism--poststructuralist
explanations are as often idealist theories about the
autonomy of, and all-determining nature of, discourse as
they are theories of the complex material determination of
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the world--he is certainly correct in pointing out that
despite their epistemological claims, poststructuralists
would not necessarily disagree with many of Carroll’s
assumption: anti-foundationalists as uncompromising as
Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish would see nothing wrong with
the claims of evolutionary psychology, provided that those
claims were well proven as proof is defined by the dominant
scientific paradigm. That such theorists would point out
that science is a set of mutually reinforcing propositions
that can never be ultimately grounded does not mean that
they do not see the “accuracy” and utility of contemporary
science (provided, of course, that we understand that
utility only makes sense in terms of an already-present
model, and so on).
Biopoeticists believe that they are making a radical
claim in maintaining that humans are physical, biological
beings; but their ideological bogeymen, the
poststructuralists (along with feminists, Marxists, and
others who wish to “politicize” the aesthetic) would not
disagree--or, rather, they would only disagree by pointing
out that humans are not only biological beings, or by
pointing out that this claim, while cogent and reasonable to
most people today, is in a strict sense epistemologically
ungroundable.
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The biopoeticists also believe, of course, that humans
are not just biological beings, but biological beings with
an innate, evolved, and adaptive (at least in origin)
psychological architecture. There is in fact throughout the
work of the biopoeticists a certain “he who is not with us
is against us” logic that quickly moves from the truism that
human beings exist as biological beings to the idea that any
remotely plausible evolutionary-psychological theory is
true; either one must believe with the poststructuralists
that there is nothing outside of language, or everything is
socially constructed, or whatever else it is that these
radicals believe, or one must believe that humans not only
do exist outside of language (or whatever) but that they
also have a certain set of innate cognitive tendencies.
Assuming that the evolutionary-psychological claims
that the biopoeticists make are true--even the ones that are
controversial among evolutionary psychologists, such as the
idea that art in general, or certain aesthetic forms, is an
adaptive trait--what significance do these ideas have for
the explanation of and evaluation of literature? As we have
seen in the work of Dissanayake, the hypothesis that the
artistic impulse is evolved and innate can reinforce the
idea that art performs both individually and socially
important functions: that it served specific functions in
the environment of evolutionary adaptedness can at least
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suggest that it serves similar functions today. Of course,
most evolution-minded critics are well aware that adaptive
origin and present function are not necessarily the same;
but when Dissanayake argues that because the artistic
impulse is innate and evolved a diminishment of the
“artistic” in modern life might be of psychological
consequence, she is making a reasonable point (assuming, of
course, that the premise is correct).
And yet, does such a theory really add much to literary
theory that cognitive science does not? One might argue that
the speculations of evolutionary psychology are valuable in
the search for innate cognitive structures9--they might
suggest the specific modular basis of difficult-to-explain
universal and apparently innate psychological tendencies and
abilities, for example--but it is still the cognitive
science that is of direct import, not the speculative
stories of the origins of cognitive structures.
Speculative adaptive stories invented by literary
critics would seem to have two primary justifications:
suggesting (like evolutionary psychology itself) research
programs for cognitive science, or implicitly suggesting
that the adaptive purpose of art must be its purpose now--or
9

Although, as I noted in the earlier discussion of sociobiology and
evolutionary psychology, many critics believe that evolutionary
psychology actually distorts the research program of cognitive science
by placing undue emphasis on validating the assumptions of folk
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if it isn’t, it should be. On this model Dissanayake, for
example, is doing a little of both: on the one hand she
seems to be doing evolutionary psychology--suggesting, like
Cosmides and Tooby, an adaptive explanation for a trait that
she sees as both universal and innate; and if the adaptive
story itself is not falsifiable, that the cognitive
structure is innate is, at least in theory. One could say
that she and critics with similar programs are simply
expanding evolutionary psychology into the explanation of
art as a trait, and that their project is as valid as the
project of evolutionary psychology in general.
On the other hand, stories of evolutionary origin
proposed by literary critics are often attempts to do what
evolutionary psychologists are usually careful enough not to
do: imply that adaptive origin and present function are the
same. Many of the critics whose work we have considered move
with quite unreasonable haste from origin stories that they
know to be controversial even by standards of evolutionary
psychology to an argument about the necessity of art for
psychological and social health today. Adaptive origin might
suggest present utility (and many biologists would caution
against going that far), but to suggest present utility
before even proposing a program to verify that the “trait”
exists is certainly premature.
psychology.
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So in their own evolutionary psychological explanations
of art and literature the biopoeticists reproduce and
amplify the epistemological shortcomings of the discipline
of evolutionary psychology; they are prone to the same
problems of evidence and fallacious reasoning (explicit and
implicit). When they extend the field of evolutionary
psychology by inventing their own origin stories, they are
on very shaky ground. These stories have the rhetorical
effect of adding a sheen of plausibility to arguments about
innate structures that otherwise have weak justifications in
cognitive science, but they are logically weaker than those
proposed by most mainstream evolutionary psychologists.
But what of the more modest project of importing the
claims of evolutionary psychology to literary criticism. How
useful has this project been, or can it be? Is it really
revolutionary?

Tony Jackson has, I believe, been accurate

in maintaining that much of the belief among members of this
movement that they are doing something of consequence is the
result of their pugnacious misreading of the meaning of (or
at least the literary-critical implications of)
poststructuralism; they believe that asserting, for example,
that authors are biological beings who are (at least in a
sense) the originators of their works is a radical challenge
to the poststructuralist establishment--despite the fact
that there is hardly an interpretive model that does not at
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least implicitly accept the importance of an intention
effect.10
If an appropriation of evolutionary psychology isn’t a
radical challenge to dominant interpretive paradigms, in
what way can such an appropriation aid in the interpretation
and explanation of literature? Models such as Dissanayake’s,
although they are methodologically suspect, can at least
suggest a theory of the psychological and social importance
of art (provided that one always keeps in mind the
distinction between origin and present function).
Models such as Storey’s and Dissanayake’s, which
suggest that certain works are not only valued but valuable
because they embrace certain “innate” forms or themes
overreach; they are in fact examples of the naturalistic
fallacy: an attempt to derive an ought conclusion from is
claims alone. Frederick Turner, we shall see, tries to
provide an argument that explains why such forms are “good”;
without such an argument, however, literary value judgments
rooted in theories of innate cognitive tendencies make no
sense.

10
As Jonathan Culler points out in On Deconstruction, although
intention, for a number of reasons, can never be ultimately
determinative of meaning, an attribution of intention is an essential
part of the context of any interpretive act (121-126). Stanley Fish has
also argued that of the many things we might do with texts, interpreting
them is something we would not say we were doing unless we assumed an
author with an intent.
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Ultimately, the models presented by critics influenced
by evolutionary psychology are far from revolutionary. When
they are not making somewhat basic logical mistakes--or
coming up with evolutionary just-so stories that most
evolutionary psychologists would find unconvincing--they
produce interpretations that seem to be connected in only
the most tenuous way with the findings of evolutionary
psychology.
Although there is no reason to think that evolutionary
psychology will ever revolutionize literary interpretation,
or to think that it should ever become central to such
interpretation, evolutionary psychology might make a more
modest contribution. As we saw that Carroll’s work suggested
(before it was carried away by more grandiose claims),
evolutionary psychology might aid in interpretation simply
by virtue of being knowledge about how the world works.
If true, axioms such as “humans tend to have an innate
distaste for sexual intercourse with close kin” or “men tend
to desire more, and more varied, sexual partners” can
certainly add to literary understanding. Just as an
understanding of, say, gravity or the Second Law of
Thermodynamics can assist us in understanding what a text
probably means (ceteris paribus, the interpretation in which
the boulder is rolling uphill is probably not the correct
one), a knowledge of innate cognitive structures can assist
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in the same sort of understanding.
If evolutionary psychology ever becomes a mature
science, if its claims are ever well proven (or even merely
accepted as well proven), it will become an essential part
of the critic’s conceptual toolkit, like other well-known
scientific precepts. It is unlikely, however, to change the
way we think about literature.
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Part II: Evolutionary Progress and Literary Theory

Biological Progress

Charles Darwin cautions to “never say higher or lower”
in regard to evolution (Gould, Full House 137); his theory
of natural selection as the mechanism of evolution (which he
consistently defined as “descent with modifications”)
provides neither a possible mechanism for “progress” nor any
criteria for judging progress. Nevertheless, in the broader
culture (although not, for the most part, in the scientific
community), “evolution” is equated with “progress”--progress
that led inexorably “up” from microorganisms to the jewel of
creation: us.
The idea that evolution led inevitably to us--or even
to “intelligent” life like us--is believed by hardly any
evolutionary biologists, and the idea of evolution as
“progress” is generally deplored within the field.
Nevertheless, there is a sizeable minority of evolutionary
biologists who believe that there is there is a general
trend toward increasing complexity among organisms.
We saw in our first section that the term “survival of
the fittest”--borrowed from Herbert Spencer, who certainly
did believe in progress--is in fact a tautology: since
“fitness” in orthodox Darwinian theory is a measure of how
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many descendants of an organism survive into the next
generation, the phrase actually translates to “survival of
that which survives.”
Remember how natural selection works, according to
Darwin: members of a species differ in some respects--some
have traits that are advantageous to reproduction, others
have disadvantageous traits. Ceteris Paribus, those
organisms with the advantageous traits will come to
dominate. If a group is reproductively isolated, enough of
these traits can accumulate for speciation to occur--the
group is no longer able to mate with the original species.
It is important to note here that “fitness”--in the
sense of being adapted to one’s environment, of having
traits advantageous to reproduction--refers to whether a
particular organism has traits that are advantageous in a
particular ecological niche. There is no such thing as
“absolute” fitness--being well adapted to all ecological
niches; in fact, such a notion is not even coherent.
Thus the universal disdain for the idea of progress
within orthodox Darwinism: there is no notion of a general
trend toward greater fitness; and as fitness depends greatly
on the particular environment in which an organism is
embedded and a given degree of reproductive success can be
achieved by radically different strategies, there are no
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traits--of size, complexity, and so on--that can be
considered universally advantageous.
Local adaptation (adaptation within a niche) may as
easily result in anatomical simplification as in greater
complexity: Sacculina, a descendant of the barnacle, is a
“formless bag of reproductive tissue” much simpler than its
ancestors (Gould, Full House 139); such simplification
frequently occurs among parasites.
And yet the idea of some kind of direction to evolution
persists, not only in the popular culture, but even among
some members of the scientific community. Even as esteemed a
naturalist as E.O. Wilson has sometimes seemed to endorse
the idea of a trend toward increasing complexity and size of
organisms.
The persistence of this notion of evolution as progress
could be attributed to ideology, to a persistent
anthropocentrism. We wish to see evolution as leading “up”
to us because we wish to see ourselves as the greatest of
all creations (so far)--the pinnacle of a new Great Chain of
Being--and as therefore having the right to use the rest of
nature as we wish. As we shall see, this belief in evolution
as progress also serves--and has long served--to justify
certain social relations: apparently irrational,
exploitative, inefficient, or unjust social relations can be
justified by pointing to this idea of progress.
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But functionalist ideological explanations alone will
not suffice to explain the belief in evolution as progress-our imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence
are not created by dominant groups out of whole cloth: there
is history, and there are conventions of discourse. One need
not be a metaphysical realist to assume that, generally
speaking, ideology cannot simply be made up in order to
serve a social function.
So where does this idea of Darwinian evolution as
progress come from? Darwin is partially to blame for
appropriating the term “evolution” at all: before Darwin
redefined the term to mean “descent with modifications,” the
term encompassed the idea that such descent was also an
“ascent” to higher forms. “Higher” tended to be an illdefined term (defining higher and lower is still a problem
for advocates of evolutionary progressivism), but it was
simply assumed that man was the “highest” form of life yet
achieved on earth.
But the simple history of the term does not explain the
persistence--not merely among a majority of those of the
public who believe in evolution at all (49% in the US) or
who believe in evolution without the intervention of god
(10%)(Chang), but by a not-insignificant number of
biologists who work within the utterly dominant Darwinian
paradigm--of the idea of progress. Darwin won; why aren’t
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the implications of the theory of natural selection more
widely accepted?
Stephen Jay Gould believes he can explain this curious
state of affairs. The idea that evolution is not progressive
is one that Gould spent his entire career illustrating and
explaining; but in Full House: The Spread of Excellence from
Plato to Darwin, Gould (whose popularizations usually take
the form of essays in the journal Nature that are ultimately
collected in book form) devotes an entire book to the
subject. In an earlier book, The Mismeasure of Man, Gould
examined the history of attempts to quantify human
intelligence, revealing the ways in which, from craniometry
to IQ testing, well-meaning and distinguished researchers
find in their data, through experimental and conceptual
“mistakes,” evidence to justify the dominant ideas of their
culture--usually about gender or race.
Full House applies the same methods of
ideological/scientific critique employed in the celebrated
earlier work--neither maligning the scientists who are
blinkered by ideology for “lying” nor ignoring the fact that
when they err, they always err in the direction of the
dominant ideology. In Full House, which Gould considers a
companion volume to Wonderful Life--his study of the Burgess
Shale fauna, which presents some of the most persuasive
empirical confirmation of the Darwinian “prediction” of
118

nonprogressivism--Gould points to a few basic causes of a
belief in evolutionary progress. Most of these causes take
the form of misunderstandings of basic concepts in
statistics--misunderstandings that are understandable, if
unfortunate, in the general public but highly questionable
among scientists.
E.O. Wilson, for example, who should know better,
believes that evolution is progressive. He lets slip,
however, that the reasons for this belief are not
scientific. In a passage from The Diversity of Life, Wilson
makes one of his strongest claims for evolutionary progress:
Many reversals have occurred along the way, but
the overall average across the history of life has
moved from the simple and few to the more complex
and numerous. During the past billion years,
animals as a whole evolved upward in body size,
feeding and defensive techniques, brain and
behavioral complexity, social organization, and
precision of environmental control. Progress,
then, is a property of the evolution of life as a
whole by almost any conceivable intuitive
standard, including the acquisition of goals and
intentions in the behavior of animals. It makes
little sense to judge it irrelevant. Attentive to
the adjuration of C.S. Pierce, let us not pretend
to deny in our philosophy what we know in our
hearts to be true. (187) (emphasis mine)
Intuition, like common sense, is the homeland of
ideology; Wilson is aware that there is no evidence for--or,
within the theory he has devoted his life to expanding and
defending, a mechanism for--progress. There isn’t even a
criterion for progress: he is reduced to vaguely gesturing
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toward increased size and “complexity” (itself, as we shall
see, a troublesome and disputed term) and asserting that in
our hearts we know progress when we see it.
We will soon examine the idea of complexity and its
countless definitions; but before we look at such technical
arguments, let us look again at Wilson’s assertions. Perhaps
there are no clear criteria for progress, but Wilson is
right: life began with a few small and simple organisms; now
the world is teeming with life, and there are large and
“complex” organisms. To the observer not blinded by the
absence in orthodox Darwinian theory of a means for
progress, doesn’t this at least look like progress?
It is this idea--that the existence of big and complex
organisms constitutes a prima facie case for progress--that
is the foremost obstacle to understanding the nonprogressive nature of evolution; Gould argues that believing
that the existence of large creatures constitutes proof of
progress in evolution results from a basic misunderstanding
of the idea of statistical trends.
It is indisputable, of course, that while once there
were only a few micro-organisms, there are now many
creatures, many of which are quite big and “complex” in many
senses of the word. If this were all that is meant by
“progress,” then one would have to concede that indeed there
is progress.
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This is not, however, what is meant by evolutionary
progressivists; they maintain that there is a general trend
or tendency to evolution: that there is some sort of
inexorable surge “upward.” Gould’s explanation of the
increase in the number of large organisms is much more
elegant and persuasive: an increase in the statistical
“sample” (the total amount of life on the planet) leads to a
greater absolute, although not relative, number of large
organisms.
If we were to look at a group of ten human beings, we
probably would not find anyone over six feet five inches
tall. If we were to look at ten million people, we would
find plenty of people that tall--and some much taller; the
tail end of the distribution now includes a lot more people.
If we took the first sample on Tuesday and the second
on Friday, we would not maintain that people had grown in
the intervening time because of the existence in the latter
sample of very tall individuals; but this is exactly the
kind of claim that progressivists are making, according to
Gould. The existence of large and complex organisms is taken
as evidence of a trend, although there has been no average
increase in size.
In fact, now--as billions of years ago--the dominant
life forms on the planet are single-celled organisms:
bacteria. Bacteria are not only what Gould calls the “modal”
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life form on the planet (there are more of them than of any
other) as well as the median (if we were to list every
living thing on the planet in order according to size, the
middle one would be a bacterium), but they also outweigh all
other biomass on the planet combined.
Given that the modal life form on the planet has not
changed in billions of years, where is even the appearance
of an increase in complexity and size? In the increase in
the average size of organisms. Unlike in our height example,
there has been over time a real (if surprisingly minute)
increase in the average size of organisms.
Why has there been an increase in the average size of
organisms? Because unlike in our example, the other end of
the distribution has been cut off. The number of organisms
has increased, and therefore chance throws up a few large
animals on the right-hand tail of the distribution; this
affects the average because although the distribution
remains what is called a “random walk,” it is a random walk
away from a wall of minimum complexity.
What we call “life” has a lower bound, and those
organisms that reproduce started from an absolute minimum in
complexity. Moreover, small-bodied species near the minimum
size tend to be the only survivors of mass extinctions--so
that each extinction starts with only small species. After
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each extinction event, there has been an increase in total
number of species, increasing total diversity.
Given these facts,
We note an increase in size of the largest species
only because founding species start at the left
wall, and the range of size can therefore expand
in only one direction. Size of the most common
species (the modal decade) never changes, and
descendants show no bias for arising at larger
sizes than ancestors. But, during each act, the
range of size expands in the only open direction
by increase in the total number of species, a few
of which (and only a few) become larger (while
none can penetrate the left wall and get smaller.
. . . [I]n cases with boundary conditions . . .
extreme achievements in body size will move away
from initial values near walls. Size increase, in
other words, is really random evolution away from
small size, not directed evolution toward large
size. (Gould, Full House 162)
The distribution of life on earth as to size actually
looks like one would expect a random distribution against a
left-hand boundary to look: like only the right-hand side of
a Bell curve, with an overwhelming preponderance of microbes
on the left, and a very small number of large mammals on the
right.
When this left-hand wall is not a factor, there is no
evidence of a general trend towards larger size, and a small
but growing amount of data supporting the idea that there is
no general trend towards larger size. One study by
researchers at Florida State University comparing 342
Cenozoic species with their known descendants found no such
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general trend: a descendant was just as likely to be smaller
as to be larger (Arnold 206).
It remains a logical possibility that even though much
of the appearance of increasing size and complexity is the
result of an increase in total variation, we might find
empirical evidence of a general increase in size of lineages
not beginning near the wall of minimum complexity.
It would then be legitimate to speak of a general trend
towards more complexity. Such evidence, however, has not
been discovered, and absent a plausible mechanism for
increased size and complexity, there is little reason to
suppose that it will.
If there is any sort of general trend, it is much more
likely, argues Gould, to be in the other direction:
One common mode of Darwinian success (local
adaptation) does entail an apparent preference for
substantial decreases in complexity--namely, the
lifestyle of parasites. We are not speaking here
of an organic rarity, but a mode of life evolved
by probably hundreds of thousands of species. Not
all parasites gain adaptive benefit through
simplification, but one large group of species
certainly does--those that live deep within the
bodies of their hosts, permanently attached and
receiving all their nutrition by commandeering the
blood supply, or some of the food already digested
by the host. Such species require neither organs
of locomotion nor digestion, and natural selection
favors their loss. One or a few novel organs might
evolve for special needs--hooks for attaching to
the host, or suction devices to drain off food,
for example--but these elaborations are more than
offset by a far greater number of lost organs.
(Gould, Full House 200)

124

(Interestingly, these parasitic species, consistent
with the cobbled-together nature of all life, often preserve
in their development the history of their “more complex”
ancestors--yet another reminder of the importance of history
and contingency in the evolution of life.)
So: no known mechanism for increasing complexity, no
evidence of increasing complexity, an explanation for the
appearance of increasing complexity. Given these facts, how
can the scientist or educated layperson persist in thinking
that evolution leads to increasing complexity and size?
As we saw with E.O. Wilson, even the most learned of
evolutionists can be led astray--the appearance of
complexity confirming what his heart knows is true. And the
absence of real evidence for increasing complexity is not
the same as evidence against (although such evidence is
accumulating). If they can propose a plausible mechanism,
the orthodox Darwinists might for now retain their belief in
progress without appearing completely irrational.
The appearance of a general increase in size has led
some biologists working within the Darwinian model to
propose a general adaptive benefit of increased size. As
biologist Anthony Hallam puts it:
Since phyletic size increase is such a widespread
trend in the animal kingdom, there must be
manifestly one or more selective advantages of
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larger size. . . . Among those proposed are an
improved ability to capture prey or ward off
predators; greater reproductive success; increased
regulation of the internal environment; and
increased heat regulation per unit volume. (Hallam
264)
But this adaptive benefit is only proposed because of
the debatable assumption that size increase is “a widespread
trend”--there is no direct evidence of general adaptive
benefits of larger size, and certainly no evidence that,
overall, those benefits outweigh the reproductive and
survival costs associated with larger size (as we shall see,
the biopoeticists carry this logic one step further:
“obvious” trends in larger size indicate an adaptive benefit
to larger size; the assumption of presumed adaptive benefits
somehow strengthens the original assumption of a general
trend).
Similarly, a few biologists believe that there has been
a general increase in intelligence, or in neurological
complexity, in nature. The case for this is perhaps even
weaker than for a general increase in

size: the curve from

least intelligent to most intelligent life is much steeper,
meaning that even the appearance of a trend is much less
apparent in this regard.
Nevertheless there is that appearance, and the apparent
trend is generally explained as a concomitant to the general
increase in size. But the case for increased intelligence
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sometimes depends on the example of humankind: evolution led
to us, the smartest animals ever, so there must be an
evolutionary impetus toward greater intelligence.
This assumption is highly questionable on the
statistical grounds that we have already examined--one
outlier does not a trend make. Moreover, as we saw in our
discussion of Miller, very few evolutionary biologists--or
even the more extreme evolutionary psychologists--have been
able to propose an immediate evolutionary advantage to human
intelligence, or to many of the specific abilities of the
human brain.
The overwhelming majority of evolutionary biologists
agree with Gould that human intelligence is a historical
“accident.” Not only humans but even “human-like” animals
were hardly an inevitability. We are the descendants of tiny
mammals who came into their own when the dinosaurs died in
the Cretaceous extinction; but if the dinosaurs had not died
out (for example) there is no reason to suppose that--like
the planets on Star Trek populated by human-like
intelligences--the earth would now be run by a race of
intelligent dinosaurs.
Despite the general skepticism in the scientific
community in regard to the idea of a trend toward increasing
intelligence--and the overwhelming rejection of the idea of
the inevitability of human-like or –level intelligence--the
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leading biopoeticists persist in claiming that evolution is
progressive, and that aesthetic, ethical, and political
values can be inferred from evolutionary progress.
They see the appearance of increasing complexity and
feel that it calls for explanation; they see human
intelligence and feel that it must be the culmination of
something--and perhaps the jumping off point for something
even higher.
The biopoeticists could base their case on the idea of
a general increase in intelligence. They would, however,
have to produce a better explanation for this increase than
that it is linked with increased size if they want to come
to their desired conclusions; and if they wish to stay
within the pan-selectionist model (and, as we shall see, if
they want to support their normative conclusions), that
explanation must involve a specific and direct benefit to
intelligence.
They choose, however, to also base their argument on
the example of human intelligence. As we saw in our
discussion of evolutionary psychology, biopoeticists are
willing to make speculations that even the most ardent
evolutionary psychologists are not; in proposing adaptive
explanations for human intelligence they are just as
reckless.
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Ultimately, though, they realize that adaptive
explanations are not enough: human intelligence defies such
explanations. But they are unwilling to accept that human
intelligence is in a sense a historical accident and a byproduct of other adaptations.
Alfred Lord Wallace was unable to find an adaptive
explanation for the superfluous majesty of the human mind;
rather than change his model of natural selection to
accommodate such a thing, he ultimately rejected a
scientific explanation altogether. The only explanation that
remained was supernatural, magical: God.
Like Wallace, the biopoeticists are so stymied by their
pan-selectionism that they cannot remain within the
Darwinian model. But unlike Wallace, they do not turn to
God. To explain the human mind, and ultimately the mystery
of progress, they turn to another sort of magic: selforganization.
To understand why the biopoeticists believe that all
matter, not just life, tends toward “higher” levels of
organization, we must take a brief detour through another
science: complexity theory. It is a science, we will find,
that so appeals to them that they will incorporate it into
their models for more than its explanation of progress.
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Complexity

To understand what is known as “complexity theory,”
“dynamical systems theory,” “self-organization theory,” in
addition to a number of other names, we must begin by
understanding the form of this theory that first entered
public consciousness in the nineteen-eighties: chaos theory.
After the publication of James Gleick’s best-selling
popularization of the field, Chaos: Making a New Science,
one could hardly avoid references to and analogies to the
field. In the popular consciousness, chaos was best
symbolized by one of the field’s most suggestive images: the
“butterfly effect.” An illustration of “sensitive dependence
on initial conditions,” the butterfly effect summoned the
image of the flapping of a butterfly’s wings changing
weather patterns on the other side of the globe.
That such a phenomenon could occur was considered
surprising because most systems studied by classical
mechanics were presumed to change in linear proportion to
changes in their inputs: a billiard ball (on a frictionless
table) sent at the same vector and same force as another
ball, but from a fraction of an inch away, would end up some
readily calculable distance from its fellow. The
relationship between these two elements would take the form
of a linear (i.e. non-exponential) function: y=2x perhaps,
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or y=1/2x. Such functions are called “linear” because when
graphed, they describe a straight line.
But despite the many great successes of the classical
model, this model was based on an idealization of real
systems. In nature there are few--if any--systems like our
frictionless billiard table. Rarely do we find systems with
only two elements and no external influences. Even the
calculations of the orbits of the planets of our solar
system are based on idealizations: they are only useful and
“accurate” because of the scale of the system being studied.
Systems involving more than two elements, or affected
by factors like friction, must be modeled by nonlinear
(exponential) functions: X2=y, for example. The important
difference between linear and nonlinear functions is that,
generally speaking, linear functions have a general or
“closed form” solution (Kellert, Wake 3; Coveney, Frontiers
35), which means that there is a relatively simple solution
allowing us to discover the final state of the system
(Kellert, Wake 3; Coveney, Frontiers 36).
Nonlinear systems (that is, systems that are modeled by
nonlinear functions) have no such simple solutions. The only
way to find the end state of a nonlinear system is to
calculate every state leading up to that end state: the
model must actually be “played out,” and no system can be
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accurately predicted by a model simpler than the system
itself.
Why is any of this important or surprising? After all,
few of us really believe that the world is as orderly and
predictable as the idealizations of classical mechanics
would suggest. Folk wisdom such as “For want of a nail . .
.” and science fiction stories in which a minor change in
the past (a time-traveler stepping on a butterfly in the
Jurassic, say) results in a completely altered future (an
idea parodied on a Halloween episode of the popular
television show The Simpsons) reflect our general sense that
the future is inherently unpredictable.
Yet chaos theory was hailed as revolutionary in part
because of a misunderstanding of these epistemological
claims as being an ontological claim: specifically, a
refutation of determinism. Researchers in the field could
hardly have predicted this; in fact, the field was more
precisely defined as “deterministic chaos” (a definition
encompassing the idea that “chaotic” behavior was often the
result of simple underlying rules). Nevertheless, in the
popular mind--and, as we shall see, in the minds some who
hoped to apply chaos theory to the humanities--chaos theory
implied not only that the future was unpredictable but that
it was in fact undetermined.
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Since the notion of determinism plays a role in some of
the normative conclusions made by the biopoeticists, it
might be of some use to quickly review

what exactly is

meant by the concept. Perhaps the most famous formulation
was made by Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace:
An intelligence which, at a given instant, would
know all the forces by which nature is animated,
and the respective situation of all the elements
of which it is composed, if furthermore it were
vast enough to submit all these data to analysis,
would in the same formula encompass the motions of
the largest bodies of the universe, and those of
the most minute atom: nothing for it would be
uncertain, and the future as well as the past
would be present to its eyes. The human mind, in
the perfection that it has been able to give to
astronomy, provides a feeble semblance of this
intelligence. (Qtd. Ruelle 29)
Laplace never thought that his “demon,” as it is
frequently called, was a practical possibility. He was
simply pointing out that in a universe of matter in motion,
controlled by physical laws, every future state of the
universe follows of necessity from the preceding state.
One way of looking at this a little less grandly is
simply to say each state of the universe is the necessary
result of the previous state; if we could somehow “replay”
any given moment, the next moment would be exactly the same.
Yet another way of looking at this would be through a more
human example. You are driving your car and approach a
traffic light just as it turns red. You hit the brakes just

133

in time to avoid barreling through the red light. A
determinist would say that if we could repeat this event--if
the antecedent states were the same--there is no way you
could have done otherwise. How could you have?
Although determinism is the working model of most
scientists, this seemingly common-sense notion has generated
interminable debate on its consequences for “free will.”
Many philosophers, even up to the present day, find the
supposed implications of determinism for notions of human
freedom and responsibility to be distasteful, indeed
unacceptable.
The debates about whether “could have done otherwise”
in the sense of the above example is an accurate empirical
description of the world, whether such a notion even makes
logical sense, and what role this particular definition of
freedom plays in our ideas of “strong” or “ultimate”
responsibility can take fairly technical forms; we will
therefore only consider these debates as they touch directly
upon claims made by the biopoeticists.
We will also consider later the possibility that
quantum events might be “undetermined,” or that the physics
of dynamical systems might result in undetermined behavior.
The important thing to note here is that chaos--at least in
the form of sensitive dependence--presents no challenge to
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this model; it in fact depends on the notion of
determinism.
If this misreading of the implications of chaos
research constitutes the most significant effect of chaos
theory on popular culture, is this really all there is to
the spread of the idea that chaos is really a new or
revolutionary kind of science? Not at all.
One profound observation made by the pioneers of chaos
theory, also illustrated by the idea of the “butterfly
effect,” is that apparent chaos or complexity can emerge
from underlying simplicity (some forms of complexity theory,
as we shall see, spy another phenomenon: surface order
[simplicity?] arising from underlying disorder).
The import of this observation is that although as a
practical matter me may never be able to accurately predict
the weather or the development of an ecosystem beyond the
near future, we might be able to understand how such things
develop, and to model what might be considered the
underlying dynamical “rules” of such a system.
But what relevance do such concepts as “sensitive
dependence” and “underlying simplicity” have for the
humanities in general, and for literary theory in
particular? Perhaps the best-known early approach to
appropriating chaos theory for literary studies was in N.
Katherine Hayles’s work Chaos Bound.
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In this work Hayles (a literature professor with a
Master’s degree in chemistry) attempts both to make chaos
theory accessible to the humanities scholar and to argue
that there are deep affinities between chaos theory and
contemporary cultural theories and movements. As she puts it
in her introduction,
. . . there are also suggestive similarities
across disciplinary lines. Suppose an island
breaks through the surface of the water, then
another and another, until the sea is dotted with
islands. Each has its own ecology, terrain, and
morphology. One can recognize these distinctions
and at the same time wonder whether they are all
part of an emerging mountain range, connected both
through substrata they share and through the
larger forces that brought them into being . . ..
In this book, I argue that certain areas within
the culture form what might be called an
archipelago of chaos. (3)
As this analogy suggests, much of Hayles's analysis
will be of the "it is no accident that . . ." variety. It
will be the burden of Hayles’s argument to prove not only
that chaos theory and contemporary cultural theory arose
because of a particular cultural milieu (terms like
"zeitgeist" or "expressive causality" come to mind, although
she never uses them) but also that there is indeed some deep
philosophical affinity between chaos and postmodernism and
poststructuralism. The latter attempt meets with only
moderate success.
More successful, however, is her exposition of
fundamental concepts of chaos theory. Her first chapter,
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"Self-Reflexive Metaphors in Maxwell's Demon and Shannon's
Choice: Finding the Passages,” makes clear the connection
between entropy and information and the fundamental
disagreement in the field about the relationship between
order and information. The Shannon-Weaver heuristic-popular, we are told, with electrical engineers--explains
that "the more uncertain a message [is], the more
information it [can] convey" (57). The Brillouin heuristic,
which grew out of an analysis of Maxwell's demon (which
Hayles explains very clearly) "makes sense only if
information and entropy are opposites" (58).
Hayles reconciles the two viewpoints, noting that
neither position associates absolute order or randomness
with information:
Like the optimist and pessimist regarding a glass
of water, Shannon and Brillouin locate themselves
at the halfway point of the informationprobability arc and look in opposite directions. .
. . Shannon, looking forward, sees a downwardsloping curve and argues that the more certain the
message is, the less information it conveys.
Brillouin, looking backward, also sees a downward
curve and argues that the more surprising a
message is, the less information it conveys. Both
recognize that maximum information comes when
there is a mixture of certainty and surprise. But
where Brillouin emphasizes certainty, Shannon
stresses surprise. (59)
Hayles sees the difference between the viewpoints this
way: "Shannon considers the uncertainty in the message at
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its source, whereas Brillouin considers it at the
destination" (58). This is a valuable observation, but
perhaps the most important point of this chapter was its
making clear that "maximum information is conveyed when
there is a mixture of order and surprise, when the message
is partly anticipated and partly surprising" (53). This
chapter also succeeds in making somewhat concrete the
concept of “the edge of chaos,” a concept from complexity
theory that the biopoeticists find quite useful.
Hayles's chapter on Prigogine and Stengers's Order out
of Chaos (Prigogine’s work, we will find, is much more
popular with humanities scholars than with Prigogine’s
fellow scientists) is somewhat less successful--although
this is probably more due to the difficulty of the concepts
being addressed than to any lack on Hayles's part. The
arguments about self-organization are fairly clear, but the
metaphysical speculations about the unidirectionality of
time are not. Here follows part of Hayles's summary of
Prigogine and Stengers's "refutation" of the notion that
"the necessity for time to move forward is . . . inherently
subjective, an artifact of the observer's presence":
They assert that once the [pool] balls are
dispersed [from an original triangular rack], the
information the triangular form represents has
been dissipated. For the pool balls to reassemble,
they would have to "communicate" with each other
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about position, momentum, trajectory, and so on,
so that all the different motions would be
coordinated in just the right way. Even for a few
pool balls, the volume of information involved is
very large. If the entire universe were to run
backward, it would be essentially infinite. Thus
Prigogine and Stengers conclude that time can go
only forward because an infinite information
barrier divides past from present. (97)
Whether it is the idea itself or Hayles's explanation
that is unclear I am not sure; I am sure that this does not
make any sense. Hayles had just made the conventional
argument that
although nothing inherent in physical reality
causes time to move in one direction, it goes
forward and not backward because the probability
for events to happen in a myriad of different ways
is infinitely greater than for them to happen in
one way. And why must things happen in just this
way? Because our knowledge defines the triangular
pattern, and only the triangular pattern, as
"past." (97)
That is to say that the triangular pattern is no less
likely than any one of the multitude of configurations
possible; the balls don't need to communicate to form the
triangular configuration--it’s just that we see that one
unlikely pattern as the "past" while any one of the equally
unlikely other configurations can be the "future."
That this notion is not made clearer is a problem, but
the notion of self-organization does not depend on it; and
anyway, as Hayles points out, the Prigogine branch is only
half of what we call chaos theory. In addition to the selforganization branch, there is also the Lorenz-Feigenbaum139

Mandelbrot-Shaw strange-attractor branch--the branch
emphasized by James Gleick in his influential book
(Prigogine’s work is now more frequently associated with
complexity theory than with chaos theory proper). Hayles's
chapter on this branch, which concludes with a discussion of
Gleick's book, is very useful (read: clear and concise).
Fairly interesting chapters on The Education of Henry
Adams, The Golden Notebook, and the works of Stanislaw Lem
are interspersed with the technical chapters--the Education,
we are told, "transforms its voids and ruptures into gaps
from which radiates an energy that radically reorganizes
whatever comes in contact with it" (77), while Lessing's
book "has many of the characteristics associated with the
new paradigms--a problematic relation between local sites
and global theories, an interest in recursive symmetries as
a principle of organization, an awareness of how small
fluctuations can effect large-scale changes" (241); the
connection between Lem and chaos theory, although "he seems
not to know" about it (115), is less forced because of Lem's
explicit interest in cybernetics and information theory--but
the book really heats up when Hayles starts trying to draw
connections between chaos and poststructuralism.
In a chapter called "Chaos and Poststructuralism"
Hayles does a fine job of summarizing some major points of
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thinkers such as Derrida, Barthes, and Michel Serres. She
also gets down to what she's been leading up to all along-drawing affinities between contemporary cultural theory and
the chaos paradigm.
For example, Hayles draws a very convincing parallel
between Derrida's notion of iteration and Feigenbaum's.
Hayles's gloss of Derrida's notion:
Any word, he argues, acquires a slightly different
meaning each time it appears in a new context.
Moreover, the boundary between text and context is
not fixed. Infinite contexts invade and permeate
the text, regardless of chronology or authorial
intention. Hamlet, for example, influences our
reading of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead;
but Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead also
influences our reading of Hamlet. The permeation
of any text by an indefinite and potentially
infinite number of other texts implies that
meaning is always already indeterminate. Because
all texts are necessarily constructed through
iteration (that is, through the incremental
repetition of words in slightly displaced
contexts), indeterminacy inheres in writing’s very
essence. (181)
On Feigenbaum:
Recall that Feigenbaum attributed the universal
element in chaotic systems to the fact that they
were generated from iterative functions. He showed
that for certain functions, individual differences
in the equations are overwhelmed as iteration
proceeds, so that even though the systems become
chaotic, they do so in predictable or regulated
ways. Derrida claims that his iterative
methodology is similarly regulated, in the sense
that its production of undecidables is not a
capricious exercise but a rigorous exposition of
the text's inherent indeterminacies. (183)
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Even more successful is Hayles's comparison of
Barthes’s S/Z with the Shannon-Weaver heuristic. Shannon,
remember, views maximum information as the result of the
right balance of surprise and certainty. But while Shannon
is concerned with separating "noise" from desired meaning,
in the Weaver interpretation "the 'desired meaning' goes
from being what the sender intended to whatever comes out at
the end after semantic noise has been included" (193).
This, we find, is similar to the viewpoint espoused by
the Barthes of S/Z, a work that seems to valorize the
proliferation of interpretations for their own sake. Barthes
argues that literature is in fact the "art of noise" (188),
and in turning a 13,000-word story into a 75,000-word
analysis, "he claims that the reader will find this extra
information more delectable than the original message"
(188).
In her final chapter, "Chaos and Culture," Hayles
extends her argument to cultural postmodernism, which she
defines as "the realization that what has always been
thought of as the essential, unvarying components of human
experience are not natural facts of life but social
constructions. We can think of this as a denaturing process"
(265). Hayles argues that "with language, context, and time
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all denatured" by theory, "the next wave . . . is the
denaturing of the human" (266).
It would not be useful here to review Hayles's clear
and uncontroversial discussion of, say, the denaturing of
language via Saussure. What is most important about this
final chapter is her discussion of the denaturing of the
human. Here she quite reasonably invokes Donna Haraway's
"Manifesto for Cyborgs." Although there is little truly
original in this essay (and Haraway freely admits how much
of her argument is stolen from science fiction writers from
Olaf Stapledon through John Varley), it does make available
to the academy arguments about how technology literalizes
what we poststructuralists intuitively recognize--the
constructed nature of the autonomous subject. As Hayles puts
it,
Haraway argues that information technology has
made it possible for us to think of entities
(including human beings) as conglomerations that
can be taken apart, combined with new elements,
and put together again in ways that violate
traditional boundaries. (283)
The problem with this interesting final chapter,
though, is that Hayles fails to make apparent the affinities
between chaos theory and cultural postmodernism. While she
made productive comparisons between, say, Derrida and
Feigenbaum, Hayles never quite succeeds in arguing that the
denaturing of the human has much of anything to do with the
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new chaos paradigm, or even that the denaturing of the human
is a uniquely postmodern phenomenon.
One doesn't have to be a poststructuralist to agree
with Donna Haraway's critique of the autonomous subject
(one can imagine as hard-nosed a positivist as B.F. Skinner
agreeing with her entirely); but even if one embraces (for
the sake of Hayles's periodization) the notion that
Foucault and his contemporaries invented the idea that "man"
is an ephemeral construct, Hayles still fails to really
explain what this denaturing has to do with the complex of
scientific approaches she has defined as "chaos theory."
But this "failure" may in fact rest on Hayles's
(defensible) refusal to ever really define what she means by
chaos. She hints at what she means ("order in disorder") but
never really gives a useful definition--if by “useful” we
mean something like "can be explained to someone in fifty
words or less."
Early on, Hayles explains her use of the terms "chaos
theory" and "science of chaos" despite their signaling that
"one is a dilettante rather than an expert":
Part of my project is to explore what happens when
a word such as "chaos," invested with a rich
tradition of mythic and literary significance,is
appropriated by the sciences and given a more
specialized meaning. The older resonances do not
disappear. They linger on, creating an aura of
mystery and excitement that even the more
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conservative investigators into dynamical systems
methods find hard to resist. . . . The name is
important, for in its multiple meanings it serves
as a crossroads at which diverse paths within the
culture meet. (9)
That this is more than just a defense of a failure to
adequately define an important term (or to choose a more
specific one) becomes clear when we consider again Hayles's
chapter on entropy. Here we find that the very slipperiness
of the term in different contexts proves immensely
productive of new ideas. In her fast-and-loose use of the
term "chaos" Hayles is trying to create the same sort of
productive situation.
Although her work accomplishes this, by most measures
it is a failure. Carl Matheson and Evan Kirchhoff, in a
generally critical essay on the use of chaos theory in
literary studies, argue that Hayles’s work, like that of
many others applying chaos theory to the study of
literature, fails to make a compelling case that creating an
analogy between chaos theory and literature or literary
theory contributes anything to our understanding of any of
these subjects (“Chaos”).
Matheson and Kirchhoff do not object primarily to the
many mistakes or misstatements that Hayles makes, both in
regard to literary theory and to chaos theory, although
these could be considered a major problem: right-wing
watchdogs of the use of science in the humanities Paul Gross
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and Norman Levitt provide a withering indictment of Hayles
based primarily on an enumeration (hardly exhaustive) of
such mistakes in their book Higher Superstition: The
Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science (98-106).
Matheson and Kirchhoff concede rather generously that
confusion over a few fundamental terms does not necessarily
make a discussion like Hayles’s inherently unproductive.
They argue, however, that her analogy is nevertheless
unproductive.
Matheson and Kirchhoff propose that there are several
ways in which an analogy can be useful, some more powerful
than others: an analogy might allow us learn about a given
subject in ways that might not otherwise be possible; an
analogy might be the best way for someone who is familiar
with one subject but unfamiliar with another to learn about
the unfamiliar subject; someone who is somewhat acquainted
with a given subject might learn more about that subject by
learning about the analogous one; or there is a structural
similarity between two subjects, “and this is inherently
interesting” (41).
Matheson and Kirchhoff argue convincingly that Hayles’s
work fails to accomplish either of the first two goals: the
conclusions drawn from applying chaos theory to literary
studies could be drawn without this analogy, and because her
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“intended audience is not composed of scientists in need of
elementary instruction in literature” (42).
Hayles has also not shown that those somewhat
acquainted with the study of literature can learn more about
it by learning about chaos theory, primarily because
If the terms contained in the scientific
illustration must be laboriously explained before
they become at all comprehensible, the analogy
itself is often effectively deflated, and can be
discarded altogether in favor of the ordinarylanguage explanation which necessarily accompanies
it. (42)
Matheson and Kirchhoff argue that Hayles’s argument
does not even meet their minimum criterion for a useful
analogy: as Hayles is unable to demonstrate significant
structural similarities between chaos and literature or
chaos and literary theory, such an analogy is not even
interesting.
Here Kirchhoff and Matheson are being too harsh. They
may be correct about there being no significant structural
similarities between the two terms of Hayles’s analogy
(although this is debatable), but this does not mean that
such an analogy is not interesting. It is the very slippage
of the term “chaos” that is conceptually productive, not the
almost accidental similarities between chaos and literature.
Hayles’s work does not succeed if we view the goal of
literary theory and criticism as discovering the “truth.”
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Its scientific misstatements and logical gaps make for an
unconvincing argument. But if we judge her by the standard
that she attributes to Barthes--the proliferation of
interpretations is in itself good, and the “noise” of
criticism surrounding a text can be more interesting than
the text itself--it is certainly an “interesting” one.
This is where Hayles’s application of chaos theory is
superior to that of the biopoeticists: hers succeeds on its
own terms; theirs does not. One could appreciate their work
as a contribution to the proliferation of discourse about
literature, as interesting writing about writing; Hayles’s
work operates in just this way.
But the entire justification for the biopoeticists’
project is that contemporary literary theory is not
“scientific” enough, that it does not obey scientific rules
regarding logic and evidence. If their arguments are just as
lacking in empirical evidence--and are much weaker
logically--than those of their rivals, their project can
hardly be considered a success.
Hayles’s work provides one model for the importation of
chaos theory into literary studies: observe some
similarities with literature, note that these similarities
(“real” or not) are interesting. But how do the
biopoeticists do it?
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Self-Organization

The biopoeticists are not primarily interested in
“chaos theory” as we have defined it (this term, never
popular among researchers in the field, is now practically
dead anyway). They are more concerned with the field that
could be said to embrace chaos theory. The object of study
of this field is variously known as “complexity,” “dynamical
systems,” “self-organization,” “emergence”--among many other
names. That these concepts are not exactly synonymous is a
reflection of the ill-defined nature of the field.
According to a list compiled by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, at least thirty-one different
definitions of complexity have been proposed by researchers
(Horgan 197). One of the most frequently referred to
definitions is one proposed by Gregory Chaitan, a researcher
at the Santa Fe Institute: the complexity of something can
be measured by the amount of processing power it takes to
completely model it (Coveney and Highfield, Frontiers 37).
The problem here is that such a definition would accord a
rotting carcass at least as much complexity as a living
animal, and would describe, in the words of John Horgan, “a
text created by a team of typing monkeys as more complex-because it is more random and therefore less compressible-than Finnegans Wake” (Horgan 197).
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Researchers have often considered rejecting the term
“complexity” altogether as being so ill-defined as to be
meaningless (Horgan 197), and many of the scientists at the
Santa Fe Institute simply employ “interesting” as a loose
synonym (Horgan 197). But as Horgan points out, “what
government agency would supply funds for research on a
‘unified theory of interesting things’?” (Horgan 198)
According to Chris Langdon, another researcher at the
Santa Fe Institute, chaos is related to complexity in that
both deal with nonlinear dynamics (Lewin 12). But while
chaos deals with apparently random, “chaotic” phenomena that
are the result of the interaction of many parts,
“complexity” deals with the emergence of a different kind of
interesting behavior from such interaction:
From the interaction of the individual components
down here emerges some sort of global property up
here, something you couldn’t have predicted from
what you know of the component parts. (Qtd. in
Lewin 12)
That “couldn’t have predicted,” we will find, makes
this statement controversial, but the statement does give us
a rough definition: if chaos can be described as “disorder
out of order,” complexity could be described as “order from
disorder.”
On one reading, the one stressed by the biopoeticists,
this is a radical statement: it implies a violation of the
Second Law of Thermodynamics (“entropy increases”). Indeed,
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one researcher, Stuart Kauffman, believes that we may need a
fourth law to accommodate self-organizing phenomena
(Investigations).
On another, less controversial reading, selforganization or emergence simply refers to the phenomenon of
globally interesting behavior resulting from many parts
interacting locally. Two popular works--Out of Control: The
New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic
World, by Kevin Kelly, and Emergence: The Connected Lives of
Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, by Stephen Johnson-provide fascinating studies of these phenomena.
For example, the human mind. The current model of the
human mind embraced by most cognitive scientists, as we saw
earlier, is the modular one. What this means is that the
human mind (and consciousness) is not simply a unitary,
global phenomenon. There is no “self” that runs everything.
What we think of as “mind” is an epiphenomenon of the
interaction of countless cognitive “modules,” each of which
is not transparent to the others but, rather, interacts in a
relatively limited way.
An ant pile, too, seems to have a consciousness, and to
plan things: the location of a new pile, where to put the
dead, where to put the garbage, where to find food. But this
“smart” global behavior results from “dumb” ants following
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simple rules and communicating with each other in a limited
way.
Human cities grow in a way that can also seem directed,
but is really just the result of individuals making
decisions. This explains the appeal of such “bottom-up”
simulation games as SimCity--a game in which the player
controls such things as property taxes and general
infrastructure while an algorithm simulates the kinds of
decisions people living in such a city would make about
where to live, what businesses to start, and so on. The
resulting “city” grows in ways that appear to simulate the
dynamics of a real city.
This notion of self-organization is not altogether new.
In fact, the classic example of this sort of selforganization is what Adam Smith called the “Invisible Hand”
of the market. By purely local interaction, the “market”
results in efficient use of resources: if demand for a
product increases, supply will respond; if it decreases,
some suppliers will choose to sell a different product.
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between
this idea of self-organization, which is well documented and
implies no mechanism outside the known laws of
thermodynamics, and the ideas embraced by the biopoeticists,
which are supported by few undisputed studies and propose no
mechanism other than a new law of nature. It is this version
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of self-organization on which their belief in the
progressive nature of evolution relies--and it on this
version that we will continue to focus as we consider the
biopoeticists’ aesthetic arguments based on this belief.
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Frederick Turner: Beauty and Evolution

Frederick Turner, a professor of English Literature at
the University of Texas at Dallas and a celebrated poet,
believes that we have forgotten about beauty.
As we saw in our chapter on evolutionary psychology and
literary criticism, Turner has provided an explanation of
the operation of metered poetry in light of findings from
cognitive science: he believes that metered poetry comes to
us in “stereo” mode--integrating left- and right-brain
function and thereby allowing us to make fuller use of our
brains: in particular, to reach new heights of empathy with
humans and nature.11
Although he suggests an immediate adaptive function as
the origin for this mechanism, he is rather halfhearted
about justifying this suggestion; he seems aware that a
specific adaptive explanation for such a late-appearing (in
the history of the species) trait is unlikely to be very
persuasive.
11

This thesis, which relies on somewhat overhyped and oversimplified
notions of the left-brain/right-brain split, raises a couple of
interesting questions: why would integrating the two halves of the brain
increase cognition? Presumably, (given the sort of Darwinian logic that
Turner endorses), the human brain is split for a reason, and cognitive
science does suggest that the specific nature of human cognition
results from the parallel operation of the two halves, which are
(relatively) limited in their communication with each other. Moreover,
research suggests that women’s brains are somewhat less divided in their
function (each half is less specialized: verbal processing, for example,
more often occurs in both hemispheres, while in men it tends to be
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He does not need such a specific adaptive story,
however, because his explanation of the function of poetry
is that it is part of a general human capacity for
recognizing and creating beauty. We have already seen, in
several forms, the argument that the human capacity for
creating and appreciating art has an adaptive origin:
“making special” for Ellen Dissanayake, or sexual selection
for Geoffrey Miller, for example.
Turner’s argument, however, hinges on his definition of
beauty. Beauty, contrary to the beliefs of both the
political left and right, is neither merely ideological nor
merely pretty. It is not subjective; it is in fact “real”
(Culture 10).
“All human societies,” Turner informs us, “possess the
concept of beauty” (“Evolutionary” 106). What is beautiful,
of course, we all agree on: peacock feathers, tropical fish,
and, of course, the blue satin bowerbird, which as part of
its courtship ritual builds a complicated and apparently
useless bower, which is decorated with colored objects and
painted with berry juice (“Evolutionary” 106).
Having provided examples of (but yet no definition of)
“the beautiful,” Turner asserts that we have an innate
tendency to respond to beauty. His argument proceeds

localized in the right-brain); does this mean that women’s brains work
better than men’s?
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curiously: first, he asserts, our capacity to create and
experience beauty is a characteristic of an evolved animal,
and that beauty is thus in some way a biological adaptation.
Beauty is “a physiological reality” because the
experience of beauty can be linked to the activity of
certain brain chemicals, such as endorphins and enkephalins.
Turner points out that drugs such as heroin and cocaine are
addictive because they chemically resemble the “chemistries
of joy” with which the brain rewards itself (“Evolutionary”
107).
We experience pleasure, which is ultimately chemical,
when we perceive beauty--a pleasure so great that “artists
will starve in garrets” and “for whose mimicked substitutes
rats and addicts will happily neglect food and sex”
(“Evolutionary” 107).
What then is the adaptive function that this sense of
beauty serves, asks Turner, this sense that is so strong
that it can lead us to forgo nourishment or the opportunity
to reproduce?
Before we proceed to Turner’s answer, we should note
that there are problems with this argument already. First of
all, it conflates the chemistry of “joy” with the specific
experience of beauty. While there is plenty of evidence that
viewing “pretty” things stimulates the release of certain
chemicals in the brain, lots of things stimulate the release
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of these chemicals, and the suggestion that heroin addicts
and rats with electrodes in the pleasure centers of their
brains are experiencing “mimicked substitutes” for beauty is
unwarranted and misleading.
Moreover, Turner provides little argument to support
his assertion that the experience of beauty is an adapted
trait at all. As we have seen, Steven Pinker, along with
most cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists,
believes that the pleasure that we experience when we
encounter beauty is a form of “cheesecake for the mind.”
(Just as we have a taste for sweets not because they are
good for us but because we have an adaptive desire for
certain tastes or foods that were scarce in the environment
of evolutionary adaptedness but all too plentiful in the
industrialized world, we enjoy the “pretty” because it
flatters certain innate tendencies of the human mind.) The
controversial assertion that it is a primary trait and not a
by-product or mediated trait therefore requires some
argument. And even if we assume that it is an identifiable
trait, this is leaving aside the questions raised by Stephen
Jay Gould and others about the assumption that every trait
has an adaptive explanation.
Let us assume for the moment, however, that Turner is
correct in his assertion that the experience of beauty is an
innate and adaptive trait (the claim is at least not
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demonstrably false; as we’ve seen, adaptive stories are
unfalsifiable, which is why many consider them fundamentally
unscientific); what adaptive function does beauty serve?
Turner’s origin story begins somewhat like Geoffrey
Miller’s: with sexual selection. He asks us to imagine a
mating ritual that affects an individual’s likelihood of
reproducing. Those who have the cognitive ability to perform
the ritual have a better chance of attracting a mate and
leaving progeny. Cultural changes in the ritual will give an
even greater reproductive advantage to those individuals who
can easily master those changes (“Evolutionary” 108).
This notion of sexual selection as the spur towards the
development of the human brain, expanded upon in other
essays,12 is thus far very similar to Miller’s: demanding
mating rituals gave a reproductive advantage to those who
had the best cognitive skills (at least in regard to these
rituals) and eventually led to the modern human brain.
But whereas Miller emphasizes the somewhat arbitrary,
out-of-control nature of sexual selection (since sexual
selection has little to do with survival, any particular
trait could become hypertrophied through what is basically a
historical accident), Turner wants to emphasize that
evolution led to a particular human propensity to create and
12

“Beauty: The Foundation of Cognition” and “An Evolutionary/Chaotic
Theory of Beauty and Meaning.”
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recognize beauty, a propensity that he argues has survival
value in itself.
He reaches this conclusion by a rather circuitous
route, introducing first the notion of the evolutionary
origin of standards of human beauty.
In this hypothetical situation, according to Turner,
the idea of beauty is obviously important. The ritual led
not only to a general improvement in cognition, but to “a
capacity for recognizing and creating beauty,” a competence
that was selected for because of the ritual (Culture 108).
As the ability to recognize beauty was selected for, “to be,
and to be able to recognize, a beautiful human being, and to
desire to mix one’s genes with him or her” might have also
driven human evolution (Culture 108). In this scenario,
“personal physical beauty takes on new importance”;
ultimately, argues Turner, “we look the way we do as a
species, largely because that was the way our ancestors
thought intelligent, strong, loving, and imaginative-ritualready animals ought to look. We are the monument to our
progenitors’ taste” (Culture 108).
This idea of the evolutionary development of
transcultural standards of beauty is a common one in
evolutionary psychology, but it is unclear how it relates to
the hypothetical with which Turner has presented us.
Traditional evolutionary-psychological explanations of the
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development of standards of human beauty revolve around
relatively straightforward arguments: youth (in women) and
symmetry of features, for example, are attractive in a
potential mate because they are indicators that healthy
progeny might result from a union with this person. How
Turner gets from an evolved ability to perform a mating
ritual to an evolved propensity to perceive beauty--and to
desire to embody it and mate with it--is completely obscure.
However, this leap does allow him to introduce the idea of
beauty into the argument:
If the theory of the biocultural evolution of the
sense of beauty through traditional ritual is
correct, we might expect to see a specific set of
capabilities, natural-classical genres or systems
by which we generate, recognize, and appreciate
beauty, based on new or revised neural structures
in the hominid brain, that would be culturally
universal and fundamental to the human arts. What
should we call these special human abilities? They
would be much more powerful and more sharply
focused than the general processing of the basic
mammalian brain. Perhaps we could call them
hereditary knowledges, or lores, or skills, or
powers. . . . Or perhaps we should call them
genres, because they have distinct forms and even
rules. . . Let us settle for the word “charms,” in
the combination “neurocharms.” (Culture 208)
Note the introduction of the idea of beauty into the
discussion of the development of skills due to the mating
ritual: the argument as originally formulated required no
specific content for the ritual, but now the skills are
somehow about beauty.
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There is no logical problem, within the framework of
sexual selection, in simply arguing that what we find
beautiful now is what our ancestors found beautiful, and
that what our ancestors thought beautiful was somewhat
arbitrary (Miller makes this argument in part), but this is
not the argument that Turner is making. He ultimately argues
that beauty is not arbitrary in this way.
Leaving aside for a moment this questionable origin
story, let us consider his fascinating proposal about
special human skills related to beauty.13 The idea of
“natural classicism” is one that he first developed in his
1991 book of that title, which first introduced his theories
about poetic meter.
People see (hear, touch, taste, smell) the
beautiful, and recognize it by a natural intuition
and a natural pleasure. This “natural intuition”
is for us human beings activated, sensitized, and
deepened by culture, is a natural capacity of the
nervous system [that] now incorporates a feedback
loop, and also uses the physical world, through
art and science, as part of its own hardware. The
theory of such a training or sensitization, the
incorporation of this cultural feedback loop, the
plugging of it in to the prepared places in our
brains, is what I have called “natural
classicism.” (Culture 106)

13

It may seem peculiar at this point to still be withholding a
definition of beauty, but it is important in examining the logic of
Turner’s argument that he provides both an inductive definition of
beauty (beauty is what is found in those things that the right people
find beautiful) and a content-neutral origin story for the sense of
beauty before he provides his ultimate definition.
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The neurocharms (a term first introduced and most
thoroughly developed in Beauty: The Value of Values), one of
which is poetic meter, are at the heart of his theory of
natural classicism. “Natural classical” art is that art
which makes use of these innate abilities, which include
(and the heterogeneous grouping of things and actions is
Turner’s) syntactical organization; trope, symbol, metaphor,
and various forms of reference; collecting, selecting,
classification and hierarchical taxonomy; dramatic mimesis
(basically reflection and modeling); debate, dialectic, and
eristics; the scientific imagination; narrative, story, and
myth; musical meter, tempo, and rhythm; musical tone,
melody, and harmony; musical performance; pattern
recognition; color sense; eye-hand mimetic capacity; dance,
gymnastic, and the martial arts; mapping; poetic meter;
cuisine; and the art of massage (Culture 109-110).
These are divided, in Turner’s schema, between leftbrain and right-brain “charms,” with dance, mapping, and (as
we have seen) poetic meter mediating between the two
hemispheres (Culture 109-110).
There is much evidence from cognitive science that many
of these are innate and specialized human capacities. They
are obviously capacities of the human mind; the question is
whether these capacities are simply the abilities of a very
complex general computing machine, or specialized modules
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that allow humans to perform particularly well in these
domains. There is a general agreement among cognitive
scientists that the human mind is modular in this way; there
is less agreement as to whether these modules are inherited
or acquired, and the question of the evolution of such
modules takes us out of the realm of cognitive science into
the speculative realm of evolutionary psychology.
Turner argues, not completely unpersuasively, that
these abilities are innate because we are so awfully good at
them, asking us to imagine that we had developed other
skills instead:
If our species had evolved in a highly mechanized
biocultural milieu, it could easily have developed
an innate skill for instant, easy and unconscious
calculation of mathematical problems. Just by an
act of intention as simple as raising one’s arm,
one could bring to one’s mind the value of pi or
the square root of two to any desired decimal
place, or rattle off the first three hundred prime
numbers. We regularly, as in the grammar of the
language we speak, or in the evaluation of speeds
or vectors in a busy intersection, perform
calculations at least as complex and requiring at
least as much neural processing. We very nearly
did develop this capacity: some idiot savants seem
to have the power of instant calculation, though
it looks as if other brain capacities may have had
to be sacrificed in order for them to do so. Or
imagine that we could as naturally recognize or
create an eight-second poetic line as we do the
normal and universal three-second one. Or that we
could as instinctually catch the “tune” of a piece
of serial music when we have not heard it before,
as we can pick up a melody based upon the
universal human music scale. Or that there is the
same kind of unambiguous natural mimetic and
representational referent for musical keys and
phrases, preexisting musical conventions, that we
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find in visual outline pictures, so that
programmatic or narrative music would be as easily
interpreted across cultures as pictorial
representations are. Or that the meaning of such
works as Spenser’s The Fairy Queene or Joyce’s
Finnegans Wake, aspects of which appeal to
hypothetical but not actual human linguistic
abilities, should be as transpicuous to the
general understanding as those of Homer,
Shakespeare, and Tolstoy, which are at least as
complex but which are tuned to real human brain
capacities. (“Beauty” 367-368)
Of course, it is not easy to compare the “difficulty”
of different tasks; computers are good at certain things not
only because of their architecture but because of how they
are programmed; it is quite possible that an artificial
intelligence developed in a “bottom-up” manner, through
learning, would be as inept at doing on-the-fly calculations
as most humans (Moravec, Mind). That certain things that
humans do, such as seeing and balancing and understanding
speech, are incredibly difficult for computers to do is
suggestive, but hardly definitive proof of modularity.14
Assuming that these neurocharms exist--and that they
are innate and adaptive in origin--what difference does this
make for literary theory and criticism? We need not rehearse
here the logical problems involved in taking these
statements about human nature and turning them into

14

This question of comparing the difficulty of different tasks is
responsible for a few of the holdouts from the modular model of the
human mind. For a lucid (though biased towards modularity) discussion of
this debate, see Pinker (1997).
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evaluative standards. As with the other theorists we have
considered, knowledge about the innate structure and content
of the human mind might help in developing a theory of
literary effect, and also might assist in reconstructing
authorial intention, but such knowledge automatically
entails no particular value claims.
If Turner were claiming that these “neurocharms” were a
response only to the fundamentally contingent dance of
sexual selection--as Miller essentially does--then his
theory would face these limitations. But Turner claims that
this sexual-selection story about the development of the
sense of beauty (and he has here jumped from claims about
cognitive structures that his own story describes as having
contingent origins to claims that these structures are
collectively related to beauty) is only part of the story:
So much for the special evolutionary truth about
beauty. Without the general evolutionary truth, it
would be meaningful only in a practical sense, it
would leave out that tremble of philosophical
insight that we associate with beauty, and would
ignore the beauty that we find in nature and in
the laws of science. It is not enough, from the
evolutionary point of view, that individuals
within a species should be endowed with a speciesspecific sense of beauty related to co-operation
and sexual selection, even if the selection favors
big brains, sensitivity, and artistic grace. The
whole species must benefit from possessing a sense
of beauty. This could only be the case if beauty
is a real characteristic of the universe, one that
it would be useful--adaptive--to know. (Culture
114)
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There are two serious flaws in this argument: first,
both the theory of the gene as the unit of selection (the
theory that Turner believes is true) and the theory of
sexual selection both imply that there might be traits that
are beneficial to the organism but detrimental to the
species. Second, Turner himself has argued elsewhere that it
might be possible--even beneficial--for a species to evolve
to hold certain beliefs, even if those beliefs are false.
But let us assume, however, that Turner is correct in
stating that there is a sense of beauty--a sense of
something out there in the world; what, ultimately is
beauty, or the experience of beauty? The experience of
beauty, proposes Turner, is “a recognition of the deepest
tendency or theme of the universe as a whole” (Culture 114).
Our experience of beauty “enables us to go with, rather than
against,” this deepest tendency, “to be able to model what
will happen and adapt to or change it” (Culture 115). What
is this tendency? The universe’s “self-organizing process”
(Beauty 59).
Before examining exactly what Turner means by this, we
should perhaps examine how Turner comes to the conclusion
that our sense of beauty is a recognition of selforganization. Turner derives this idea from a discussion of
one of the neurocharms--visual pattern: it seems that people
prefer to look at visual images that are neither too simple
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nor too complex. When subjects are shown images of
horizontal, vertical, or radial lines, they prefer to look
at images that have neither too few nor too many lines: they
prefer those that are just right (Culture 111).
From this seemingly mundane fact about the function of
the eye, Turner comes to a general conclusion: “Patterns are
beautiful that exist at the margin between order and
disorder, that exhibit a hierarchical organization which is
troubled and opened up by contradictory elements” (Culture
112). And there is “only one kind of phenomenon [that] can
satisfy all these criteria, and that is the form of a
growing organism or evolving system” (Culture 113).
That we find evolving systems beautiful he deduces from
the function of the eye. But what is it about evolving
systems that is so special?
Without any argument as to why it should be seen as the
“central tendency” of the universe, Turner provides a list
of “descriptions or characteristics of that theme”: “unity
in multiplicity,” “complexity within simplicity,”
“generativeness and creativity,” “rhythmicity,”
“hierarchical organization,” and “self-similarity”
(“Transcending” 7).
Turner argues that these descriptions belong “to
feedback processes and the structures that are generated by
them” (Culture 116). One example of a feedback process,
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Turner claims, is evolution. Evolution, however, “is only
one of a class of processes that are characterized by
various researchers in various ways: nonlinear, chaotic,
dissipative, self-organizing”--equating “feedback processes”
with that over-used and ill defined term, “complexity”
(Culture 117).
It might be helpful at this point to summarize Turner’s
argument so far, which has remained fairly consistent
throughout his work since 1979 but which is most integrated
in The Culture of Hope: beauty is an objective
characteristic of the universe. Humans, as biological
beings, develop certain traits through evolution. Sexual
selection could hypothetically provide the spur for the
development of bigger brains and specific skills-“neurocharms”--related to the mating ritual. These skills
are also related (incidentally?) to beauty.
Humans find interesting things that are neither too
complex nor too simple; therefore the beautiful exists “at
the margin between order and disorder.” This is because our
sense of the beautiful is a recognition of the deepest theme
or tendency of the universe: feedback, a term that
encompasses systems that are chaotic, self-organizing,
dissipative, or nonlinear. That beauty is real and objective
we know because humans would not have a sense of beauty if
such a sense were not functional for the entire species--and
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it couldn’t be functional if it weren’t true (this despite
his mating ritual fable of the origin of the aesthetic
sense, and despite his own discussion of how false beliefs
can be adaptive).
As we have seen, this argument is fallacious, or at
least incomplete, at every step. But let us turn from his
unconvincing story of how the sense of beauty developed--his
explanation of why we find beautiful the things we do--to
his discussion of why feedback, chaos, nonlinearity, or
self-organization should be what we find beautiful.
Perhaps his normative claim is rooted in his assertion
that feedback is the fundamental theme or tendency of the
universe. Turner provides little argument as to why this
should be the case--and as it stands, the assertion makes
little sense: one might concede that almost every thing and
process in the universe is characterized by feedback, but
everything in the universe is characterized by many things.
To say that the central tendency of the universe is feedback
is akin to saying that the central tendency of humans is to
breathe, because everybody does it.
But perhaps Turner simply means that the universe shows
a statistical tendency toward increasing complexity, selforganization, and so on. We will examine in more detail in
the next section why such a claim is almost certainly false.
Let us suppose, however, that he is correct: complex systems
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are emerging everywhere, more and more all the time (the
other possible interpretation of his claim--that the
universe as a whole is becoming more complex rather than
less--is one even Ilya Prigogine would not endorse; even he
admits that the universe [assuming that it is a closed
system] will eventually wind down); so what?
It should not be necessary here to reiterate the
distinction between adaptive origin and present function, or
between “adaptive” and “good.” We may charitably assume that
Turner is not making the simple and fallacious argument that
our taste for beauty has an adaptive origin and is therefore
good.
What he seems to be arguing is that our sense of beauty
is not only adaptive in origin but also adaptive now. What
can this mean? Adaptive for what? To make sense of this
claim, we should perhaps examine his discussion of
hypothetical “false but functional” beliefs. Although Turner
believes that nature is teleological (and we will examine in
a moment Turner’s connection of the sense of beauty to a
belief in natural teleology), this part of his argument does
not seem to hinge on the truth of this proposition:
Concede even that beauty, value, meaning, freedom,
planning for the future, teleology, soul, etc,
were indeed complete nonsense; nevertheless for a
species to operate as if they were real--by
nurturing its young, self-sacrifice, ritual
celebration and the like--such a species would be
at a competitive advantage with others. But that
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concession is now a purely metaphysical one, with
no practical or scientific relevance. Those
“abstractions” will have become laws of nature.
Good hard empirical science would tell us that of
course the universe is full of value and purpose.
If values are for animals as functional as teeth,
that does not make the values any the less values
than it makes teeth any the less teeth. Only if we
let the likes of Kant dictate our definition of
value--as essentially unlike teeth--is there a
problem: but it may be that Kant’s values never
existed anyway, and the word value would be more
useful applied to something that does exist. If
values necessarily evolve in the struggle for
survival, belief in the meaninglessness and
valuelessness and directionlessness of the
universe is an act of purely religious faith,
maintained in the face of the cold hard facts of
meaning, design, love, progress and beauty. The
austere and faithful dialectical materialist, in
his sackcloth and ashes, could then say with the
mystic “Credo quia absurdus est”--I believe
because it is absurd. (“Transcending” 231)
This argument is a central one in his aesthetic theory-demonstrating as it does the link between Turner’s factual
and normative claims--and therefore calls for some
untangling.
Although it is a question still debated by
epistemologists and philosophers of science, the assumption
that there is no such thing as a value-free fact is one we
may grant Turner (despite his vociferous objections
elsewhere to the “politicization” of science). This
assumption, however, does not free Turner from the
responsibility for explaining, in a work presumably intended
to persuade others to embrace his aesthetic values, the
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connection between values and observations almost
universally accepted to be factual assertions. He does not
disarm us by admitting up front that he is collapsing the
fact/value distinction, nor does he free himself from the
responsibility for logical argument by appealing to the
authority of “serious philosophy” that he believes collapses
this distinction.15
But, again, Turner is not only arguing that his view of
the universe as teleological is true but that such a belief
is useful. This is a questionable assumption; one could
easily image a species with no sense of cosmic destiny whose
members still cared for their young, engaged in ritual, were
sometimes self-sacrificing--in fact displayed at least as
many qualities contributing to the continuity of the species
as a species that did believe in cosmic purpose.
Although Turner’s notion that the “central trend” of
the universe is self-organization is factually false, and
his derivation of an ethics from this trend (even if it were
true) fallacious, his aesthetic might still stand simply on
what seems to be Turner’s central value, as illustrated by

15

Although it is almost certainly true that all normative philosophies
(except those whose authors admit that their founding assumptions are
ultimately ungroundable) do collapse the fact/value distinction,
arguably almost all of these do so not by providing a compelling
argument about the nature of this distinction but by making unwitting
(or rhetorically justified) leaps in logic. That great philosophers have
violated Hume’s law is no refutation of it.

172

his discussion of the functionality of belief: the survival
and “evolution” of the human species.
If we jettison Turner’s speculation about the antientropic nature of the universe and his derivation of an
ethics from this nature, we are left with a politics and
aesthetics of (evolutionary) progress--one that we will see
is not without its virtues. But before we purge his
aesthetics of its metaphysics, let us take him at his word:
the universe is evolving, and as the most complex,
intelligent, and self-aware (as far as we know) species in
the universe, it is our responsibility to assist the
universe in its surge to increasing complexity. What does
this mean for literature and aesthetics?
In The Culture of Hope, Turner presents five basic
ideas for an “ecopoetics” (an early name for what Turner and
Brett Cooke will later dub biopoetics), a poetics that is
informed by ideas about natural classicism, selforganization, progress, and the idea that “beauty is a real
property of things” (221).
Such a poetics will concern itself with
healing: the rejoining of broken wholes, the
reuniting of false dichotomies, the bringing
together of cultural energies vitiated by their
division. Our theory must rejoin artist with
public, beauty with morality, high art with low,
art with craft, passion with intelligence, art
with science, and past with future. (222)
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It is unclear how these imperatives follow from the
rest of Turner’s argument; he does suggest, however, that
the split between the cultural left and the cultural right
is that the left values disorder while the right values
order. The solution, he says is in the middle--the “radical
center.”
So we need a poetics of healing. What will this entail?
First, it must understand “ratio, space and quantity” (222)
and “reconnect with mathematics, geometry, logic, number
theory, and geometry” (222). This will allow us to notice
interesting things such as that Dante’s description of the
cosmos in the Paradiso is similar to recent mathematical
theories of the universe that describe it as “a double
super-sphere, that is a sphere with two centers, each of
which is the periphery of the other” (222).
Second, the new poetics must understand the physical
world, a world that “is full of subtle phase-changes,
turbulences, emergent orders, and self-reflective processes”
(222). Such processes can “act as amazing models and
analogues for artistic creation” (222).
Third, the new poetics must embrace the living world.
We must assimilate the findings of sociobiology and natural
classicism, and also understand the way that DNA “edits,
expresses, and repairs itself” because “literature, music,
and art . . . do exactly the same things” (223).
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Fourth, the new poetics must understand the human
world--that is, understand that the history of tradition and
ritual and artistic form is not the history of societally
imposed ideologies, but the history of the different
expressions of innate predispositions (223).
Fifth, the new poetics calls for art that is popular,
but that does not “truckle to the infantile and uncultivated
appetites of the masses” (224). How should it do this? Look
to Shakespeare (224).
Sixth, the new poetics should avoid imposing modern
moral values on the past (224). This could result in
“important” historical literature.
Finally, the new poetics should assimilate our
knowledge about the spiritual universe. The world can be
seen as “both the fetal body of a divine being, and as a
sort of theater in which its story will play itself out”
(225), and “the very nature of the good, the beautiful and
the true is still being worked out, created, and unfolded”
(225).
These suggestions are mostly fairly reasonable--even if
they do not necessarily follow logically from Turner’s
broader argument. Literature and theory should understand
science and history--and if science and history were as
Turner sees them, then it would be reasonable for literature
and theory to see them this way.
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But they do not follow from the broader argument;
moreover, they are so vague or commonsensical as to provide
very little guidance: understand science and history, obey
natural classical conventions, be popular and good--like
Shakespeare. What does this have to do with evolution or
self-organization?
Turner actually provides very little in the way of
guidance as to how his ideas that the universe is selforganizing and evolving, and that humans should share the
universe’s “goals,” should affect literary or critical
practice--particularly in terms of form.
In terms of theme, however, we can extrapolate that it
means that great literature should celebrate the evolution
of mankind and the universe, and that works that are
thematically anti-evolution are questionable. This
extrapolation seems accurate in that Turner, a fairly
acclaimed poet, does celebrate evolution in his work, and
nowhere more so than in his book-length epic poem Genesis--a
work about the struggle to terraform (make Earth-like,
presumably for human habitation) the planet Mars.
This work, which follows natural classical guidelines
in its hewing to a traditional narrative and in its use of
iambic pentameter, addresses a theme that Turner has dealt
with elsewhere--most prominently in an essay originally
written for Harper’s magazine about the spiritual reasons
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for terraforming Mars, but also in the Culture of Hope and
in several other essays.
We have already seen Turner’s leap from a belief in the
evolution of the universe to a belief that evolutionary
progress is “good.” It is our responsibility to contribute
to the complexification of the universe, and terraforming
Mars is a grand project to do this--the making of a lifeless
rock into a world full of life.
In Genesis the hero, Chance Van Riebeck, battles
assorted enemies--particularly members of the Ecotheist
movement, which “divides human beings off from the rest of
nature and regards all human interference with nature as an
evil” (Genesis 15). Chance and his followers succeed against
the assorted enemies of life and evolution, and the planet
is eventually terraformed.
The poem is an often moving dramatization of many of
the political and aesthetic positions espoused in Turner’s
critical work--self-organizing systems are beautiful, the
universe is evolving, we have a responsibility to help it
evolve--but aside from these themes, it is difficult to see
how the poem is particularly influenced by an aesthetic of
complexity or evolutionary progress.
Turner’s vision is a grand one, but the grand theory in
which he embeds his ideas of natural classicism results in
an impoverished poetics. What Turner ends up recommending is
177

nothing more than that art thematically celebrate complexity
and evolution. We will examine later the worth of such a
project; for now, let us now simply note the irony of a
critical theory conceived as a corrective to the
politicization of contemporary theory calling for the utter
subservience of art to a particular political agenda.
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Alexander Argyros: Self-Organization,
Complexity, and Literary Theory
Alexander Argyros also attempts to derive normative
political and aesthetic conclusions from chaos theory. In A
Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and
Chaos, Argyros argues that biological and cosmological
evolution are progressive, that chaotic systems are “the
beautiful,” and that the goal of art is to imitate the chaos
of the universe and help it reach higher levels of
complexity.
Argyros bases his argument on some by-now-familiar
assumptions. First, Argyros proposes, without any argument
as to how this could take place, that “literature is an
emergent evolutionary development of Homo Sapiens” (Argyros
196). We have already examined in some detail the claims by
assorted theorists that art in general or literature in
particular is an adaptive behavior--and the rejection of
such theories by most mainstream evolutionary psychologists;
let it suffice to say here that Argyros does not present
even the sorts of feeble arguments that Turner does for how
literature could develop adaptively.
Although he fails to present a plausible evolutionary
story for the origin of literature, he does, like several
theorists working in the evolutionary paradigm, propose a
socially important purpose for literature. According to
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Argyros, “literature is most fruitfully understood as an
activity through which human beings create models of the
possible effects of concrete choices” (197).
Of course, why art would be “most fruitfully
understood” as serving this purpose is unclear if he has not
made an argument for this purpose being literature’s
adaptive origin--and even if he had made such an argument,
he provides no reasons why we should primarily consider
literature as serving this purpose instead of the many other
purposes literature obviously serves.
Although Argyros makes no explicit argument, the tacit
logic here is clear: since literature’s adaptive purpose was
this kind of modeling/prediction, literature should be
judged by how well it achieves this purpose.
Criticism, meanwhile, reduces the various scenarios
generated by literature to “the higher cortical level of
concepts, hypotheses and theories” (207). While literature
“engages the entire brain, from the reptilian stem to the
huge human neocortex,” criticism works only in the
neocortex, translating the experience of literature into
ideas that can be discussed and evaluated.
Criticism completes the work of literature by providing
“hypothesis synthesis” (205), and by making judgments about
the values of specific readings (206). Presumably, the more
“valuable” reading is the one in which the text is seen as
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generating the most useful scenario--“most useful” meaning
“most accurately modeling the world.”
This is obviously a blatant example of the naturalistic
fallacy, but as a stand-alone proposition, the idea that
literature provides counterfactual models of the world--and
that works can be judged by the usefulness or accuracy of
the models they provide--is not the most ridiculous claim
one could make.
In any case, Argyros proceeds with this definition,
embracing along the way Frederick Turner’s notion of
“natural classical” cultural universals. Argyros agrees with
Turner that humans have certain propensities for
creating/appreciating certain themes, forms, and genres.
Argyros believes that great art must employ “natural
classicism” to anchor the otherwise wild and unfruitful
experimentation of art, because “human future projection
cannot be purely free . . . but must, if it is to be as free
as possible, use the entirety of the past as its
springboard” (224).
Art must be “as free as possible” in order to provide a
model of “the trends and patterns that nature has manifested
in the evolution and self-organization of matter and energy”
(224).
This is the crux of Argyros’s argument. Argyros argues
that the best works of literature will be those that are
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“chaotic” and “self-organizing” in form (or which deal with
themes of chaos and self-organization) because the universe
itself is chaotic and self-organizing! Such works will be
better because they will be more accurate models and because
(as we will see), to Argyros, “beautiful” means chaotic,
self-organizing, complex.
To evaluate these claims, we must examine the
underlying assumption behind them: that the universe--along
with life--is evolving toward greater complexity. What can
this mean? We have already seen how there is no clear
evidence of an increase in complexity in nature, or any
mechanism for such progress in the Darwinian model.
And the idea that the universe as a whole is moving
toward greater complexity (less entropy) is an extremely
marginal one: all of the mainstream cosmological theories
describe a universe that began in a low-entropy state and
which is moving toward maximum disorder. Islands of order
may exist in this winding-down universe, but they take place
against a background of increasing disorder.
But there has yet been no evidence to definitively
claim that evolution is not progressive; given a mechanism,
it just might be. And although the universe as a whole may
be increasing in entropy, those islands of order do exist-and persist. How do we explain this?
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Unlike Frederick Turner, who tends to simply claim that
matter becomes more organized, Argyros relies for his
argument on the speculations of Ilya Prigogine, who argues
that in certain systems “far from equilibrium,” order can
spontaneously emerge.
Why is this important? Because it is an apparent
violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states
that in a closed system, entropy always increases (or
remains the same in a reversible system). Entropy is a
rather difficult concept, but it can be roughly defined as
“manifest disorder.” Another way of thinking about entropy
is simply to see increasing entropy as the tendency for
systems to reach more and more likely configurations.
The classic example of this involves air molecules in
an air-tight chamber. Left to themselves, these molecules
will spread out throughout the chamber. Such a distribution
is the most likely distribution of these molecules.
If the air were compressed by a piston, so that it
only occupied the bottom third of the chamber, this would be
an unlikely arrangement of these molecules; if the pressure
were removed, the molecules would spontaneously return to
their most likely configuration. The reverse would never
happen: the molecules would never spontaneously get together
in a third of chamber (actually, this is theoretically
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possible, but the likelihood is vanishingly small). Eggs do
not unscramble themselves, glasses do not unbreak.
The Second Law is perhaps the best established--and
most justified, both theoretically and empirically--of the
physical laws. As Arthur Eddington put it:
The Law that entropy increases--the Second Law of
Thermodynamics--holds, I think, the supreme
position among the laws of Nature. If someone
points out to you that your pet theory of the
universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s
equations--then so much the worse for Maxwell’s
equations. If it is found to be contradicted by
observation--well these experimentalists do bungle
things sometimes. But if your theory is found to
be against the Second Law of Thermodynamics, I can
give you no hope: there is nothing for it but to
collapse in deepest humiliation. (Qtd. in Penrose
154-155)
Nevertheless, there are a few scientists who, disliking
the philosophical consequences of the Second Law, are
devoted to disproving it--or as Stuart Kauffman puts it in
his book Investigations, finding a Fourth Law regarding the
self-organization of certain systems (primarily living
systems).
Kauffman is following in the tradition of Ilya
Prigogine, a Nobel Prize-winning scientist16 who developed a
16

James Horgan, without naming names, indicates that many of
Prigogine’s fellow scientists working in thermodynamics or complexity
studies think that he has “won the Nobel Prize for less cause than any
other recipient” (End 217). Horgan also notes that even those scientists
who admire Prigogine for the work in irreversible thermodynamics that
won him the Nobel Prize think that the philosophical conclusions that
Prigogine draws from his research in far-from-equilibrium systems are
unwarranted.
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theory of dissipative structures, “according to which
patterns are supposed to form when the uniform,
uninteresting ‘thermodynamic branch’ of the system becomes
unstable” (Shalizi).
Very few of Prigogine’s fellow scientists believe that
Prigogine has shown anything like a tendency for open
dissipative systems to order themselves--although pop
sociologists such as Alvin Toffler have been much taken with
the idea. Many of the systems that Prigogine has studied do
in fact appear to become more ordered; the standard
explanation for this is that such systems are importing
order from the larger systems in which they are embedded.
Physicist Roger Penrose provides a lucid explanation in
his popular work The Emperor’s New Mind of the standard
model of importation of order at work: he explains how the
Earth’s biosphere, and the individual life-forms it
comprises, are entropic systems that would fall victim to
entropy if they did not constantly import low-entropy.
Contrary to popular conceptions, we do not really
obtain energy from food and oxygen; except when we are
growing, or putting on weight, the energy in our bodies
remains approximately the same throughout our lives. We take
in energy, but that energy leaves our bodies again, in the
form of heat. What we import is low entropy:
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We take in energy in a low-entropy form (heat,
carbon dioxide, excreta). We do not need to gain
energy from our environment, since energy is
conserved. But we are continually fighting against
the Second Law of thermodynamics. Entropy is not
conserved; it is increasing all the time. To keep
ourselves alive, we need to keep lowering the
entropy that is within ourselves. We do this by
feeding on the low-entropy combination of food and
atmospheric oxygen, combining them within our
bodies, and discarding the energy, that we would
otherwise have gained, in a high-entropy form. In
this way, we can keep the entropy in our bodies
from rising, and we can maintain (and even
increase) our internal organization. (319)
Meanwhile, the Earth as a whole is receiving lowentropy visible light photons and re-radiating high-entropy
infra-red ones. Visible light photons, having a higher
frequency than infra-red photons, individually have higher
energy; the infra-red photons, having less energy, are more
numerous, meaning that this energy has more degrees of
freedom than the incoming energy; it is therefore spread out
over a greater phase space, and the entropy is much
greater.17 (320)
There is little technical work challenging Prigogine’s
conclusions in his popular, non-technical work about
spontaneous order--most scientists do not believe that the
17

Put simply, “phase space” is a conceptual space in which each element
or variable in the system has its own dimension (each element or
dimension is referred to as a “degree of freedom”; that a system has
more degrees of freedom is frequently misunderstood to mean that the
system is somehow more free). Therefore, if we think of graphical
representation of a system in phase space, each state of the system can
be represented by a single point. The trajectory of that point
represents the evolution of the system over time.
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Second Law needs defending, and accept the adequacy of the
standard model--but there are a few very lucid explanations
of the confusion that Prigogine’s and Kauffman’s work can
lead to among non-scientists.
Particularly enlightening is an article by Dorion
Sagan, a paleontologist, and Jessica Whiteside, a magician,
for SWIFT, the journal of the James Randi foundation. Randi,
who is closely allied with the Skeptical Enquirer, is a
magician and perhaps the world’s most famous debunker of
“paranormal” or “supernatural” phenomena: his promise of one
million dollars to the first person to demonstrate any sort
of psychic phenomenon--ESP, telekinesis, precognition--under
laboratory conditions has remained unclaimed for decades. As
a professional skeptic, he also supports research debunking
all sorts of unlikely things, from alien abductions to
perpetual motion machines.
Sagan and Whiteside point out that if Kauffman’s claims
are taken seriously--if he is really arguing that order can
spontaneously emerge in a system considered as a whole--he
is simply mistaken; if this were true, it would be a
refutation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Kauffman has
noted an interesting phenomenon, however, that calls for
explanation:
What Kauffman really means (it seems; he has a
talent for grandiose obfuscation) is that order
(i.e. nonrandom arrangements of matter) can arise
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without natural selection. This is a decent idea
(one attractive to Stephen Jay Gould, long opposed
to the narrow adaptationist view of evolution
which would invent a natural selection survival
story for every attribute of every organism--e.g.,
socially objectionable ones like rape), but
completely mistaken if we accept it at face value.
Order (or better, organization, which suggests a
process more than a state) in physics is never
“for free” but always the result of previous order
or organization, always paid for in the coin of
energy. (4)
Although Gould has spoken favorably of some of
Kauffman’s theories, he has, unsurprisingly, “specifically
repudiated” the suggestion that, as Kauffman believes, life
inexorably becomes more complex because of mathematical laws
(Horgan 136). Unlike Gould, who emphasizes contingency in
evolution, Kauffman is driven by a dissatisfaction with the
“cold and mechanical” notion that life is constructed out of
random variation and selection (Horgan 136).
This unlikely agreement, however, does point out a
fundamental contradiction in biopoeticist thought: if
biological complexity can be built by mechanisms other than
natural selection, as the biopoeticist interpretation of
complexity theory implies, this undermines the assumption
behind their radical evolutionary psychology--that the
existence of every part of an organism can be explained by
an adaptive story.
Physicist Jean Bricmont discusses a confusion similar
to that surrounding Kauffman’s work (the failure to consider
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the larger system in which a “self-organizing” system is
embedded) in the work of Ilya Prigogine. Prigogine argues
that in open systems far from equilibrium, order can
increase, and there is movement away from equilibrium.
Bricmont points out that
This is correct, provided that part of the
environment is more ordered than the system, where
“order” is taken in a technical sense: the system
plus its environment (considered as approximately
isolated) is in a state of low entropy, or is in a
small subset of its total phase space and moves
towards a larger subset of that space. But it is
misleading to suggest that order is created out of
nothing, by rejecting “entropy” in an unspecified
environment. It is not enough to be an “open
system”; the environment must be in a state of low
entropy. While it is correct to say that the
Second Law “applies only to isolated systems”; it
should not be forgotten that most systems can, at
least approximately, be considered as subsystems
of isolated ones, and that, therefore, the Second
Law does imply some constraints even for open
systems. (“Chaos in Science” 32)

Bricmont patiently considers many examples of “selforganization,” explaining how such organization is always
the result of order in the environment. For example, the
Benard instability,18 in which structure seems to emerge
from the introduction of heat to a system (heat is usually a
source of disorder):

18

“A fluid is maintained between two horizontal plates, the lower one
being hotter than the higher one. If the temperature difference is large
enough, rolls will appear” (Bricmont 33).
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But what is needed, of course, is a temperature
difference between two plates. So, if one heats up
from below, one must have some cooling from above.
The cooling acts like a refrigerator, so it
requires some “ordered” source of energy. The more
one heats, the more efficient must be the cooling.
(Bricmont 33)
So what difference does it make if certain systems are
creating order rather than importing it? First of all, the
idea of “order for free” is necessary if one wishes to argue
that there is some sort of trend toward increasing
complexity in the universe--otherwise, the universe as an
isolated system must be seen as “winding down.” Argyros
would have to embrace something like Kauffman’s Fourth Law
to maintain this; and this assumption is necessary for
Argyros to maintain that there is evolutionary progress from
which we can draw normative conclusions.
Second, Argyros believes that this notion of antientropy--with its implication that order is achieved
autonomously--provides some kind of refutation of Laplacian
determinism. This notion is frequently seen in
popularizations of chaos theory and of complexity theory
(Laplace is given quite a drubbing in Gleick’s Chaos and in
Coveney and Highfield’s Arrow of Time and Frontiers of
Complexity) despite the fact that chaotic systems are
assumed to work the way that they do because of determinism.
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This is not to say that determinism in the Laplacian
sense is true; it is possible that “undetermined” events
occur on the quantum level--and that these events could have
an effect on the macro level. Complexity theory, however, is
simply irrelevant to this argument. As physicist Jean
Bricmont puts it, “If we did not know about quantum
mechanics, the recent discoveries about chaos would not
force us to change a single word of what Laplace wrote”
(Science).
But why should Argyros so badly want chaos to provide a
refutation of determinism? Because he believes that free
will and determinism are incompatible--that for there to be
freedom and responsibility in a meaningful sense, some
things, like our choices, must be “undetermined.”19
The philosophical debates over free will and
determinism are ancient, and have become extremely
complicated, so let us focus here on the idea of free will
that Argyros embraces. He appears to believe that we are
determined up to a point, but that “chaos” creates a break
in the causal sequence.

19

Ilya Prigogine’s philosophical speculations about the nature of farfrom-equilibrium systems seem motivated by a similar distaste for the
consequences of determinism. In an interview with John Horgan,
Prigogine maintains that “You cannot on one side believe that you are
part of an automaton and on the other hand believe in humanism” (Qtd. in
Horgan 218).
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To put this in terms of our earlier example: if you
slam on your brakes at the red light, you could have done
otherwise even if all the antecedent conditions were the
same. If it were somehow possible to play this moment back,
we might do something different--because our brain function
is chaotic, and therefore undetermined.
This is very similar to philosophical arguments that
were made in the wake of findings in quantum mechanics that
seemed to imply that some events were undetermined. It was
argued, for example, that although we are determined in our
behavior up to a point, quantum indeterminacy could explain
our free will. Again, we approach the red light. Antecedent
conditions would seem to determine our decision. But no-quantum events might cause some neurons to fire “randomly.”
If we were able to replay the event, quantum effects could
bring about a different decision.
According to this argument, our freedom lies in the
acausal, random events that interrupt an otherwise causal
and deterministic sequence of events.
The flaw in such an argument--proposed by, among
others, philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay “Causality
and Determination”--is its assumption that “undetermined”
equals “freely willed.” As physicist David Deutch puts it,
Replacing deterministic laws of motion by
indeterministic (random) ones would do nothing to
solve the problem of free will. . . .Freedom has
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nothing to do with randomness. We value our free
will as the ability to express, in our actions,
who we as individuals are. Who would value being
random? What we think of as our free actions are
not those that are random or undetermined but
those that are largely determined by who we are,
and what we think, and what is at issue. (Fabric
338)
Erwin Schrodinger--one of the founding architects of
quantum mechanics and devisor of the “Schrodinger’s Cat”
paradox--also saw no logical connection between quantum
indeterminacy and free will (Ruelle 31-32).
There are many conceptions of free will, some
compatible with determinism and some not, but what is clear
is that randomness or lack of determinism has nothing to do
with free will. Even David Hume, who famously proposed that
we could never prove causality but merely note the “constant
conjunction” of some events, argued that our notions of
freedom and responsibility in fact assume determinism (Ayer
126).
To make this a little clearer: when you approach the
red light, your decision is determined by, among other
things, the antecedent state of your brain. You are
responsible for that decision not despite the fact that it
was determined, but because of it. That decision was the
inevitable conclusion of a causal sequence.
If you were forced to alter your decision because of
the flip of a coin, say (and we can think of random firings
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in the brain as “flips of a coin”), you would hardly think
of that decision as being “more free,” or of yourself as
being “more responsible” because of this imposed randomness.
Rather, you would think of yourself as less free.
It may be difficult to understand why the paradoxical
notion of “ultimate” freedom and responsibility--the idea
that our decisions are neither determined nor undetermined,
but arise freely and autonomously--should be of such concern
to anyone other than God (and perhaps Kant); and indeed, to
most scientists, the question of determinism (at least on
the macro level) is a settled one, with no particular
consequences for our everyday notions of freedom and
responsibility.
Nevertheless, Argyros wishes for chaos theory to square
the circle of ultimate freedom and responsibility. Unlike
Frederick Turner, who is savvy enough to admit that complex
systems are only “free” in the sense that their future
states cannot be calculated by any systems simpler than
themselves, Argyros simply assumes that the practical
impossibility of predicting the behavior of complex systems
is itself a refutation of Laplacian determinism, despite the
fact that Laplace himself acknowledged this impossibility.
Argyros insists on conflating “chaotic” with “nondeterministic”; throughout A Blessed Rage for Order he
confuses the epistemological claim that certain systems are
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unpredictable with the ontological claim that such systems
are undetermined. According to Argyros, chaotic systems,
like good art, steer a course between stultifying order and
determinism and complete disorder.

20

The notion that certain kinds of complex systems are
“more free” than others in an ultimate sense (Argyros
insists on reading “having more degrees of freedom” as
“being more free” rather than “having more elements”) is
important for Argyros’s aesthetics and politics: liberal
capitalism is the most free political system, and
experimentation rooted in natural classicism leads to the
most free art, because these forms are “chaotic” and
therefore “free.”
Argyros is refreshingly direct about his political
commitments:
Whether of the teleological or the demystifying
type, academic Marxists tend to agree that
capitalist/technological institutions are
oppressive constraints on the freedom of human
beings. I will conclude this chapter by suggesting
the opposite, that it is precisely a form of
multinational, free-market capitalism whose energy
is channeled productively by a certain amount of
socialist top-down control that is most likely to
foster freedom, justice, community, and individual
happiness in a world that is metastable between
matter dominance and spirit dominance. (329)
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Stephen Kellert points out that Argyros makes a basic mistake when he
claims that chaotic systems are neither deterministic or random, “when
they are both” (Science 232).
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(This last part about “matter dominance” and “spirit
dominance” is a typical bit of ecopoeticist bad faith:
Argyros, like Turner, has a habit not only of viewing the
injustices of today in the light of an unimaginable postmatter eschaton but also of imagining that matter and
scarcity have already lost their pre-eminence in human
life.)
But what, exactly, has all this to do with aesthetics
or literary theory? Argyros has made some highly
questionable--even wrong--assumptions about human nature,
progress, and complexity: he has embraced a radical version
of evolutionary psychology, proposed that biological and
cosmological progress are self-evident, and proposed
complexity theory as the motor of that progress. He has also
proposed that chaotic systems are the most free (without
giving a coherent definition of freedom).
On one level, Argyros is simply arguing that because
the purpose of literature is to generate plausible scenarios
(and we know this is what literature should be because it
evolved to serve this purpose), and because the world is
unpredictable, the speculations of literature should be made
using natural classical rhetorical terms--both to make those
speculations more comprehensible to humans and to ground the
speculation, in order to better model the unpredictable-butnot-completely-disordered world.
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If we ignore the fallacy of equating evolutionary
origin with present function, accept the plausibility of an
unlikely evolutionary psychological model, and accept that
art is most effective when it “goes with the grain” of human
behavioral propensities, this argument is not completely
incoherent.
As a broad general claim, stripped of the unnecessary
and obfuscatory chaos metaphor, the idea that literature
should constitute an arena in which we can play out
scenarios of our future, and that such scenarios are more
useful--more accurate--when they are neither too
conservative and ordered or too radical and disordered makes
some sense. This aesthetic is revealed as somewhat lukewarm
when stripped of the suggestive language of chaos theory,
but the purposes and methods that it suggests for literature
are not unreasonable.
But Argyros is more ambitious than this. His full
aesthetic theory seeks to integrate his ideas about these
purposes and methods with his belief in progress.
One way in which Argyros attempts to construct an
aesthetic from this belief is by defining beauty in terms of
the motors of progress, arguing that “evolution, feedback,
chaos, and ritual . . . combine to form a system which is
the beautiful” (286).
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Why should we think of such systems as beautiful?
Because they are self-organizing, and therefore creative:
when a far-from-equilibrium system makes a “global leap” in
organization, “such events are truly creative--they bring
into existence something that did not previously exist”
(286).
So: beauty is defined as the result of “creative”
processes--“creative” being defined as “producing something
that did not previously exist.” On its face, this seems a
useless formulation: since everything in the universe at any
given moment did not previously exist, doesn’t this
definition simply identify everything as beautiful?
His definition becomes clearer when he explains his
notion of how complex systems operate, proposing that the
beautiful is “the unpredictable and discontinuous emergence
of higher levels of systemic complexity” (287).
The “unpredictable” we can grant him (no real-world
system is utterly predictable), but it is that
“discontinuous” that is essential to this argument--and this
word is totally wrong in this context. To reiterate a point
we discussed earlier: complex or chaotic systems operate the
way they do because they are deterministic, not because they
are not.
Here the misreading of Laplace becomes important. Not
content to simply say that there are points at which the
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behaviors of certain systems are in a sense harder to
predict (when considered on a specific scale), Argyros wants
to claim that there is an actual break in the causal
sequence.
Like the philosophers who sought freedom in quantum
indeterminacy, Argyros wants to equate “nondeterministic”
with “free.” Argyros goes further, though, equating “free”
with “creative.”
We have already seen the problems involved in trying to
salvage a meaningful sense of absolute freedom from
indeterminacy; but perhaps he means to simply define
“creative” as nondeterministic, without any complicating
talk of “freedom.” This would only make sense, of course, if
there were some reason to think that the systems he
describes as beautiful are nondeterministic (or even somehow
less deterministic than other systems). There isn’t.
Proceeding with this incoherent definition of beauty,
Argyros goes on to make a completely nonsensical claim:
When we read a work of literature that we are
tempted to describe as beautiful, I suspect that,
at the very least, the work is a self-similar
system, displaying similar patterns at different
levels of description, and that it functions as a
nonlinear, dynamical system able to occasion
global leaps of organization in the reader’s mind.
(287)
Even if we grant him the metaphor of literature as
bringing about “global leaps of organization” (reminiscent
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of a silly speculation by Turner about works of literature
being strange attractors), this assertion makes no sense. If
Argyros is claiming that works of literature are literally
self-similar, as fractals are--displaying the same pattern
on several scales--it is simply wrong. If he means fractallike--displaying patterns that seem somewhat similar on
several levels--it is difficult to imagine what would not
fit this description.21
These tenets--there are “natural classical” forms that
must be used if art is to be understood most widely; art
must be “chaotic” both because creativity inheres in chaotic
processes and because the world, about which art
hypothesizes, is chaotic--are ultimately subordinate to
Argyros’s primary idea, however: that there is progress.
What does Argyros mean by this? Much like Frederick
Turner, Argyros believes that there is a trend throughout
the universe toward greater complexity. He bases this belief
on the “obvious” increases in complexity in the Earth’s
biosphere (we have already examined the flaws in such
reasoning) and on the speculations of Paul Davies, the
author of such popular science books as God and the New

21

This argument is quite similar to one cited by Eugene Eoyang as one
of the more egregious misuses of chaos theory in literary studies:
“’Humpty-Dumpty’ displays fractal self-similarity because it
rhymes”(Qtd. in Kellert, “Science” 218)
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Physics, that the cosmos is becoming more ordered rather
than less. Argyros puts it this way:
If by history we mean something like the
history of Homo sapiens, the evolutionary history
of biological organisms, or the history of the
entire cosmos, then certain long-standing trends
are inescapable. One of these is the selforganization of the universe into increasingly
complex entities. (214)
If Davies--along with Argyros--means that the universe
is increasing in average or total complexity, this is an
extremely controversial claim, one that is in direct
contradiction to the Second Law. The universe, considered as
a closed system, cannot spontaneously become more ordered.
On the other hand, if he simply means that there will
continue to be pockets--even, in a sense, “eruptions”--of
order in a universe that is as a whole winding down, it is
difficult to see how this could constitute a trend (or, in
Frederick Turner’s words, “the central tendency of the
universe.”)
Let us grant Argyros these two extremely controversial
claims: that life is increasing in complexity and that order
sometimes arises spontaneously in the universe, not from
order being imported into a system but through a real
increase in order, raising the total order of the universe.
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What does this imply for aesthetics and for literature?
To understand Argyros’s aesthetics, we must first understand
his politics.
First, as we have seen, Argyros believes that chaos
provides a direct justification for certain kinds of social
systems:
Ultimately, I believe that chaos offers a bracing
vision of political normativity. If the universe
is, indeed, a society of chaotic, self similar
layers, then it appears that everything in nature,
from prebiotic dissipative systems, to the
ecosystem of a river, to the organization of a
primitive nervous system, to the dynamical flow of
a human brain, to the shape of a kinship group, a
city, a nation, or a world works best when it
resembles a chaotic attractor. (331)
Now, there are a number of problems with this argument,
not least of which is that, as Stephen Kellert points out,
“this antecedent condition is in fact false: the universe is
not made up entirely of ‘chaotic, self-similar layers’”
(“Science” 225).
Moreover, as Kellert also points out, even if the
universe were the way Argyros thinks it is, this would not
necessarily mean that chaotic systems “work well” unless we
assume that the universe selects for systems that by
definition work well (“Science” 225). (Actually, if the
universe were made up entirely of “chaotic, self-similar
layers,” to draw normative conclusions from this would be
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nonsensical--like saying “objects work best when they are
made of matter.”)
Argyros might mean, proposes Kellert, something like
“in the long run, only robust systems will persist,” but he
points out that this “assumes that new systems are not
continually generated” (“Science” 225). We will examine in a
moment a fairly successful attempt to generate a normative
political model from complexity theory that emphasizes the
robustness of complex systems, but Argyros neither provides
any proof that chaotic systems are more robust than other
systems nor explains why such robustness would be valuable.
More important than the argument from chaos, however,
is the argument from progress. That the universe is evolving
toward greater complexity implies, for Argyros, that “our
chief responsibility to the universe” is “to be an
instrument of its introspection and evolution” (115). For
Argyros, evolution is the primary value, and the primary
goal should be to assist this (inevitable?) process.
Literature, in this view, “can be thought of as an
adaptation of Homo Sapiens to facilitate the handing of the
main baton of evolution from the biological or genetic realm
to the cultural realm” (206). This is of course rather
silly, if we are expected to read this as a claim that
literature arose in order to speed up evolution.
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Literature can, nevertheless, contribute to cultural
change, even “evolution.” Argyros argues that it should fill
this role not only because we should do what the universe
wants, but also because our evolutionary future is just
lovely:
Our world is evolving toward a global society. . .
. This world would witness the gradual merging of
knowledge and reality with a concomitant
sharpening of the distinctions among the kinds of
knowledge available to human beings, the
increasing individuation, sexualization, and
information-processing capacity of its inhabitants
through a radically lengthened life-span due to
nanotechnology and some form of computer-neural
interface, the emergence of an immensely complex
global state in which the old nation-state
allegiances are felt to be underpinned less by
metaphysical necessity than by aesthetic choice
(this is like the difference between killing
someone biologically and doing it on stage), the
increasing reverence for art that is at once
classical and experimental, the rehabilitation of
our old bio/noo/sociotemporal roles, such as sex
roles and kinship roles, in a flexible and
ultimately aesthetic manner, and the discovery of
new forms of devotion to the sacred. An
information-centered world could be, to resurrect
an old Puritan idea, the setting for a new Eden.
(328)
Like Turner, Argyros seems to realize that his chaosand-complexity-based arguments for free-market capitalism
are feeble, and feels the need to justify his political
preferences by reference to a future telos--a technological
utopia. Presumably socialism would slow our ascent into the
noosphere.
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As with Frederick Turner’s politics, when stripped of
the metaphysics of inevitable progress, of inexorable
complexification, Argyros’s notion is difficult to challenge
on its own terms. That the inefficiency, injustice, and
ecological destructiveness of capitalism are justified
because of the wealth that the system ultimately provides,
far from being a marginal notion, is a central assumption of
mainstream neoclassical economics.
Although one could challenge this assumption in various
ways, an aesthetics subservient to a politics of “chaotic”
capitalism and “evolutionary” technological progress would
not be the most ridiculous or inhumane aesthetics ever
proposed.
But what, finally, does such an aesthetics amount to?
Argyros explicitly states that he is not arguing “that
painters should devote themselves to painting seahorse tails
and writers to writing great evolutionary epics” (342). In
fact, as natural classicism implies, there are only a few
great aesthetic themes, which are “legitimate cultural
attractors, drawing artists to their basins across cultures
and through time” (342).22

22

This metaphor not only is befuddling, but also provides an example of
a scientific mistake (one of many) that Argyros makes throughout the
book--confusing “attractor” and “basin of attraction.” The basin of
attraction is constituted by all the points that are drawn to an
attractor. To speak of something being drawn to a basin of attraction
makes no sense.
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If this chaotic/progressive aesthetic does not call for
literature to address certain themes, as Frederick Turner’s
does, what concrete proposals does Argyros make?
Very few. Argyros does suggest that “chaotic” art (as
we have seen, very loosely defined as art that has both
structure and “randomness”) will produce more novelty than
other art, and “a society that is able to manufacture more
innovation will be more likely to survive in the long run”
(330).
So literature that is, well, imaginative but anchored
by natural classicism is the best sort of literature because
it will create “controlled novelty” (what writing does
not?), and such “chaotic” art, in addition to being
beautiful because it is the result of a creative process
(again, what isn’t?), is necessary for a chaotic,
evolutionary, self-organizing society--and chaotic, evolving
societies are not only the quickest route to techno-utopia,
but also our “responsibility” as members of an evolving
universe.
Even if we grant Argyros all of his dubious
stipulations and conclusions, his aesthetics is practically
useless--his notion of chaos so broadly defined as to
include almost anything, his one example of “chaotic” form
in literature (the use of natural classicism) seeming to
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reveal nothing more than an idiosyncratic preference for a
certain ratio of “order” to “randomness.”
But we need not grant Argyros all of his assumptions,
and perhaps the most dubious of these are two that he shares
with Frederick Turner--that complexity theory posits
evolutionary progress as a central “trend” or “theme” in the
universe and especially in the development of life, and that
we can draw some normative conclusions about this.
And yet, even if Argyros and Turner cannot logically
connect the findings of complexity theory to their
valorization of complex or self-organizing systems, there is
certainly nothing intrinsically wrong with their defining
“beautiful” as “complex” and finding things that either are
or seem to be self-organizing--embryos, whirlpools,
whatever--beautiful. Such an aesthetic is no more loosely
defined than past theories that aestheticized “life.”
Nor is there anything particularly monstrous about
their politics of human progress to an ultimate Omega Point,
an ultimate ascent of spirit into the noosphere; even if
they are mistaken about the route to such transcendence-liberal capitalism--they would not be the first to
subordinate aesthetics to a teleological politics. If they
desire art that values “evolution” over “justice,” as
Turner’s poem Genesis does, one cannot challenge this
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commitment by questioning their science or their reasoning-one must challenge that politics directly.
The problem here is not that the aesthetics of Argyros
and Turner is based in an a priori reprehensible politics-the problem is that these theorists claim that their
aesthetics are apolitical. Turner constantly bemoans the
fact that feminists and Marxists have politicized art;
Argyros believes that the nature of the universe is
incompatible with poststructuralism (Argyros is a little
confusing, or confused, here; he argues that no particular
political or ethical beliefs flow from poststructuralism,
but also argues that the politics of poststructuralism is
wrong).
But they do not escape politics by redefining beauty;
the literature that their theory values (at least as far as
Turner explains it; Argyros’s aesthetic is, as Raymond
Williams said of Christopher Caudwell, not even specific
enough to be wrong) is as crudely subservient to politics as
Socialist Realism. If these authors would simply admit their
political commitments--that they like capitalism and dislike
the whining of losers, that they think a grand technological
future justifies almost any apparent injustice or waste now-their aesthetic would be far more convincing.
Genesis, along with Turner’s other poetry, expresses
this evolutionary ideology far more effectively than does
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the non-fictional work of Turner and Argyros because it does
not rely exclusively on reasoned argument. Reduced to
propositional form the idea that “we should contribute to
the evolution of the universe because the universe evolves”
is ridiculous; in an epic poem, it is an inspiring religious
tenet. The pro-capitalist ideas put forth in Ayn Rand’s
novels are even more bizarre when put into propositional
form, yet generations of otherwise bright adolescents enjoy
her novels and think that they believe in her politics and
ethics (until confronted with the consequences of and selfcontradictory nature of these beliefs).
There are many possible justifications for the
unbridled capitalism advocated by classical liberalism--the
rights-based justifications of Robert Nozick, the
utilitarian justifications of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von
Mises--but while utilitarian justifications are subject to
debate (does unbridled capitalism really lead to greater
happiness than socialism?) and rights-based theories lead to
theoretical edifices as incommensurable as the basic rights
they assume (Nozick’s libertarianism vs. John Rawls’s
welfare liberalism), the notion of progress as a universal
imperative is used by the biopoeticists, as it was by
Herbert Spencer (who believed the evolutionary imperative
trumped all other concerns): to short-circuit political
debate.
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That is to say, one can at least attempt a utilitarian
calculation weighing the wealth and technological prowess
generated by capitalism against the suffering of its victims
(is a more equal, but less wealthy overall, society a
maximally happy one? Is it even true that great income
inequality is necessary for a productive society?), but if
one assumes a priori that progress is a universal
imperative, and what is most desirable is what leads to such
progress, the most rapacious and brutal forms of capitalism
are justified if they can be shown to hasten mankind's
ascent into the noosphere--or, as Neal Stephenson calls it,
"the great global furball."
Alternatives to this mythical valorization of
complexity can be seen other recent works of science fiction
dealing with the terraforming of Mars. If Turner's goal in
the valorization of complexity is to take the politics out
of politics (as he also wants to take it out of aesthetics),
Kim Stanley Robinson, a celebrated science fiction writer
with a PhD in literature (Fredric Jameson was his
dissertation director), in his own three-volume Mars epic,
leaves it in, in all its human complexity. The central
question for Robinson, in the words of one of his
characters, is "Why do we value life more than rock?" But
even this riposte to Turner is not really Robinson's
ultimate message. Robinson doesn't really take a position on
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whether bringing life to Mars or preserving it in its
pristine glory is preferable. These are absolute ethical
principles with which one really cannot argue. What is
important to Robinson is how the question of whether to
terraform Mars is ultimately political--the result of real
struggle over who gets to dispose of resources.
Bruce Sterling, too, provides a fascinating take on the
terraforming issue in his “Shaper/Mechanist” stories
(stories that take place in a milieu of humans radically
altered by technology)--those posthumans involved in the
terraforming of Mars do so because of precepts distilled
from Ilya Prigogine's complexity: they are helping Mars move
up the "Prigoginic levels." Although this commitment to the
terraforming of Mars is the most moving ethical/political
commitment in these works (and virtually identical to
Turner's position), the most thoughtful characters in these
stories think that this ideology is utter nonsense--as does
Sterling, who admits in his preface to a recent edition of
Schismatrix that Prigogine himself thinks shaper/mechanist
ideology a complete misreading of his work.
Robinson's Mars novels reveal the dual errors in
Turner's position: first, in thinking that there is a
tendency in nature toward higher forms, and second, in
believing that if this tendency is the case, man should
therefore emulate it or encourage it.
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But this logical leap is not really an “error” in the
context of Turner’s project, as revealed in his nonfiction
as well as his fiction; he is engaged in myth-making--a
different project from those of Robinson and Sterling, who,
although their focus is more on the conflict of political
visions, are guided by their own political ideologies (among
them a liberal receptiveness to debate).
So these biopoeticists subscribe to marginal science,
and their reasoning from facts to values is wrong--or at
least rather transparently fallacious. They are probably
mistaken about liberal capitalism being more “chaotic” than
other systems, and it is unclear that liberal capitalist
societies will “evolve” faster than others.
Their arguments in favor of their values are either
deceptive or sloppy; and yet, given that all values are
ultimately ungroundable, let us accept the validity of an
aesthetics based on the evolution of humanity and the
cosmos--and a belief that capitalism is the way for
humankind, or at least its social systems, to evolve most
rapidly. If they want pro-evolutionary myths and wish to
judge the quality of a work of literature based on their
perception of how that work contributes to/inhibits
evolution, how do we judge that project?
Even if we accept the premise that evolutionary
progress is the ultimate value, the aesthetics that Argyros
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and Turner construct from this premise is sadly wanting. The
only real guideline they provide is to ask whether the work
is pro-evolution or not.
Contrast this with the sophistication of and lively
debate in Marxist criticism, which also in a sense
subordinates the aesthetic to an ultimate political goal.
From Trotsky’s discussion of whether Shakespeare should be
read to Fredric Jameson’s attempts (following Ernst Bloch)
to find utopian hope in the most right-wing cultural
products, from Lukacs’s endorsement of realism to Brecht’s
championing of modernism, Marxist literary criticism has
realized the difficulty of judging a work by its political
intent or predicted political effect.
Perhaps it is unreasonable to judge these theories by
such standards. Marxist literary theory has existed for over
a century, biopoetics for less than twenty years (if we can
describe E.O. Wilson’s sociobiological speculations about
art in On Human Nature as biopoetics, as Brett Cooke and
Frederick Turner have). Attempts to derive an aesthetic from
evolutionary progress, however, date back at least as far as
Herbert Spencer, and the biopoeticists have not progressed
beyond Spencer’s ideas that art serves to keep our
facilities in shape (much like the “off-line” thinking
described by Cosmides and Tooby), and that progress in art--
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like progress in all things--lies in “heterogeneity”: the
progressive differentiation of forms (“Progress”).
At this time, even the paths of development that have
been sketched out by the “pro-evolution” biopoeticists--more
precise definitions of “pro-evolution” themes and “complex”
literary forms--appear unpromising.
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Conclusion

The biopoetics project--an attempt to depoliticize
literary theory and criticism, to make criticism more
“objective” and “scientific” through an explicit connection
with evolutionary theory (specifically, through an
application of evolutionary psychology and of the idea of
evolution as progressive)--must ultimately be considered a
failure, even on its own terms.
Where it conceives most contemporary literary theory as
impoverished for not considering all of the causes
(especially material causes) of the production of
literature, the biopoeticists present an essentially
monocausal explanation of literary production: literature is
the product of authors, whose identities are completely
determined by biology.
Such an explanation of literary production pales in
comparison to, for example, the application of the
Althusserian concept of overdetermination in the work of
Pierre Macherey and others (a concept that can ultimately
encompass any new ideas from the sciences). Moreover, while
the biopoeticists condemn most literary theorists for
ignorance of or indifference to science, the science that
they place at the center of their theory, evolutionary
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psychology, is, to say the least, immature--and they extend
the hypotheses of this science far beyond the wildest claims
of its practitioners.
While they accuse contemporary theory of “politicizing”
literature, they make “apolitical” claims such as Joseph
Carroll’s that we must understand homosexuality as a
dysfunction if we are to understand works involving
homosexual characters. In fact, there seems to be no method
in the biopoeticists’ novel evolutionary-psychological
hypotheses; all that these hypotheses seem to share is their
happy support for the biopoeticists’ cultural claims.
If their arguments for the greater explanatory power of
their model are weak, the biopoeticists’ normative claims
derived from evolutionary psychology are even more feeble:
those works that employ themes involving “innate” concerns
(reproduction, child care, male aggressiveness and female
coyness) are greater than those that do not; those that
flatter our adaptive and innate cognitive structures (our
desire for a sense of pattern, or our three-second memory
“pulse”) are greater than those that do not.
Even if their evolutionary-psychological claims are all
true, the biopoeticists still fail to provide an explanation
of why such works should be considered better than others.
That works going, as it were, with the grain of human
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cognition rather than against it are the greater ones
requires arguments that they do not provide. The most that
can be asserted from the mere existence of the cognitive
propensities that the biopoeticists identify is that works
that play to these propensities might be more widely
comprehensible than those that do not--and even this
assertion questionably assumes that cultural influence on
the human mind is slight.
When they recognize the inadequacy of mere assertion of
innate tendencies--as Frederick Turner and Alexander Argyros
do--and attempt to root their preference for traditional
forms in a larger argument, the biopoeticists get into even
more trouble. As all the biopoeticists do with evolutionary
psychology, Turner and Argyros root their argument in a
highly questionable scientific claim: evolutionary progress.
They then pronounce such progress good, and construct very
tenuous arguments that certain literary forms and themes are
the product of, and contribute to, that progress.
Elements of biopoetics may one day prove useful as part
of a broadly conceived materialist poetics. Evolutionary
psychology will always be a speculative science; one cannot
test its assertions of adaptive origin. As cognitive science
progresses, however, we will better understand the skills
and weaknesses of the human mind; it may even prove to be
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the case that certain themes have a particular appeal to
humans because of the construction of their brains. Such
findings, combined with an understanding that humans are
embedded in cultures, could perhaps contribute in a modest
way to the discussion of how literature is created and
received.
These areas are properly the domain of cognitive
science alone, however. Although some fine work has been
done by literary theorists applying the still-modest
findings of this science (Mark Turner, for example), this
work is convincing due to the very extent that it does not
rely on evolutionary just-so stories.
The theory of evolution, and especially the theory of
its primary motor, natural selection, deserves consideration
by literary theorists, who should applaud attempts to expand
their critical toolkit. A critical theory that would come to
grips with evolution, however, would do well to ignore the
foundation constructed by the biopoeticists, and seek to
build itself on firmer ground.
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